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Abstract 
Carr, Wylie A., Ph.D., December 2015   Forest and Conservation Sciences 
 
Vulnerable Populations’ Perspectives on Climate Engineering 
 
Chairperson: Dr. Laurie A. Yung 
 
Over the past decade, climate engineering—or the intentional, large-scale manipulation 
of the global environment to reduce or reverse anthropogenic climate change—has garnered 
increasing attention from scientists and policymakers. However, impacts from climate 
engineering will be unevenly distributed. Vulnerable populations already being 
disproportionately impacted by climate change might benefit or be made worse off. As such, 
legislators, members of the public, and academics alike have asserted that vulnerable populations 
deserve to have a say in the research and development of climate engineering technologies and 
the policies that will govern them. These calls have gone largely unfulfilled. The research 
presented in this dissertation was designed to help fill that gap. This project set out to answer two 
main research questions: First, how do vulnerable populations think climate engineering could 
affect them? And second, how could such populations be more effectively involved in future 
research and governance efforts?  
Drawing on 89 in-depth interviews with Solomon Islanders, Kenyans, and Alaska 
Natives, this dissertation examines perspectives from vulnerable populations on social, political, 
and ethical issues related to climate engineering. Specific findings are presented in a series of 
three manuscripts. The First Manuscript focuses on interviewees’ overall perspectives on climate 
engineering. The majority of interviewees across all three sites indicated they were willing to 
consider climate engineering. However, this willingness was both reluctant and conditional. The 
Second Manuscript focuses on ethical aspects of climate engineering and explores interviewee 
assertions that climate engineering could represent an extension of dominant society control over 
vulnerable populations. These findings corroborate ethical research suggesting that members of 
dominant societies need to vigilantly avoid moral corruption and ensure that climate engineering 
does not further erode the self-determination of vulnerable populations. The Third Manuscript 
examines interviewee perspectives on different governance frameworks for climate engineering. 
Quite a few interviewees argued that regional organizations could play a critical role in the 
governance of climate engineering research. A concluding chapter draws out connections 
between the three manuscripts, and suggests directions for policy-making and future research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Introduction 
In 1815 the largest volcanic eruption in recorded history, that of Mount Tambora in 
Indonesia, spewed millions of tons of sulfur dioxide into the upper atmosphere. That sulfur 
dispersed around the planet, combining with atmospheric water vapor and oxygen to form, “a 
global sulfate aerosol veil in the stratosphere, which resulted in pronounced climate 
perturbations” (Oppenheimer, 2003, p. 230). One such perturbation was the Year Without a 
Summer in 1816. Across the Northern Hemisphere, unseasonable cold and unusual precipitation 
patterns triggered widespread crop failure and subsequent famine (Wood, 2014).  
The abnormal weather conditions of 1816 also contributed to the composition of Mary 
Shelley’s literary classic Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus. While staying with friends at 
a villa on the shores of Lake Geneva in Switzerland, Shelley lamented that, “it proved to be a 
wet, ungenial summer, and incessant rain often confined us for days to the house” (Bechtel & 
Beaumont, 2006, p. 1). During their confinement the friends often sat around a fire retelling old 
ghost stories and composing new ones. These fireside discussions prompted Shelley to being 
writing what would eventually become the story of Frankenstein (Phillips, 2006).  
 As Stilgoe et al. (2013, p.1) point out, “Frankenstein has become the preeminent parable 
of technology-out-of-control. … The story reflects societal unease about the tensions between 
innovation and responsibility.” It is not without some irony then, that 200 years after the book’s 
publication scientists and policy-makers are seriously considering mimicking volcanic eruptions 
by injecting sulfates into the upper atmosphere to intentionally modify the global climate. 
Whether attempts to cool the earth, frequently referred to as climate engineering, represent the 
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ultimate Promethean plan for human domination of the planet, or simply our last hope of 
avoiding irreversible and catastrophic climate change remains a point of active debate (Hamilton, 
2013). However, there is little question at this point that climate engineering will play a 
pronounced role in future discussions about how we as a species respond to climate change.  
This dissertation is intended to examine emerging social, political, and ethical issues 
surrounding climate engineering. More specifically, the research presented in this document was 
designed to bring new perspectives into conversations about climate engineering research and 
governance—perspectives from vulnerable populations that have so far been largely absent. The 
remainder of this chapter lays some groundwork for the presentation of those findings, beginning 
with an extended definition of the term climate engineering and examination of some of the 
techniques currently being proposed under that moniker. This chapter then examines how 
climate engineering came to occupy a noticeable role in contemporary discussions around 
climate change solutions, and why numerous commentators from a variety of disciplines have 
expressed a need to broaden those discussions to include more diverse perspectives. The chapter 
concludes with a preview of the research presented in this dissertation and how it attempts to 
help fill existing gaps in the social science, ethics, and governance literature on this topic. 
 
Climate Engineering: A Definition & Brief History 
Climate engineering is commonly defined as the intentional, large-scale manipulation of 
the global environment with the primary intention of reducing or reversing anthropogenic 
climate change (Royal Society, 2009). According to David Keith (2000), one of the preeminent 
research scientists in the field, “Scale and intent play central roles in the definition. For an action 
to be [climate engineering], the environmental change must be the primary goal rather than a side 
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effect and the intent and effect of the manipulation must be large in scale, e.g. continental to 
global” (p. 247). Keith goes on to provide two counter-examples to demonstrate what does not 
count as climate engineering under the given definition. Ornamental gardening in which humans 
intentionally manipulate an environment to suit their desires provides an example of intent 
without scale. Anthropogenic climate change, on the other hand provides an example of human 
manipulation at large scales, but without intent, as the goal of fossil fuel combustion is energy 
provision, not climate alteration.  
Other terms that refer to the same general concept include intentional climate change 
(Jamieson, 1996), climate remediation (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), climate intervention 
(National Research Council, 2015), and geoengineering (Keith, 2000). Climate engineering is the 
term used throughout this dissertation because social science research indicates it is more 
intuitive than geoengineering. More specifically, Mercer et al. (2011) found that members of the 
public in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada were 37% more likely to correctly 
define climate engineering than geoengineering. There is no social science research available to 
date on the ability of members of the public to define other variations of the term. 
Intentional manipulation of weather and climate is not a new idea (see Fleming, 2010 or 
Keith, 2000 for detailed histories). In fact, the first high-level policy assessment of climate 
change as a potential issue of national concern for the United States proposed climate 
engineering as the sole response. Issued in 1965 by then President Johnson’s Science Advisory 
Committee, the report titled Restoring the Quality of Our Environment concludes: 
The climatic changes that may be produced by the increased CO2 content could be 
deleterious from the point of view of human beings. The possibilities of deliberately 
bringing about countervailing climatic changes therefore need to be thoroughly explored. 
A change in the radiation balance in the opposite direction to that which might result 
from the increase of atmospheric CO2 could be produced by raising the albedo, or 
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reflectivity, of the earth. Such a change in albedo could be brought about, for example by 
spreading very small reflecting particles over large oceanic areas. (President’s Science 
Advisory Committee, 1965, p. 127) 
 
The report makes no mention of reducing emissions from fossil fuel combustion to mitigate 
climate change, instead suggesting the primary solution should be the production of 
countervailing climate changes via large scale albedo modification. However, as research and 
awareness of climate change grew in the decades that followed, mitigation took on greater 
importance, while climate engineering came to be considered, “fanciful and a distraction from 
the real task of reducing emissions” (Hamilton, 2013, p. 15). 
All of that changed in 2006 when atmospheric chemist and Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen 
published a controversial editorial essay in the journal Climatic Change titled “Albedo 
enhancement by stratospheric sulfur injections: A contribution to resolve a policy dilemma?” In 
it, Crutzen (2006, p. 216) argued that, “If sizeable reductions in greenhouse gas emissions will 
not happen and temperatures rise rapidly, then climatic engineering, such as presented here, is 
the only option available to rapidly reduce temperature rises and counteract other climatic 
effects.” He went on to state that, “Reductions in CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions are 
clearly the main priorities. However, this is a decades-long process and so far there is little 
reason to be optimistic” (Crutzen, 2006, p. 217). While heavily criticized at the time by other 
climate scientists, Crutzen’s article is largely credited with breaking the taboo on discussing 
climate engineering as a potential response to climate change (Hamilton, 2013). Three years 
later, the failure of the 2009 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen, Denmark to produce a globally 
binding agreement on emissions reductions heightened consideration of climate engineering as a 
potentially necessary response to climate change (Gardiner, 2012).  
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Since then, a number of high level scientific and policy assessments and government 
hearings have focused on the topic. Prominent examples include: major reports by national 
academies of sciences including the U.K. Royal Society (2009) and the U.S. National Research 
Council (2015); joint hearings by science and technology committees in the U.S. House of 
Representatives (2010) and U.K. House of Commons (2010);1 and inclusion of climate 
engineering in the 5th Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC, 2014b). These and other reports have largely concluded that mitigation and adaptation 
remain the preferred responses to climate change. However, they have also stated that given the 
lack of sufficient commitment to both, further research on climate engineering is warranted, and 
a need therefore also exists to develop governance frameworks capable of coordinating and 
regulating climate engineering research. These same sources have also generally advanced calls 
for more inclusive research and governance efforts moving forward—an idea that will be 
explored in greater detail below.  
 
Climate Engineering: Prospective Techniques & Potential Impacts 
Many of the same science and policy assessments mentioned above have also suggested 
that the term climate engineering actually encompasses two different suites of technologies, 
carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM). CDR strategies attempt 
to sequester carbon from the atmosphere through approaches such as afforestation (large-scale 
planting of fast growing trees), ocean fertilization (creating large algae blooms by adding 
                                                 
1 In fact, Congress and Parliament allowed the presentation of testimony, documents and reports from one 
another’s hearings. Low et al. (2013) indicate that this is the first and only known time in history that such 
a joint arrangement between these two legislative bodies has occurred. 
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“limiting nutrients” such as nitrogen and iron), and/or the creation of artificial trees (machines 
that would draw carbon out of the air and store it). These and other examples of CDR can be 
seen in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: 
 
Source: Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 9 
 
 
SRM strategies on the other hand attempt to decrease the amount of solar energy absorbed by the 
earth’s atmosphere by increasing the reflectivity of the earth’s surface, the earth’s atmosphere, 
and/or interplanetary spaces between the earth and the sun. Such approaches include injecting 
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sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere, brightening marine clouds, and placing reflective materials 
into orbit between the earth and the sun. These and other examples of SRM can be seen in Figure 
2 below. 
 
Figure 2: 
 
Source: GAO, 2010, p. 11 
 
 
While CDR approaches raise a number of concerns about potential impacts to human health and 
the environment, SRM techniques are currently considered to be of greater social and ethical 
import for several reasons. First, SRM via sulfate particle injection and marine cloud brightening 
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have been suggested as relatively cheap, effective, and technologically feasible approaches to 
modifying the global climate when compared to traditional mitigation efforts and other climate 
engineering proposals (Keith et al., 2010; Latham et al., 2008; Salter et al., 2008). Therefore, 
these two approaches are receiving the most attention with a number of research efforts—
including climate models, laboratory testing, and preliminary field testing—either proposed or 
already underway. Additionally, these two approaches pose greater risks to the environment and 
human health than most of the proposed CDR techniques in terms of both known and unknown 
side effects. These known and unknown side effects are particularly concerning because they 
will be global in scope and scale. Robock (2008) has suggested 20 reasons why climate 
engineering via SRM might be a bad idea, including global environmental impacts such as 
continuing ocean acidification, ozone depletion, and increased acid deposition. 
 Some of the most significant concerns about SRM though are the anticipated regional 
variations in environmental and human impacts. Climate models suggest that the risks and 
benefits from SRM techniques will be unequally distributed. For instance, several studies 
indicate that sulfate particle injection will disturb African and Asian monsoon patterns more than 
rainfall patterns over North America (see Figure 3 below) (Moreno-Cruz et al., 2012; Rasch et 
al., 2008; Robock et al., 2008). Other models indicate that South American rain forests could 
experience significant decreases in precipitation and primary productivity if marine cloud 
brightening efforts were implemented (Jones et al., 2009).  
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Figure 3: 
 
Potential changes in precipitation patterns during northern hemisphere summers with 
stratospheric sulfate injections (Robock et al., 2008, p. 10) 
 
 
Climate models do suggest that temperature and precipitation perturbations under SRM will be 
less severe than what might be expected with unmitigated climate change. As such, many areas 
could be better off with SRM than they would be under ‘business as usual’ emissions scenarios. 
In addition, one modeling study found that SRM could increase global crop yields in a high 
carbon world (Pongratz et al., 2012). However, regional variations in temperature, precipitation, 
and crop yields under SRM have been a consistent finding of modeling studies to date. As such, 
there is widespread scientific agreement that an intentionally engineered climate will not be the 
same as a pre-industrial climate (Keith et al., 2010), and many of those groups being 
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disproportionately impacted by climate change could also experience the most significant 
changes in an engineered climate for better or worse.  
Illustrating this point, Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012) developed a regionalized model of 
temperature and precipitation changes under double CO2 scenarios versus SRM interventions. 
Their findings, displayed in Figure 4 below, indicate that most regions of the world would 
experience less temperature and precipitation change under SRM.  
 
Figure 4: 
  
Source: Moreno-Cruz et al., 2012, p. 656 
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However, there are several regions that could experience greater precipitation change under 
SRM than climate change. These regions, highlighted by red circles in Figure 4, include 
Northern, Eastern, and Western Africa, and Southeast and Eastern Asia. These areas have 
already been identified as vulnerable to climate change for a variety of reasons including water 
scarcity and food security (IPCC, 2007). According to Moreno-Cruz et al. (2012), these types of 
vulnerabilities could be exacerbated under climate engineering if precipitation losses were not 
compensated for by other means such as improved infrastructure or increased crop yields. 
Further highlighting potential disparities under climate engineering, Ricke et al. (2010) 
found that different regions would likely want to pursue different levels of SRM—particularly 
over time if greenhouse gas concentrations continued to rise. In fact, as indicated in Figure 5, 
Ricke and colleagues found that if SRM technologies were deployed with the goal of simulating 
preindustrial temperature and precipitation patterns as closely as possible, different regions of the 
world would potentially want to pursue mutually exclusive climate engineering scenarios as 
early as 2070. 
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Figure 5: 
 
 
Preferred SRM scenario by region in 2070 (Ricke et al., 2010, p. 539) 
 
 
As can be seen in the above map, the United States, Europe, and most of Asia would want to 
pursue significantly more SRM than India, Southeast Asia, and Western Africa under a high 
carbon future. Based on these findings, Ricke et al. (2010) conclude that:  
Our results demonstrate that not only would ‘optimal’ SRM activities imply different 
things for different regions, but that international negotiations over the amount of SRM 
could become inherently more difficult the longer such activities were used to 
compensate for rising greenhouse gas concentrations . . . serious issues of regionally 
diverse impacts and inter-regional equity may further complicate what is already a very 
challenging problem in risk management and governance. (p. 540) 
 
In other words, SRM has the potential to exacerbate climate change inequalities and 
vulnerabilities as well as differences in economic and political power—all at a global scale. 
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These and other factors inform calls for the inclusion of more geographically and culturally 
diverse perspectives in research and governance efforts, particularly perspectives from those 
most vulnerable to harm from climate engineering. The following section examines those calls in 
greater detail. 
 
Research Justification: The Need to Include Vulnerable Populations  
Nearly all of the high-level scientific and policy assessments of climate engineering 
mentioned above have contained some version of a call for future research and governance 
initiatives to include more diverse perspectives—specifically perspectives from populations 
vulnerable to climate change. For instance, experts testifying in the U.K. House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee hearings on climate engineering asserted that those 
populations already suffering from climate change impacts, with the least say in international 
politics, were also the most sensitive to negative impacts from climate engineering (House of 
Commons, 2010). They went on to state that these vulnerable populations, many of whom live in 
developing countries in tropical and subtropical areas of the world, deserve to be involved in any 
international debates about climate engineering. Based on this testimony, the resulting report 
from the House of Commons (2010, p. 28) suggests that, “the first challenge for [climate 
engineering] governance is to pursue an international programme of upstream public 
engagement.” The corresponding report on climate engineering from hearings conducted by the 
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science and Technology also suggested a need for, 
“widespread public engagement on a global scale” (Gordon, 2010, p. 3). 
The term public engagement used in both reports can be defined as, “participatory 
processes through which members of the public convey their views, concerns, and 
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recommendations about emergent technologies and related decision-making, with the idea that 
the outcomes will inform both research and policy-making” (Carr et al., 2013, p. 568). Upstream 
public engagement is fundamentally about including people that may be impacted by a 
technology in early discussions about the research and development of that technology (Corner 
& Pidgeon, 2010). In other words, there is a normative aspect of calls for broader inclusion in 
climate engineering research and governance—those who might be impacted by a technology 
simply deserve a say in the research and development of that technology (Stirling, 2005).  
This normative justification for including perspectives from vulnerable populations is 
pervasive throughout the climate engineering literature. In addition to the legislative reports 
above, normative calls for inclusion have been issued by ethicists (Jamieson, 1996; Preston, 
2012; Whyte, 2012a), social scientists (Carr et al., 2013; Corner & Pidgeon, 2010; Macnaghten 
& Szerszynski, 2013), political scientists (Blackstock & Long, 2010; Lin, forthcoming), and 
even members of the public participating in upstream engagement exercises in the United 
Kingdom (Ipsos-MORI, 2010). Dale Jamieson (1996), in one of the first ethical examinations of 
climate engineering, succinctly summarized this argument, stating: 
A decision to undertake ICC would likely be made by the same people who are causing 
inadvertent climate change and have reaped most of the benefits from fossil-fuel driven 
industrialization: people in rich countries and their political, social, and economic leaders. 
But if the world belongs to anyone, it belongs to the poor as much as to the rich, and no 
decision to go forward with ICC could be morally acceptable that did not in some way 
represent all of the people of the world (Jamieson, 1994). Even if people in poor 
countries would benefit from ICC, it would still be wrong to change their climate without 
their consent. (p. 329) 
 
As in the above quote, normative justifications for public engagement are based on a recognition 
that vulnerable populations are the least responsible for climate change. At the same time, 
vulnerable populations may also incur harm from climate engineering. In other words, climate 
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engineering could put vulnerable populations in the position of incurring harm from a solution to 
a problem that they did not create in the first place.  
While calls for involving vulnerable populations in climate engineering research and 
governance have often appealed to these types of normative justifications, commentators have 
also suggested substantive justifications for their inclusion. For instance, Preston (2013) suggests 
that including vulnerable populations may result in better science and technologies. 
This call for the inclusion of marginalized voices is not simply a moral call. Such input 
also has the potential to make substantive improvements to the research itself. This is 
especially true for technologies that promise large social impacts in a framework of high 
uncertainty. Including marginalized voices in planning [climate engineering] research 
may not just be good ethics, it may also be good science. (p. 29) 
 
The inclusion of perspectives from vulnerable populations is good science insofar as it opens up 
taken-for-granted assumptions being made by homogenous communities of scientists and 
decision-makers. According to Szerszynski and Galarraga (2013), these assumptions often 
involve the objectives of technologies, appropriate criteria for assessing them, appropriate kinds 
of knowledge for research, and the meaning of public concerns. As such, exclusion of vulnerable 
populations could result in technologies or regulatory policies that unwittingly further endanger 
the lives and livelihoods of those already being the most negatively impacted by climate change. 
Whyte (2012b) stresses that it is not just negative physical impacts at stake though. 
Rather, opening up taken-for-granted assumptions is about ensuring that climate engineering 
does not become a vehicle through which dominant societies further extend their control over 
already vulnerable peoples.  
For many Indigenous peoples, SRM represents a particular, global path-dependence for 
responding to climate change that will simply sweep them up before they have had any 
chance to influence or meaningfully consent to various courses of action. Non-Indigenous 
persons push to gain support and fund even early research represents an emerging 
crystallization of a commitment that will give some people greater capacity to impact the 
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climate system. As Ricke et al. (2010) indicate, this is an equity issue; it is also an issue 
of whose capabilities to dominate the environment and other people will be strengthened. 
These issues are political in character for Indigenous peoples. (Whyte, 2012b, p. 175) 
 
Alongside Whyte, Szerszynski et al. (2013) argue that substantive reasons for including 
vulnerable populations in climate engineering research and governance efforts include creating 
opportunities to examine of the type of world that various technologies could bring about, and 
who would benefit or be harmed by them. 
Despite this cacophony of calls for including vulnerable populations in climate 
engineering discussions, there have been a paucity of efforts to actually do so. According to 
Whyte (2012a): 
Indigenous peoples have yet to be addressed responsibly about their possible consenting 
and dissenting views on early SRM research. There is little to no identifiable commitment 
to establish substantive fora or events for Indigenous peoples to engage with others about 
whether such research should be conducted in the first place and, if so, what to research 
and how to conduct empirical inquiries. (p. 65) 
 
Suarez et al. (2013) point out that this lack of engagement is not just a problem for indigenous 
groups, but for most vulnerable populations. Furthermore, Suarez et al. argue that past 
experiences indicate vulnerable populations will not be provided a voice or agency in climate 
engineering decisions unless extraordinary efforts are made to include them. 
 
Dissertation Outline 
As detailed above, numerous commentators have indicated that vulnerable populations 
deserve to have a say in the research and development of climate engineering technologies and 
the policies that will govern them; however, these calls have gone largely unfulfilled. The 
research presented in this dissertation was designed to examine what members of several 
vulnerable populations around the world think about climate engineering, how it could affect 
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them, and how they could be more effectively involved in future research and governance 
efforts. 
Chapter Two provides a detailed account of the methods I used to conduct the research. 
More specifically, Chapter Two explains how I defined vulnerable populations for the purposes 
of this research and utilized that definition to identify three research sites: the Solomon Islands, 
Alaska, and Kenya. Chapter Two also discusses how I chose specific interviewees within those 
sites, and the qualitative interview process used to ask them questions about climate change and 
climate engineering. Chapter Two goes on to describe how I analyzed the results of those 
interviews, and concludes with an assessment of some of the strengths and limitations of the 
methods used in this study.  
Chapter Three contains the first of the three manuscripts, titled “Reluctant but accepting: 
An examination of perspectives on climate engineering from the South Pacific, North American 
Arctic, and Sub-Saharan Africa.” Specific findings presented include the ways that views on 
climate engineering were very much informed by interviewees’ experiences of climate change, 
and particularly their desperation for solutions. Due to their concerns about climate change, the 
majority of interviewees across all three sites indicated they were willing to consider climate 
engineering. However, this willingness to consider was reluctant at best and interviewees often 
expressed numerous concerns about climate engineering, including the potential for negative and 
unanticipated impacts. Because of these concerns, interviewees indicated they would only be 
willing to support future research efforts if certain conditions were met, namely the inclusion of 
more diverse perspectives in decision-making, assurances that climate engineering would not 
diminish mitigation or adaptation efforts, and guarantees that climate engineering would not 
further disempower already vulnerable populations. 
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Chapter Four contains a second manuscript titled, “Skewed vulnerabilities and moral 
corruption in global perspectives on climate engineering.” Building off findings in the First 
Manuscript, the Second Manuscript examines how interviewee perspectives related to and 
advanced existing ethical literature on climate engineering. Drawing primarily on the concept of 
‘skewed vulnerabilities’ as developed by Jamieson (1996), Gardiner (2011), and Preston (2012), 
this manuscript suggests that climate engineering has the potential to exacerbate existing global 
inequalities. However, interviewees also suggested, in line with Whyte (2012a), that climate 
engineering could represent a problematic extension of dominant societies’ control over the 
climates, economies, and cultures of vulnerable populations. This manuscript concludes with an 
exploration of ways in which members of dominant societies may be susceptible to ‘moral 
corruption’ (Gardiner 2011) on climate change and climate engineering. 
Chapter Five contains the third manuscript titled, “Regional Organizations and Climate 
Engineering Governance.” This manuscript focuses on how interviewee perspectives inform 
ongoing debates about the governance of climate engineering. The predominant conclusion 
across the literature to date has been that no existing international governance regime is up to the 
task of governing climate engineering (Blackstock & Ghosh, 2011; Dalby, 2015; Low et al., 
2013). As a result, governance experts have developed a number of suggestions for good 
governance frameworks, with a focus on how inclusive such frameworks should be. Some debate 
remains as to whether governance should be global in nature, or involve a small group of states 
(Lloyd & Oppenheimer 2014; Victor 2008). This manuscript assesses interviewee perspectives 
on different governance options. More specifically, this manuscript examines why interviewees, 
suggested regional organizations should contribute to climate engineering governance. This 
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manuscript concludes with a discussion about regionalism more broadly and potential pros and 
cons of regional governance for climate engineering. 
Chapter Six draws some critical connections across the three manuscripts and indicates 
directions for future research and policy-making. More specifically, the Conclusions Chapter 
suggests that while each manuscript is orientated towards a different body of literature, they also 
build off and inform one another. For example, the First Manuscript introduces and lays the 
conceptual groundwork for key concepts used in the other two manuscripts. Appreciating 
interviewee concerns about climate change, and frustration with current mitigation and 
adaptation efforts, as explored in detail in the First Manuscript, provides a useful context for 
understanding their perspectives on ethical and political aspects of climate engineering. 
Similarly, the ideas of reluctant and conditional acceptance developed in the First Manuscript 
help explain why interviewees preferred certain governance options over others as explored in 
the Third Manuscript.  
The Second Manuscript provides a deeper explanation of the context in which vulnerable 
populations may encounter and respond to climate engineering, which helps to explain why 
interviewees were adamant that climate engineering technologies should be developed in a way 
that empowers vulnerable populations. The extended examination of interviewee concerns about 
climate engineering found the Second Manuscript also helps explain why interviewee were 
adamant that they have a presence and voice in decision-making about climate engineering as 
discussed in the Third Manuscript. Finally, the Third Manuscript puts forward the culminating 
research and policy recommendations that the other two manuscripts lay the groundwork for by 
examining the specific governance frameworks that interviewees discussed and the potential 
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upsides and downsides to those frameworks. Building off these connections, the Conclusions 
Chapter also puts forward several recommendations for future research and policy-making. 
Finally there are several appendices. Appendix A contains a copy of the interview guide 
used in the data collection process. Appendices B-D contain supplemental data to provide 
additional support for the findings and conclusions presented in the three manuscripts. Appendix 
E contains an anonymized list of interviewees quoted in each chapter and the corresponding 
supplemental data.  
Appendices F-I contain reprints of four prior publications I have lead-authored or solo 
authored, all of which are closely related to the research presented in this dissertation. I have 
included these prior publications to provide additional context for the findings and conclusions 
presented in the three manuscripts, as well as to provide a fuller picture of my work on climate 
engineering. Appendix F contains a book chapter that appeared in an edited volume on the ethics 
of SRM. That book chapter examined public concerns about the ethics of SRM as expressed in 
an online survey of members of the public in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. 
Appendix G contains a journal article published in Climatic Change. That article examined the 
context and justification for global public engagement on climate engineering. Appendix H 
contains a magazine article published in an issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. That 
article presented the case for upstream public engagement on climate engineering in the United 
States, and also laid out some opportunities and barriers for successful implementation of such a 
program. Finally, Appendix I contains a book chapter set to appear in an edited volume on the 
ethics, politics, and governance of climate engineering. That book chapter drew on the same data 
presented in the manuscripts below to examine religious aspects of interviewee perceptions of 
climate engineering.  
21 
 
Chapter 2: Methods 
 
Introduction   
As discussed in the previous chapter, there have been numerous calls from governmental 
bodies, various publics, civil society organizations, and the scientific community itself for the 
inclusion of more geographically and culturally diverse perspectives in discussions about climate 
engineering research and governance. However as Cairns (forthcoming, p.4) points out: 
Although there have been some limited attempts to expand the conversation about 
[climate engineering] into different geographical contexts … it is widely recognized that 
debates about [climate engineering] are overwhelmingly taking place in countries in the 
Global North. This is clearly problematic, not least because the impacts of both climate 
change and proposed [climate engineering] interventions would likely disproportionately 
affect countries in the Global South. 
 
In other words, there is a distinct possibility that climate engineering interventions will 
negatively impact some of the same populations who are already being disproportionately 
impacted by climate change. On the flipside of the coin, many of these same populations could 
substantially benefit from climate engineering if various technologies are able to provide a 
means of avoiding deleterious impacts from climate change (Buck, 2012; Suarez et al., 2010). 
This idea that climate engineering could have disproportionate positive or negative impacts on 
certain populations, many of whom are currently absent from science and policy discussions, 
was a major motivating factor for this research project. This research was designed to explore 
two key questions. First, how do vulnerable populations think climate engineering could affect 
them? And second, how could vulnerable populations be more effectively involved in future 
research and governance efforts? This chapter explores how I set about addressing both 
questions through a detailed discussion of data collection and analysis methods.  
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Study Population 
At the broadest level, this study was interested in examining perspectives of ‘vulnerable 
populations.’ While a widely used term in the climate engineering literature (Banerjee, 2010; 
Preston, 2012; Suarez et al., 2013), what exactly is meant by ‘vulnerable populations’ is rarely 
defined. Suarez et al. (2010) offer perhaps the only definition in the climate engineering 
literature to date:  
Vulnerable populations are those with the least physical or political leverage to mitigate 
the carbon emissions driving climate change, and who equally have the lowest adaptive 
capacity to deal with the impacts of climate change … these same vulnerable 
populations—those close to the margin of tolerance for climate variability and change, 
with the least capacity to adapt—are also likely to be those most detrimentally impacted 
by any negative side effects of [climate engineering]. (p. 3) 
 
As this definition suggests, vulnerability to climate engineering is inherently tied to vulnerability 
to climate change. Furthermore, there are numerous reasons certain populations are currently 
vulnerable to climate change and therefore may be vulnerable to climate engineering. 
Vulnerability is a multifaceted affair which includes exposure to physical hazards as well as 
limited ability to adapt, both of which are inseparably linked to social, political, and economic 
factors. Though never made explicit, this framing of vulnerability in relation to climate 
engineering is an extension of existing conceptual frameworks in the climate change literature, 
and more specifically of ‘context-oriented’ vulnerability research. 
Context oriented vulnerability research in the climate change literature has emphasized 
examining not only physical exposure to particular weather and climate related hazards but also 
the broader social and ecological conditions that enable or constrain effective responses (O’Brien 
et al., 2007; Yohe & Tol, 2002). This emphasis on interrelated social and ecological contexts 
recognizes that different groups living in different places with different levels of social, political, 
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and economic capital will experience similar physical hazards in very different ways. Key social, 
political, and economic factors to consider include gender, ethnicity, poverty, access to 
government agencies and decision makers, communal perceptions of risk, and how all of these 
factors relate to one another. Attention to these types of factors can help explain, for instance, 
why the prolonged drought currently plaguing California, (which is affecting food supplies and 
costing the agriculture industry in the state upwards of $1 billion dollars, Howitt et al., 2015), has 
not had nearly the same level of impact as prolonged droughts in the Sahel region of Africa in 
the early 2010’s which created a food crisis for over 7 million people (Rice, 2010).  
In fact, the Sahel region of Africa provides a powerful illustration of several key aspects 
of climate related vulnerability. The Sahel has been identified as one of the most climate 
vulnerable regions of the world due not only to its propensity for drought, but also high rates of 
poverty, population growth, and dependence on subsistence agriculture (Denton, 2002; 
Tschakert, 2007). Poverty in particular is both a cause of vulnerability and exacerbated by 
exposure to climate change impacts. As Leichenko & Silva (2014) detail, poorer individuals and 
communities are more likely to be harmed by climate shocks because they have fewer assets to 
help them recover, are reliant on climate sensitive sectors for food and income, and/or live in 
areas with higher expose to climate risks. Vulnerability researchers have also emphasized that 
vulnerable populations are heterogeneous and that climate change not only affects groups 
differently, but also affects households and individuals differently within vulnerable groups 
(Leichenko & Silva, 2014). Denton (2002) for instance, details how rural women are particularly 
vulnerable to climate change in the Sahel due to higher reliance on subsistence agriculture and 
more polluted sources of water than men. Similarly, ethnicity can also play a role in determining 
individual and/or community vulnerability to climate change impacts. A number of studies have 
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suggested that climate change has already exacerbated ethnic tensions in the Sahel and 
contributed to ethnic marginalization and/or conflict, including in the Darfur region of Sudan 
(UNEP, 2011; USAID, 2014). Analysts are concerned that such tensions and conflicts will only 
become more pronounced in the future as climate impacts continue to worsen (Raleigh, 2010). 
Another key aspect of context oriented vulnerability is attentiveness to the ways in which 
vulnerability is embedded within globalizing processes. According to Adger et al. (2009, p. 150), 
the “vulnerability of specific individuals and communities is not geographically bounded but 
rather is connected at different scales, so that the drivers of their exposure and sensitivity are 
inseparable from large-scale processes of sociocultural change and market integration.” In other 
words, vulnerability to climate change is inexorably linked to economic and political 
marginalization and exploitation resulting from processes such as colonialization, economic and 
military imperialism, and most recently capitalist globalization (Shue, 1992).  
As O’Brien and Lienchenko (2000) discuss, both climate change vulnerability and 
processes of globalization vary across space and social groups. Aspects of this variation in 
relation to climate change vulnerability are discussed above. In relation to globalization though 
O’Brien and Lienchenko (2000) suggest that capitalist globalization has resulted in economic 
marginalization of regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. More specifically, these 
regions have not benefitted from international trade liberalization as they have received little 
foreign direct investment, while simultaneously becoming exposed to fluctuations in global food 
prices. Furthermore, physical impacts from climate change are already being generated or at least 
exacerbated by economic activity related to processes of capitalist globalization. As such, 
physical impacts from climate change are not external to systems of market expansion and 
integration, but rather intensified by them. As a result, certain populations experience “double 
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exposure” to impacts from climate change and globalization (O'Brien & Leichenko, 2000). 
Vulnerability to climate engineering will also be inherently linked to such processes (and as I 
argue in Chapter Four, may represent an extension of them). More specifically, as examined in 
Chapter One, there will likely be winners and losers with climate engineering, as with climate 
change and globalization. Unfortunately, some of the losers with climate engineering may very 
well be the same populations already experiencing negative impacts from both climate change 
and globalization. 
While rarely discussed at length, many of these aspects of vulnerability are implied in the 
existing social science, ethics, and governance literature on climate engineering. For instance, 
while never defining the term, Preston (2012) provides an examination of ways in which climate 
engineering could exacerbate existing global injustices for vulnerable populations. Other studies 
have used terms such as ‘countries in the Global South’ (Cairns, forthcoming; Winickoff et al., 
2015), ‘developing countries’ (Gardiner, 2011), or simply ‘the poor’ (Jamieson, 1996), which 
also indicate that concerns about disproportional impacts from climate engineering are 
inseparable from considerations of current global economic and political arrangements while 
also tied to historic and ongoing imbalances in wealth and power. In line with past studies then, 
this research adopted a contextual framework for defining vulnerable populations as those with 
the least capacity to respond to climate perturbations of any kind—both unintentional (i.e. 
climate change) and intentional (i.e. climate engineering)—due to both their exposure to physical 
hazards and lack of adaptive capacity resulting from past and current political, economic, and 
cultural inequities. 
The following section explains how this conceptual framework of vulnerability was 
operationalized to identify specific research sites and then interviewees therein. However, before 
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transitioning, it is worth noting that the concept of vulnerability has its critics. More specifically, 
commentators have asserted that vulnerability implies a state of powerlessness, while 
overlooking the agency of various groups and actors to interact within existing economic, 
political, and physical circumstances to creatively and powerfully respond to climate related 
challenges (Hewitt, 1995; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). While noting this concern, this study 
utilized the term vulnerable populations because it most accurately conveys the important 
theoretical considerations examined above (e.g. connections between exposure to physical 
hazards and imbalances in wealth and power), and aspects of the specific sample chosen for this 
study that other terms fail to capture, as explored in greater detail below.  
Throughout this dissertation, interviewees speak for themselves regarding the 
opportunities and constraints that they face in exercising agency related to climate engineering 
research and governance (see for instance Chapter Four where certain interviewees indicated a 
sense of powerlessness to affect international policy discussions around greenhouse gas 
mitigation). In fact, as stated above, one of the primary questions this dissertation was designed 
to examine was how can vulnerable populations be more effectively included in future scientific 
research and policy making, and do so on their own terms. All three manuscripts as well as the 
Conclusions Chapter assert that vulnerable populations have critical roles to play in climate 
engineering research and governance for the betterment of prospective technologies, the policies 
that will govern them, and resulting social, political, and economic outcomes. Furthermore, 
Chapter Five offers an extended examination of potentially empowering governance mechanisms 
that interviewees suggested could be extended to climate engineering. In sum, rather than 
insinuating powerlessness, the term vulnerability is used here to draw attention to the complex 
ways in which climate change and climate engineering affect certain populations in differentiated 
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ways while also suggesting ways those same populations can be more effectively engaged in 
future research and governance initiatives.  
 
Study Areas 
In order to transform the above definition of vulnerable populations into a study sample, I 
first identified potential study areas by cross-referencing information about disproportionate 
impacts from climate change with predictions about disproportionate impacts from SRM. More 
specifically drawing on both the social and natural science literature on climate change, I 
generated a list of geographic regions already experiencing serious harms from climate change 
(IPCC, 2007/2014b; U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2009/2014; Global Humanitarian 
Forum, 2009). That list of regions included the Arctic, Sub-Saharan Africa, the South Pacific, 
and South Asia. Identified physical impacts within those regions ranged from sea level rise, to 
desertification, to shifts in vector borne illnesses. Identified social, political, and economic 
considerations included high poverty rates, reliance on subsistence farming, fishing, and hunting, 
lack of representation in national and international forums, and lacking infrastructure. 
I then cross-referenced this list of geographic regions against modeling studies examining 
potential physical impacts from climate engineering. Several modeling studies to date have 
identified geographic regions as potentially being positively or negatively impacted by 
stratospheric aerosol injection, marine cloud brightening, or both, primarily in the form of 
changes in average temperatures and/or changes in precipitation patterns (Moreno-Cruz et al., 
2012; Rasch et al., 2008; Robock et al., 2008). This process indicated that the four broad 
geographic regions previously identified as particularly vulnerable to climate change could 
benefit or be burdened by SRM in varying ways. For each of the identified regions, a brief 
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explanation of climate change impacts and potential impacts from SRM are listed below, along 
with some of the social factors that complicate adaptation and mitigation efforts. These lists are 
intended to be indicative, not exhaustive, regarding potential impacts and social stressors. 
1. North American Arctic 
 Climate change impacts: melting permafrost, retreating sea ice, sea level rise  
o Potential SRM impacts: slowed or reversed sea ice loss, sea level rise, and permafrost 
melting 
 Social factors: inability to easily relocate communities, reliance on subsistence 
hunting and fishing, lack of political power in national and international decision 
making processes 
2. Low-lying Pacific Islands 
 Climate change impacts: sea level rise, salt water encroachment into freshwater 
aquifers 
o Potential SRM impacts: slowed/reversed sea level rise 
 Social factors: entire nations might have to relocate, lacking international political 
power 
3. Sub-Saharan Africa 
  Climate change impacts: precipitation pattern changes, increased drought/flooding 
episodes, crop yield losses 
o Potential SRM impacts: changes in African monsoon, changes in crop productivity 
 Social factors: high poverty rates, lack of food security, high disease rates 
4. South Asia 
 Climate change impacts: decreasing water availability, drops in crop productivity, sea 
level rise 
o Potential SRM impacts: slowed/reversed glacial retreat (stabilizing water supply), 
decreased precipitation (particularly during monsoon season), slowed sea level rise 
 Social factors: regional political unrest, reliance on subsistence agriculture, high 
poverty rates 
Once generated, this list revealed another gap in previous examinations of the relationship 
between climate engineering and vulnerable populations—an almost exclusive focus on 
vulnerable populations in the Global South. In fact, the few existing commentaries have focused 
on either ‘developing countries’ or ‘countries in the Global South’ (Buck, 2012; Jamieson, 1996; 
Preston, 2012; Suarez et al., 2010). As such, most studies have implicitly defined ‘vulnerable 
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populations’ as the populations of countries located in geographic regions vulnerable to climate 
change and potentially climate engineering. Applying a similar focus on the country as the level 
of defining vulnerable populations made sense for this study in three of the four regions 
identified above: the South Pacific, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the country 
level focus was problematic for the fourth region, the Arctic, and specifically the North 
American Arctic as the United States and Canada are not considered particularly vulnerable to 
climate change as nations. However, indigenous populations within both countries have been 
identified as vulnerable. Yupik and Inuit peoples in the northern United States and Canada in 
particular are already experiencing disproportionate impacts from climate change with limited 
adaptive capacity in large part due to past cultural, political, and economic marginalization 
(Cameron, 2012; U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014). By focusing primarily on the 
country level, previous studies had largely overlooked the fact that indigenous populations 
within wealthy, developed countries in the Global North might also be disproportionately 
vulnerable to climate engineering.  
Deciding to include indigenous populations within developed countries in the Global 
North muddied simple descriptions of the study population (i.e. the study population could not be 
succinctly defined as populations of developing countries or countries in the Global South), but it 
also provided the opportunity for fascinating comparisons that seemed too valuable to disregard 
on account of a straightforward definition of the study population. More specifically, this 
allowed for an assessment of whether or not there were substantial differences in the perspectives 
expressed by interviewees from developing countries and those expressed by interviewees from 
minority populations within developed countries. As detailed in the manuscripts that follow, this 
comparative approach ultimately revealed that vulnerable populations in both the Global North 
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and South may actually share many of the same concerns about climate change and climate 
engineering. Leaving the actual discussion of those similarities and differences for later, the 
point here is simply that this study broke with previous studies focused on vulnerable 
populations in the Global South by including perspectives from vulnerable populations in the 
Global North too. Within the three identified regions in the Global South, this study did follow 
the example of past studies and focus on country level populations (i.e. identifying a particular 
country within the region within which to conduct interviews, as opposed to specific sub-
populations such as pastoralists, certain ethnic groups, etc.). However, in the North American 
Arctic, it was necessary to focus instead on specific sub-populations—indigenous groups in the 
northern United States and Canada.  
Ultimately, the decision about which countries to focus on in the Global South and which 
indigenous groups to focus on in the North-American Arctic was determined in large part 
through collaborations with partner institutions based in each of the target regions. Recognizing 
the diversity of the regions chosen, I utilized existing personal and professional connections to 
identify and contact potential partner institutions that could provide research support in two key 
ways. First, the geographic and cultural diversity of the prospective study sites required partner 
institutions that could help identify potential interviewees and also provide feedback on the study 
plan based on understanding of local cultures, customs, and norms. These types of institutions 
and individuals are sometimes referred to as gatekeepers (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006) who hold 
key positions within communities and whose cooperation can enable access to other community 
members and institutions as well as explicit or tacit endorsement of the research project by their 
affiliation with it. The second reason for partner research institutions was purely logistical. 
Simply traveling to and within each of the prospective sites presented major challenges (i.e. 
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many communities in the Artic and South Pacific are not accessible by road and require either 
boat or plane charters). As such I needed assistance securing transportation and lodging and 
helping to plan the itinerary for my time in each site.  
While establishing relationships with potential partner institutions and preparing a travel 
budget, I realized there was only enough funding to travel to three regions. At that time, another 
group of social scientists was proposing to conduct research in India on perceptions of climate 
engineering. Therefore, in dialogue with committee members, I decided to remove South Asia 
from the prospective site list. There has been so little research on perspectives outside of the 
United States and Europe, we decided it was best to focus on sites that were not, to the best of 
our knowledge, included in similar research projects.  
I eventually established partnerships with The American Museum of Natural History and 
Solomon Islands Community Conservation Program in the Solomon Islands; the Barrow Artic 
Science Consortium in Alaska; and the Olare Orok and Motorogi Trust in Kenya. As such, I 
chose the Solomon Islands as my research site in the South Pacific, Alaska in the North 
American Arctic, and Kenya in Sub-Saharan Africa. While the ability to partner with a local 
institution was the deciding factor in choosing these three sites, they are also locations where 
English is widely spoken. As such, an additional benefit of these three sites was not needing a 
translator to help conduct the interviews.  
Within each of these sites, I worked with my research partners to develop a study plan 
that included conducting 25-30 interviews in a key urban hub and important rural areas. In the 
Solomon Islands, the areas we decided upon were Honiara (the country’s capital and most 
populous city), and small towns and villages in the Western Province of the country (a key 
tourist destination with extensive lagoon systems being threatened by sea level rise and ocean 
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acidification). In Alaska we decided upon Anchorage (the most populous city and home to key 
organizations and institutions related to Alaska Natives including NGOs, Native Corporations, 
and the University of Alaska), and Barrow (the northernmost city in the United States with a 
population of just over 4,000 and a 57% Alaska Native majority). In Kenya the chosen sites 
included Nairobi (the capital of the country and most populous city), the Maasai Mara region 
(key tourist destination and agricultural center for the country), and Mt. Kenya area (key 
agricultural center for the country and headwaters for major river systems). 
 
Study Participants 
Once specific research sites had been chosen, I began to seek out organizations and/or 
individuals within each site active on climate change or closely related issues. Existing social 
science research on climate engineering indicates that while public awareness of climate 
engineering is on the rise, the majority of people in developed nations like the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Canada are not familiar with the concept (Mercer et al., 2011; Ipsos-
MORI, 2010). Therefore I expected that people living in the areas identified above would also 
possess limited prior knowledge of climate engineering. In order to address this issue, the sample 
focused on individuals working on climate change in some capacity or a closely related field 
(such as wildlife conservation, large scale or subsistence agriculture, or ecotourism). Prior to and 
upon arrival in each study site I worked with research partners, internet databases, and area 
phonebooks to assemble a list of potentially relevant government agencies and ministries, NGOs, 
private companies, and universities. These various organizations were then contacted directly by 
phone, email, or in person to determine interest in participating in an interview. Contacts at these 
organizations as well as actual interviewees were also invited to recommend additional 
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interviewees. I then purposively chose additional interviewees from among those 
recommendations. Every attempt was made during this process to ensure diversity within the 
sample in terms of age, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic class, and type and scale of 
involvement with climate change. I sought diversity across these demographic variables to help 
ensure that the sample captured diverse perspectives on climate change, how it should be 
addressed, approaches to national and international politics on climate related issues, and 
ultimately, views on climate engineering. 
In the end 110 individuals participated in 96 interviews across the three study sites (while 
interviews were scheduled as one-on-one, in several instances co-workers or family members 
joined the conversation.) In the Solomon Islands 36 interviews were conducted with 37 
individuals between March 20 and April 18, 2013. Twenty-three of these interviews were 
conducted in Honiara, and an additional 13 in the Western Province. Unfortunately four of the 
interviews were largely inaudible and unable to be transcribed and so were dropped from the 
sample, resulting in 32 interviews with 33 individuals. In Alaska, 26 interviews were conducted 
with 32 Alaska Natives; 12 of those interviews took place in Anchorage and 14 in Barrow, all 
between July 15 and August 9, 2013. Two interviews were removed from the Alaska sample, one 
for inaudibility and one for a later determination that an interviewee did not fit the sample 
criteria. Therefore the final count for Alaska was 24 interviews with 29 individuals. Finally I 
conducted 34 interviews in Kenya with 39 interviewees, including 20 interviews in Nairobi, 10 
interviews in the Maasai Mara region, and the remaining four in the Mt. Kenya area in January, 
2014. One interview had to be dropped from this site due to inaudibility, resulting in 33 usable 
interviews with 38 interviewees. With the removed interviews, the total came to 89 interviews 
with 100 individuals. Removing the inaudible interviews did not change the composition of the 
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sample, nor the overall results of the study. For each removed interview there were other 
interviewees with similar backgrounds (i.e. that worked on climate change in the same or a very 
similar capacity) and perspectives on climate change and climate engineering. In other words, 
the removed interviews did not differ in any meaningful ways from those that were included in 
the final data set. 
Interviewees ranged in age from early twenties to early seventies with a similar range 
across all three sites. Thirteen of 33 interviewees in the Solomon Islands were female, 14 of 29 
interviewees in Alaska were female, and 11 of 38 interviewees in Africa were female. 
Interviewees in all three study sites came from across the public, private, and not-for-profit 
sectors. Interviewees included high-level government officials in charge of research and planning 
climate related policies at national and international levels, staff members of local, national, and 
international NGOs, ecotourism business owners and operators, large-scale agricultural 
operators, local and subsistence farmers and hunters, researchers and graduate students at 
universities, and administrators at regional scientific organizations. 
 This study attempted to capture a range of perspectives by sampling from across three 
very different study sites, and seeking out diversity within those study sites. Interviewees came 
not only from geographically diverse regions, but also dramatically different climates, cultures, 
and social, economic, and political contexts. Furthermore, within each study site, I intentionally 
sought out a range of perspectives by conducting interviews in both rural and urban areas, and 
seeking out interviewees working on climate change in a variety of ways. Finally, I also sought 
out gender and age diversity whenever possible.  
This purposive sampling approach was not intended to provide results that were 
statistically generalizable to any particular population, much less all vulnerable populations. The 
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goal of this study was not to try to determine how perspectives on climate engineering were 
distributed within particular populations. Rather, the sampling principle employed was designed 
to capture a range of different experiences of climate change and responses to climate 
engineering. Patterson and Williams (2002) assert that purposive sampling that intentionally 
seeks out different types of experiences and/or perspectives in relation to the subject of interest 
can provide an in-depth understanding of the topic of interest insofar as the data provides a rich, 
deep, and thorough look at research subjects’ beliefs and perspectives. In this way, 
representativeness is conceived of as a question of how well the findings actually represent the 
subject of interest, rather than statistical generalizability. Science and technology study scholars 
assert that this type of in-depth, highly contextualized approach is particularly appropriate for 
studying perspectives on nascent technologies where prior knowledge is likely to be low (Corner 
et al., 2012). 
In part because the three research sites were so different, I intentionally conducted 
enough interviews within each site to provide a large enough sample that the data from any one 
site could stand on its own. One distinct possibility at the outset of my fieldwork was that the 
perspectives expressed across the three sites would be so different as to preclude meaningful 
comparison. As such, I wanted to have enough data to write about each site separately if 
necessary. I therefore conducted over 25 interviews at each site. Furthermore, while seeking out 
diversity in terms of interviewee backgrounds, I also sought out overlap. More specifically, I 
wanted to be sure I could meaningfully compare perspectives not only across, but also within 
each research site. Therefore, while I sought out interviewees with diverse backgrounds, I also 
interviewed multiple government officials, NGO staff members, and private sector employees in 
each site, as well as multiple individuals from each urban and rural area I visited.  
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As discussed above, the sample focused on individuals working on climate change in 
some capacity or a closely related field. As such, the sample population did differ from the 
general population in each of the three study sites. Interviewees tended to be more educated and 
occupy positions of greater social, political, or economic influence than the ‘average member’ of 
their particular community. Interviewees also tended to have greater exposure to national and 
international discussions about climate change and related issues such as development policy 
and/or wildlife conservation. For example, roughly a third of all interviewees had participated in 
in formal national or international climate science and/or policy discussions prior to being 
interviewed for this study. Interviewees had served as members of the IPCC, had participated as 
official delegates to UNFCCC conferences, and helped to develop national climate change plans.  
It is possible that these characteristics of the sample had an impact on the results of the 
study. More specifically, the ways in which interviewees thought about and discussed climate 
change are potentially different than the way that an ‘average’ member of their communities 
would have done so. As discussed in each of the three manuscripts that follow, quite a few 
interviewees indicated they were frustrated with international attempts to address climate change 
and major emitters for not doing more to reduce their emissions. It is conceivable that 
interviewees who had participated in national and international policy negotiations on climate 
change would feel more cynical about such processes than the average citizen. These and similar 
experiences may have also contributed to a fairly pronounced narrative of vulnerable populations 
having to fight against wealthy, developed nations, and Western science and technology to 
preserve traditional ways of life. As a result, and as awareness of climate engineering grows, 
future studies may reveal different findings among general populations in vulnerable regions 
than reported here.  
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Data Collection 
In order to examine interviewee perspectives on climate engineering I decided to employ 
in-depth interviews to gather qualitative data. This data collection method was chosen in part 
because climate engineering is still a relatively new topic to most people. As Corner et al. (2012, 
p. 454) point out, “[Interviews] can allow much deeper understanding of individuals’ attitudes 
and opinions, and even for topics like [climate engineering], where knowledge is low, interviews 
can allow participants to express opinions and beliefs that a survey would not capture.” In-depth 
interviews, in other words, provided the opportunity for a highly contextualized exploration of 
perceptions of climate engineering, and allowed interviewees to describe their thoughts on the 
overall concept and various aspects of it (including specific technologies, but also social and 
ethical aspects) in their own words (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). The semi-structured format 
also allowed the flexibility to follow up on emergent phenomenon that arose during the 
interviews themselves. The goal was to enable and encourage interviewees to embed their views 
on climate engineering within their own social, cultural, and political expertise, and an interview 
format facilitated that in a way that would not have been possible using survey questionnaires. 
I used a semi-structured interview format consisting of three parts: a series of questions 
about climate change; a short informational film about climate engineering; and finally a series 
of questions about climate engineering. More specifically, the interview process began with a 
series of questions about interviewee perceptions of climate change as well as if/how their work 
related to climate issues. This section of the interview focused on interviewees’ concerns about 
climate change, how their work was currently addressing those concerns (if at all), and what they 
would consider optimal responses to climate change at various scales from the local to the 
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international (see the interview guide in Appendix A for more detail). These initial questions, in 
addition to providing me with critical information for understanding interviewee perspectives on 
climate engineering, were also intended to help the interviewees recognize that I was interested 
in their perspectives and expertise, even if they were not previously familiar with the topic of 
climate engineering. After this series of questions about climate change, interviewees were asked 
whether or not they were familiar with the topic of climate engineering, and if so where/how 
they had heard about it and what they thought about it at this time. 
After this initial series of questions, interviewees were shown a brief film (7:35 minutes 
in length) introducing the topic of climate engineering. The video indicated that scientists had 
begun researching climate engineering as a potential response to climate change, introduced the 
different branches of climate engineering (CDR and SRM), and highlighted two specific SRM 
approaches (marine cloud brightening and sulfate particle injection). The film went on to indicate 
that various techniques were still being developed and potential impacts and side effects were 
uncertain at this time. The film stated that climate engineering raised big social, political, and 
ethical questions including who would be in control, how would we decide, and who should have 
a say? The film indicated that some people have suggested climate engineering could help stave 
off dire consequences from climate change, including climate emergencies, but that we do not 
know if that is true at this time. As such, one of the big questions is whether or not to continue 
doing research on climate engineering, and who should be involved in that research? The film 
went on to say that some people have questioned whether climate engineering distracts us from 
other solutions to climate change. The film concluded by reiterating that research was just 
starting to take place and therefore now was a critical time to start thinking about all the issues 
climate engineering raises and getting people together from around the world to discuss the 
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topic. The film used in the interviews was a modified, preliminary version of a film produced by 
the Climate Media Factory for the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies and used for 
research purposes with permission. The final version of the film entitled “Engineering the 
Climate” can be viewed here: http://www.iass-potsdam.de/researchclusters/sustainable-
interactions-atmospheresiwa/news/climate-engineering-trump-card. 
After viewing the film interviewees were asked for their initial impressions of climate 
engineering, and whether or not they had any questions about the film or the information 
presented therein. They were then asked what they thought about climate engineering as a 
potential response to climate change and if they thought anything about it could be beneficial or 
harmful. Interviewees were asked specifically about several social, political, and ethical 
considerations, such as how they thought decisions about climate engineering should be made, 
who should have a say, and whether or not they thought more research should be conducted on 
the topic. They were then asked a series of questions about ways to potentially improve 
participation in climate engineering research and decision-making. These questions examined 
whether they or other people from their community should be included in research and/or 
decision-making, if they saw any opportunities or barriers to participation, and how they would 
like to see international participation expanded. Finally, interviewees were asked what they 
would like to see happen in the future regarding climate engineering and what they would ask or 
discuss with scientists and decision-makers if given the opportunity.  
The interview guide was composed of open-ended questions with a number of probes and 
follow-up questions designed to encourage depth and detail in responses. This guide, combined 
with a semi-structured approach, again allowed me to explore unique ideas and personal contexts 
that emerged during each individual interview, while also ensuring comparability in so far as all 
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of the major themes of the study were covered in every interview. A semi-structured interview 
approach also allowed for a more conversational flow in the interview process, encouraging 
interviewees to open up and engage with this often unfamiliar topic (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 
2006; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). All of the interviews were digitally recorded and professionally 
transcribed for subsequent analysis. Interviews lasted between 35 and 110 minutes in length. The 
median interview length was 62 minutes and the average length was 64 minutes. 
 
Data Analysis  
I analyzed the qualitative data from this research utilizing an iterative process of 
examining patterns across interviews both within and between the three research sites. I 
conducted this examination while keeping in mind existing theory and academic literature to 
promote dialogue between the findings of this study and the theory and findings from previous 
studies on climate engineering and other emergent and controversial technologies. The first stage 
of this analysis process was to examine each individual interview and relationships therein 
between perspectives on climate change and climate engineering. The goal of this first step was 
to understand the context in which interviewees were encountering and responding to climate 
engineering, with a focus on their experiences and perceptions of climate change. During this 
phase of the analysis I also starting to look for patterns across interviews. This analysis process 
actually began during the interviews themselves with extensive note taking throughout each 
conversation. I also frequently dictated additional thoughts or preliminary analysis into the 
digital recorder or wrote additional notes in my notebooks immediately after interviews. The 
analysis process continued as I returned from the first research trip to the Solomon Islands and 
began receiving transcribed copies of the interviews.  
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All interviews were professionally transcribed verbatim (with some ums and ahs 
removed). I thoroughly proofread each transcript while listening to the accompanying audio to 
check for accuracy. Once ten transcripts from the Solomon Islands had been proofed, I chose 
five interviews that I felt represented diverse perspectives on climate engineering. I read through 
each transcript at least twice to gain a sense of the overall interview, or a feeling for the data in 
its entirety. After these initial read-throughs important themes became apparent and I proceeded 
to highlight key quotes and ideas relating to similar and different perspectives on climate change 
and climate engineering. This highlighting and note taking was originally conducted on hard or 
electronic copies of the transcripts themselves.  
After analyzing these first five interviews from the Solomon Islands, I began coding 
interviews using NVivo 10 software. I created codes that allowed me to easily store data 
according to the overarching themes that I saw across the interviews. These codes were 
organized under a single word or phrase related to the broader theme of the quotes they 
contained. Once I reached ten coded interviews from the Solomon Islands, I revisited each code 
to clarify what I intended for it to capture, and whether or not the data was fulfilling this 
expectation. This examination allowed me to simplify the coding scheme by deleting several 
unnecessary codes, combining several repetitive codes, and ensuring that the codes actually 
contained the appropriate data for each interview. I developed a memo as a part of this code-
cleaning process that explained what I was looking for in each code from that point in the 
analysis forward. This memo was valuable as questions arose in the analysis of the remaining 
interviews about where a given quote belonged. 
Shortly after completing this code revision process and prior to coding all of the 
interviews from the Solomon Islands, I traveled to Alaska to continue data collection. Upon 
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return from that trip I decided to repeat the process described above with five interviews from 
Alaska before completing the coding for the remaining interviews from the Solomon Islands. I 
wanted to see if there were obvious differences in interviewee perspectives between research 
sites. At that point I was already planning my trip to the third research site and if there were 
important differences, I wanted to be aware of them so I could take them into consideration in 
preparing for the final trip. Therefore, I repeated the process of choosing five interviews that I 
felt represented diverse perspectives, read through each transcript at least twice, and began 
noting and highlighting important themes relating to perspectives on climate change and climate 
engineering. I then returned to my initial coding scheme and the related memo to see if the codes 
fit the Alaska data. I made some changes to the scope and content of several codes, but felt that 
overall the codes fit quite well across both research sites. I proceeded to code interviews from 
Alaska and the Solomon Islands as the completed transcripts became available.  
Before finishing coding interviews from Alaska and the Solomon Islands, I traveled to 
Kenya—my final research site. Upon returning from Kenya I chose five diverse interviews, 
asked the transcriptionist to prioritize them, and once they were returned repeated the process 
described above. Again, I modified some codes, but found that the codes were useful 
organizational tools across all three research sites. In other words, I did not find that I needed to 
create site specific coding schemes. Rather one general coding scheme worked well to organize 
quotations from all three sites in relation to both climate change and climate engineering. I 
proceeded to read, analyze, and code the remaining interviews as they became available from the 
transcriptionist.  
During this coding process, the coding memo described above developed into an 
organizational tool where I logged my thoughts on the codes, their contents, and the relationship 
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between excerpts from various interviews. Over time this memo allowed me to revise the coding 
scheme as necessary as it became evident that some codes needed to be divided into sub-
components, whereas other codes were redundant and ultimately combined. This document 
eventually served as an overarching outline of all the study findings and my tentative assessment 
of their relationship to one another and various bodies of literature. Building off this document, I 
began the writing stage, which involved substantial additional analysis of the themes and how 
they related to what has already been studied and written about climate engineering. This phase 
of analysis also served to pare down and focus findings into the most salient results in relation to 
the current state of social, political, and ethical research on climate engineering.  
The analysis process revealed substantial commonalities in perspectives on climate 
change and climate engineering across all three research sites. In fact, the commonalities in 
perspectives across the three sites were more striking than the differences, a somewhat surprising 
finding given the geographic and cultural diversity of the sample. It also became clear during the 
analysis process that many of the commonly held perspectives had direct relevance to ongoing 
discussions about social, ethical, and political aspects of climate engineering. As a result, though 
this study intentionally sought diversity within the sample, all of the manuscripts focus on 
commonalities in perspectives across the three sites, rather than differences within or between 
them. At the same time, the manuscripts also attempt to indicate the complexity and nuance of 
interviewees’ perspectives on the topics being discussed.  
 
Quotation Selection 
The three manuscripts contain data in the form of excerpts from the interviews 
themselves. The data presented is intended to provide evidence for the results drawn from the 
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analysis in each of the manuscripts. As with any qualitative study, only a fraction of the actual 
data can be included in the form of in-text quotations. Utilizing a manuscript model further limits 
the amount of data that can be presented in reporting results as the manuscript chapters have 
been written with target journal word limits in mind. Therefore, I have carefully selected the 
included quotations because they succinctly convey particular ideas. While there were almost 
always numerous quotes that could have been chosen, the examples provided were chosen for 
both concisely, but also insightfully representing a particular perspective. To augment this space 
limitation on in-text quotations, I have also included supplemental quote tables for each 
manuscript in Appendices B-D. The supplemental quote tables in these appendices provide 
further examples of a point or perspective discussed in the manuscripts and often also indicate 
that the perspective was shared across research sites. Along these lines, I have also attempted to 
utilize quotations from a variety of individuals across all three sites both in-text and in the 
supplemental tables to support claims that particular points of view were commonly held across 
the sample. 
All quotations, both in-text and in the supplemental tables, have been anonymized. 
Interviewees were given the option of having our discussion remain anonymous or having their 
real name used in any future publications. The majority of interviewees indicated that they were 
comfortable having their names associated with this study. However, quite a few interviewees 
preferred anonymity. Because several of the communities I visited were small and interviewees 
often shared connections with one another through their work on climate change, I decided to 
remove any identifying information from quotations used in the manuscripts and supplemental 
data tables to help protect the identities of those who preferred anonymity.  
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To anonymize the quotes I utilized a random number generator to assign each 
interviewee a number. That number was combined with a letter indicating the research site where 
the interview took place: S for Solomon Islands, A for Alaska, and K for Kenya. So, for 
example, an interviewee from the Solomon Islands might be denoted as S-07, but that does not 
necessarily mean that individual was the seventh interviewee in that site. In addition to 
supplemental data tables, I have also included tables in Appendix E indicating which 
interviewees were quoted and how often in each of the three manuscripts. 
 
Strengths and Limitations 
There are a number of benefits this qualitative interview method provided for discussing 
an emergent technology like climate engineering. For instance, the method neither assumed nor 
required that interviewees were climate engineering experts; in fact the method did not assume 
any prior knowledge about the topic. The provision of standardized, accessible information 
allowed diverse interviewees to engage in intelligent and insightful discussion regardless of their 
prior exposure to the subject matter.  
However as several recent articles on perceptions of climate engineering have pointed 
out, attempts at eliciting perspectives on emergent technologies that the large majority of people 
are not familiar with presents methodological complications and potential pitfalls (Cairns, 
forthcoming; Corner et al., 2012). One key consideration is the framing of information provided, 
with several studies to date indicating that different framings of climate engineering likely 
influence perceptions.  
For instance, Corner et al. (2011) and Corner and Pidgeon (2015) indicate that framing 
climate engineering technologies as more ‘natural’ or comparing them with natural processes 
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may make people view them more favorably. This consideration is particularly relevant to this 
study as the following images and accompanying language appeared in the film to describe 
sulfate particle injection and marine cloud brightening, two prospective SRM approaches. 
 
Figure 6: 
 
One of these methods would imitate volcanic eruptions. When volcanoes erupt, they put 
particles into the atmosphere. These particles spread around the planet and reflect some 
sunlight back into space. Humans could potentially do the same thing. Using special 
aircraft, we could put particles into the atmosphere, reflect sunlight, and cool the planet. 
 
 
47 
 
Figure 7: 
 
Another technique involves making clouds over the ocean brighter. There are consistently 
clouds over certain, large areas of the ocean. A fleet of special boats could spray salt 
water into these clouds. This would make the clouds brighter and they would reflect more 
sunlight back into space, cooling the planet. 
 
The description of sulfate particle injection as mimicking volcanic eruptions provides a clear 
comparison with natural processes, and while an accurate comparison, could positively bias 
interviewee perspectives. With regards to marine cloud brightening, the imagery and description 
indicate the technique works with or enhances natural processes, again potentially positively 
biasing interviewee perspectives. Evidence exists in the data set both for and against these 
potential biases. For instance one interviewee from Kenya thought that at least one climate 
engineering technique sounded quite natural: 
Q: It sounds like you would be in favor of doing more research on climate engineering? 
 
A: Very much so. That’s why I really wanted to understand. Whatever you explained to 
us, there was nothing artificial. Because when you talked about the clouds, you did not 
say you are introducing an artificial thing to the clouds, you said it is just a matter of 
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increasing the water droplets. That could happen even under a normal situation whereby 
more water evaporates. So I saw them as all natural situations, but you’re just trying to 
speed up processes. 
 
This particular interviewee was a current graduate student in a climate change focused degree 
program at a university in Kenya. She had seen the film, but also heard me give a guest lecture 
on the topic in one of her courses prior to the interview. That is why she refers explicitly to me as 
‘explaining’ marine cloud brightening (this relates to potential information and knowledge biases 
as discussed further below). It is evident in her response that she feels climate engineering 
enhances natural processes, which is at least part of the reason she states she is supportive of 
conducting research on climate engineering. However, this interviewee’s perspective was not 
widely shared on this particular aspect of climate engineering. Of the 28 interviewees who spoke 
explicitly about naturalness, she was the only one to state that she thought climate engineering 
enhanced natural processes. All of the other interviewees felt that climate engineering was 
‘unnatural’ or would negatively impact natural processes. For example, one interviewee from the 
Solomon Islands directly contested the idea that climate engineering mimicked natural volcanic 
eruptions. 
With a volcano, it shoots up all these gasses that are emitted from the earth’s core. Huge 
amounts of gasses. … Do we really know the composition of gasses that are coming out 
of this natural system, the quantities? It’s something that’s naturally emitted, it happens 
and it cools down that part of the world. If we had a plan that tried to mimic that—to me 
it just feels unnatural. I’d trust the volcano. I wouldn’t trust the fumes of a Boeing 737 or 
747 or whatever jet that’s used to seed the atmosphere. Do they have the right 
composition? Do they have the right gases? Would it not further erode the ozone layer? 
These questions, they raise a bit of concern. In the Pacific, we are volcanic islands, and 
there are active volcanoes here. If we were spraying here and a few volcanoes decide to 
emit as well, it could have a double impact. And we’re still active, there are some 
volcanoes that are still active. 
 
Rather than accepting or agreeing with the naturalness framing in the film, this interviewee uses 
the volcanic analogy as a jumping off point to directly challenge the ‘naturalness’ of sulfate 
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particle injection. He indicates that natural processes like volcanic eruptions are highly complex 
and he mistrusts human ability to replicate them without causing more harm. As will be 
discussed in the manuscripts that follow, interviewees discussed a range of reasons for 
supporting the research and development of climate engineering technologies, but viewing them 
as natural or enhancing natural processes was not a common theme. It is difficult to assess how 
much this framing may have led to more generally optimistic views on climate engineering. As a 
specific framing concern however, the idea of climate engineering as akin to natural processes 
was challenged far more often than it was accepted. 
Another potentially problematic framing in relation to climate engineering is what Corner 
et al. (2011, pp. 13-14) call the climate catastrophe framing:  
It is true that the consideration of [climate engineering] techniques is borne out of 
concern that current mitigation and adaptation strategies will not be enough to prevent 
dangerous climate change. It is also true that there is some scope for a large-scale 
technological intervention to act as a rapid response to changes in the climate. But 
presenting [climate engineering] to people as a possible response to a climatic emergency 
is problematic, especially if linked to the need to conduct research at an early stage: It 
provides a very strong framing of necessity, which is likely to have artificially enhanced 
the acceptability of conducting research into these technologies. 
 
The script for the film utilized the following language and imagery as one reason why scientists 
are interested in researching climate engineering: 
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Figure 8: 
 
For the time being, we could still mitigate climate change through aggressive emissions 
reductions. But what if our efforts fail? Could we reach a point where adaptation is no 
longer possible? This could lead to conflicts over fresh water or fertile soil. In such a dire 
situation calls for solutions like climate engineering would grow louder and louder. It 
could be helpful to know if climate engineering would work in a climate emergency and 
what the likely consequences would be. 
 
As Corner et al. (2011) point out this framing could be problematic insofar as it makes climate 
engineering research seem necessary and opposition difficult to justify. There is still debate 
about what constitutes ‘dangerous climate change,’ what potential climate tipping points might 
be, and especially whether or not climate engineering could actually help in such a situation 
should it arise. Therefore, explicitly using the term ‘climate emergency’ as a justification for 
research alongside imagery of a barren Earth could have pushed interviewees to endorse research 
under artificial pretense. Again there is evidence both for and against this potential biasing in the 
interviews themselves. For instance, one interviewee from the Solomon Islands does seem to 
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have been influenced by the film into thinking that climate engineering might be necessary 
because of climate disasters or emergencies. 
Q: What do you think about climate engineering as a potential solution to climate 
change? 
 
A: I guess we have come to a point where human beings are destroying the earth in a 
way. So if there is going to be a solution—if human beings are coming up with a solution 
for it, what have we got to say? We need it. I mean we’re pumping all this whatever into 
the air, then someone else says, ‘Okay, we can reduce that by all these ideas.’ 
 
Q: So that could possibly be beneficial or positive? 
 
A: Yeah. Because we are creating things, so we might as well have a solution to all this 
stuff that we are putting into the air. That’s how I see it. 
 
This interviewee’s statement resonates with Corner et al.’s (2011) concern. She expressed 
downright fear about the prospect of climate engineering in other parts of the interview, 
however, as is evident in the above quote she also indicates a sense of grudging acceptance of the 
need for climate engineering if humans are destroying the earth. On the other end of the 
spectrum, the exchange below with an interviewee from Kenya indicates how she actively 
challenged the idea of climate engineering as an emergency response to climate change. 
Q: One of the things that folks who are researching this right now are wrestling with is 
that no one thinks it’s a standalone solution to climate change. Everyone is researching it 
saying, “This is plan C. Mitigation first, adaptation is already having to happen, and if we 
get into a really bad situation we might consider climate engineering.” And that’s one of 
the justifications for research. If we get to a really severe climate tipping point, people 
will say we should do something like this, and at that point it might at least be better to 
have done research on it and to know the potential consequences. 
 
A: But what kind of tipping point would that be? What kind of scenario are you talking 
about? 
 
Q: That’s exactly the question I was about to pose to you! [laughter] Can you imagine a 
tipping point where the risks of climate engineering seem less or at least acceptable 
compared to the risk we might face from, say, runaway climate change? 
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A: I think it’s quite difficult to determine what that tipping point is. It depends on how 
resilient everything is and how anything can recover from a tipping point. If things can 
recover naturally, it should be done naturally. It would have to be extremely severe. 
 
Q: Some of the ones that people have hypothesized are things like the collapse of a major 
Antarctic ice sheet where we’re looking at severe sea level rise in a relatively short period 
of time, or the collapse of the Greenland ice sheet or the collapse of the Amazon rain 
forest, things like that. 
 
A: But then would any kind of solution or intervention be quick enough to solve that? If 
there’s a collapse of an ice sheet, how do you arrest that? If you see that coming, that’s 
quite difficult. 
 
This interviewee was extremely critical of climate engineering throughout the interview, which 
is part of the reason I pushed pretty hard in this particular exchange to see if there was any 
scenario under which she would consider climate engineering an appropriate response to climate 
change. While clearly maintaining her skepticism throughout this exchange, she also indicates 
that she does not buy the tipping point or climate emergency justification. Unlike this individual, 
most interviewees were willing to consider the potential need for climate engineering, as 
discussed in greater detail in the manuscripts that follow. However, their willingness to consider 
it was rarely explicitly tied to the potential for climate emergencies. Again it is hard to determine 
exactly how this framing may have influenced interviewee perspectives in more subtle respects. 
Overall though, the climate emergency theme was not prominent across the interviews. 
A third potential framing consideration was the comparison of the potential cost of 
various climate engineering proposals. In introducing the two types of climate engineering—
CDR and SRM—the film script contained the following information: 
Scientists think there are a lot of ways we could artificially cool the entire planet. For 
instance, to capture greenhouse gases we could build giant air scrubbers or create large 
algae blooms in the ocean. However, capturing carbon would be an expensive and slow 
way to cool things down. On the other hand, blocking sunlight could cool the planet 
quickly and be relatively inexpensive. For this reason, several methods to block sunlight 
are receiving a lot of attention from scientists and policy makers. 
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Corner et al. (2011) caution against the use of information about comparing costs of various 
climate engineering proposals at this early stage.  
While it is certainly true that different [climate engineering] technologies will have quite 
different costs associated with them, the technologies are currently at such early stages of 
development that cost estimates are indicative at best. This suggests that undue emphasis 
should not be placed on the financial comparability of competing technologies until more 
information is available. (p. 11) 
  
This one mention of relative costs is not likely to present an “undue emphasis” on different costs. 
Furthermore, of the potential framing concerns related to the information presented in the film, 
the cost of any form of climate engineering was frequently questioned and contested by 
interviewees in all three sites, as in the quote from Kenya below.  
Q: Do you have any thoughts or questions? 
 
A: Maybe a small contribution. I think it’s a good idea. It’s workable. But maybe the 
challenge could be the technology. Technology and also the financial aspect of it. 
Something like coming up with the special airplanes and clouds, I think that would take a 
lot of money. Kenya, being a developing country, cannot afford that. But it’s a good idea. 
 
Interviewees frequently challenged the dominant framing of cost in relation to climate 
engineering, stating that the cost would actually probably serve as a barrier for most developing 
countries. 
A final framing consideration relates to the imagery used in the film. According to 
Corner et al. (2011) any depiction of climate engineering technologies should be clearly labeled 
as merely a depiction of a possible technology as the technologies do not exist yet. As the film 
used was animated, I assumed it was clear that all images were artistic impressions and not literal 
depictions of potential technologies. However one particular image appeared to confuse several 
interviewees in the Solomon Islands. The following image was used to depict the potential range 
of climate engineering technologies. 
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Figure 9: 
 
 
Several interviewees interpreted this image to depict the actual relative size of the various 
technologies. For instance one interviewee from the Solomon Islands who was a high-level 
government employee stated the following directly after viewing the film: 
Through climate engineering we will be able to see gigantic size planes and ships and 
infrastructures that would be used. It will be very exciting. I think climate engineering 
will produce or stimulate the human mind to further investigate opportunities and make 
new discoveries. I think it is possible in the future to address, through whatever means, 
some of the issues that are highlighted there. 
 
This interviewee held a Ph.D. and had worked both in the Solomon Islands and internationally 
for over 30 years on environmental issues. The confusion was not due to a lack of scientific 
understanding on his part. Rather, it likely indicates a cultural difference in the use of imagery, 
but also a sense of technological optimism. This confusion in relation to scale was only evident 
in three interviews and was easily discussed and clarified in each case. However, other more 
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subtle impacts of imagery—in particular due to cultural differences and misunderstandings—
may be present in interviewee perspectives. 
This last framing concern leads directly into what is perhaps the most significant 
potential limitation of this study, the fact that these three research trips were my first encounters 
with these three geographically and culturally diverse areas and peoples. I did conduct extensive 
background reading on each site and worked directly with individuals and organizations based in 
each site to help protect against confusion and misunderstanding in relation to the film and 
interview questions. However, it would be naïve to suggest that cultural differences between 
interviewer and interviewee did not affect the results of this study on some level, either through 
interviewee responses or my interpretation and analysis of them. 
As discussed above, due to the nature of the topic, all the interviewees were actively 
working on climate change or a related issue in some capacity at the time of our discussion. This 
meant that, on average, interviewees had relatively high levels of formal education, were fluent 
in English, and held positions of authority within their respective communities. As such, the 
cultural distance between me as the interviewer and the interviewees was not as great as it would 
have been should I have attempted to interview the ‘average’ individual in any of the three sites.  
Despite these considerations and potential limitations, the film and interview method 
utilized in this research also had quite a few strengths that likely helped to offset some of the 
potential biases introduced by the various framings in the film. First, I opened every interview 
with the following statement: 
Thank you for your willingness to talk with me today. I am interviewing people for my 
graduate research on possible solutions to climate change including climate engineering. 
The goal of this research is to better understand what people think about climate 
engineering and to suggest ways that different perspectives can be included in future 
discussions about research and policy. I am not an advocate for or against climate 
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engineering; I am simply interested in learning more about what other people think about 
it. You don’t need to be familiar with climate engineering to answer my questions. I’m 
interested in your opinion because of your experience working on climate change. 
 
This disclaimer was intended to indicate that I was not promoting a particular perspective on 
climate engineering and interested in the interviewee’s perspective on the topic regardless of 
their previous knowledge about it. I also discussed the following disclaimer with every 
interviewee prior to showing the film: 
The video is about 8 minutes long and was produced by a group of researchers to provide 
the public with information about climate engineering. I did not have any input into the 
content of this video and the views being expressed are not my own. I say that because 
you should feel comfortable agreeing or disagreeing with anything in the video – again I 
am not for or against climate engineering, I am simply trying to better understanding 
other peoples’ views on it. We can pause or rewind the video at any time if you would 
like to.  
 
In truth, I did have input into the content of the video, namely the addition of scenes providing 
more detail about sulfate particle injection, the deletion of several parts of scenes that I was 
concerned would bias interviewee responses, and some editing of the translation of the film 
script from German to English. However, this disclaimer was intended to allow interviewees to 
feel comfortable critiquing or disagreeing with anything in the film—from the information 
provided to any opinions or framings they perceived. In addition, in any instance where 
interviewees appeared to be conflating me as the interviewer with either a particular position on 
climate engineering or as an expert on the topic, I would gently remind them I was not a 
proponent or opponent of any aspect of climate engineering, nor an expert on the subject. The 
need for this type of prompt was relatively rare. In fact, I found more often that interviewees 
would ask for my opinion about climate engineering at the end of the interview. This indicated to 
me that the large majority of interviewees did not feel I had advocated for a particular stance or 
perspective. My sense overall both during the interviews themselves and in the subsequent 
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analysis was that these disclaimers and the interview format did provide a comfortable space for 
interviewees to agree or disagree with the film content as well as the broader concept of climate 
engineering.  
The goal of providing a sense of separation between me as the interviewer from 
individuals with a stake in climate engineering was to provide interviewees greater freedom to 
challenge the information, perspectives, and framings in the film. It also provided them the 
ability to question the broader concept of climate engineering at any level from perceived 
foundational premises to the efficacy or impacts of particular approaches. This method was also 
intentionally selected so as not to privilege one particular form of knowledge over others, such as 
the privileging of western scientific knowledge and perspectives over indigenous knowledge and 
perspectives. 
Second, the information provided in the film was not overly scientific or complex. Corner 
et al. (2011) indicate the first public engagement exercise on climate engineering in the United 
Kingdom may have provided overly technical information about climate change and climate 
engineering, leading to confusion among interviewees. They go on to indicate that the goal of 
engagement exercises is not to make members of the public scientists, but rather to indicate the 
value of their own non-technical experiences and expertise. The film used in this investigation 
appears to have provided a solid but basic level of information and appropriate detail, leaving 
interviewees feeling comfortable discussing their perspectives on the topic with very little 
confusion expressed or indicated in their initial responses to climate engineering.  
Interviewees did ask a lot of questions and were quite keen for more detail about how 
various technologies would work and their potential impacts. This indicated the film may have 
erred on the side of simplicity and could have included more information. However, as 
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anticipated, the diversity of interviewee backgrounds, including education levels and formal 
scientific training meant that erring on the side of simplicity was appropriate as it allowed for 
understanding across the sample. 
Third, as researchers from both the fields of science and technology studies and 
international relations, among others, have argued, framing is inherent in discussions about 
science and policy (Stirling, 2005; Kadlec & Friedman, 2007). In other words, no matter how I 
provided information to interviewees about climate engineering, framing would have been a 
concern. Rather than suggesting that researchers avoid any framing then, many scholars have 
asserted that framing can be an effective tool for, “clarifying the range of positions surrounding 
an issue so that citizens can better decide what they want to do” (Kadlec & Friedman 2007, p. 
11). In other words, researchers have the opportunity to develop frames that help open up the 
range of possible responses to an issue and help people effectively navigate them to arrive at 
their own conclusions. If done with awareness and intentionality then, the framing of information 
can create legitimate space for the articulation of diverse concerns, values, moral positions, and 
knowledges in technical and political decision making. This study attempted to frame both the 
information presented to interviewees, as well as the questions they were asked about climate 
engineering in such a way as to create space for them to express diverse opinions and draw on 
different forms of knowledge to do so. As such, this study embraced what both Friedman (2007) 
and Walmsley (2009) refer to as a framing-for-deliberation, as opposed to a framing-to-persuade 
approach.  
Corner et al. (2011) also criticized previous engagement processes for not focusing more 
on social, ethical, and political issues and questions, particularly early in the deliberative 
processes. One strength of the film and subsequent interview questions was an emphasis on these 
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very issues, and ample space for interviewees to discuss them throughout the interview process. 
For instance, the film explicitly raised the following issues and questions: 
We would need to answer a lot of questions before climate engineering could be used 
safely – including big questions about risks and negative side effects. We would also 
need to answer big questions about who would be in control. For instance, who would 
decide whether or not to do climate engineering? The United Nations? Individual 
countries who can afford the technologies? How should we decide who benefits if 
different regions will be impacted in different ways? Our decisions would affect future 
generations too, so should they have a say?  
Obviously, not all the questions about climate engineering are scientific; many are 
social, political, and ethical. With all these issues to consider, is climate engineering just 
too complicated? Should we stop doing research on it now? … Climate engineering could 
affect everyone on the planet, so how can more people be involved in talking about it? 
Does discussing climate engineering distract us from the real problem of climate change? 
… At this time, we don’t know whether climate engineering is a solution to climate 
change. Discussions about science and policy are just starting to take place. So now is an 
important time to start thinking about all these questions, and to start getting people 
together from all over the world to talk about what role climate engineering might play in 
our future. 
 
These themes were followed up on in the interviews with questions like:  
What are your initial thoughts about climate engineering?  
Does climate engineering evoke any emotions for you? 
Does the idea of climate engineering raise any hopes or concerns for you? 
What do you think about climate engineering as a possible response to climate change? 
As the video mentions, if anyone were to do climate engineering, it would affect the 
whole planet. But the harms and benefits of climate engineering would not be even. How 
should uneven impacts be handled? How should we decide who benefits? 
How should decisions about climate engineering be made and who should have a say? 
If climate engineering technologies are developed, who should be in control of them? 
If you could talk with climate engineering researchers, are there any questions you would 
like to ask them? 
 
Asking these types of questions is critical since climate engineering technologies are still in the 
upstream phase of research and development. There is still a lot of uncertainty about what 
technologies will eventually be developed, how they will be used, to what effect, and by whom. 
Several decades of research demonstrates that normative aspects of emergent techno-scientific 
issues are often overlooked by scientists (Wilsdon & Willis, 2004). However, these tend to be the 
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issues of greatest concern to members of the public, particularly those likely to be impacted by 
an emergent technology. Therefore, one of the strengths of this interview and film method was 
encouraging interviewees to think about and discuss these issues. Interviewee responses to these 
questions are also the most interesting and relevant to the current state of climate engineering 
research and governance as we strive to determine how best to include diverse populations 
moving forward. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as the data from the interviews in all three 
manuscripts demonstrates, the combined semi-structured interview and film format enabled 
sophisticated and insightful discussions with 100 individuals from geographically and culturally 
diverse regions of the world. This methodological approach seems to have successfully 
encouraged interviewees to draw on their own experiences and the contexts in which they are 
currently experiencing climate change to assess and discuss climate engineering. As the results 
and discussion sections of all three manuscripts indicate, interviewees actively questioned the 
assumptions and worldviews embedded in the film, the concept of climate engineering more 
broadly, and made novel suggestions for future research and governance. The range of 
interviewee responses and the ways in which interviewees challenged different frames embedded 
in the film indicate that the interview format allowed interviewees to transcend the perspectives 
provided and construct their own nuanced views on the topic. 
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Chapter 3: Reluctant but Accepting: An Examination of Perspectives on 
Climate Engineering from the South Pacific, North American Arctic, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Introduction 
Climate change constitutes one of the greatest humanitarian challenges of our time. The 
Global Humanitarian Forum (GHF, 2009) estimates that over four billion people are currently 
vulnerable to climate change, with 325 million people seriously affected every year. Climate 
change currently results in over 300,000 deaths annually, with that number expected to climb to 
over 500,000 by 2030. Developing countries bear a disproportionate burden. They are home to 
over 98% of severely affected populations, 99% of weather related disaster deaths, and 90% of 
climate related economic costs (GHF, 2009). Regions that have been identified as particularly 
vulnerable to physical impacts from climate change—such as Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Pacific Small Island Developing States—are also home to some of the world’s 
poorest populations with the least capacity to adapt (IPCC, 2014a). Of course, these same 
populations have also contributed the least to the problem in terms of greenhouse gas emissions.  
Disparities exist within wealthy, developed nations too, where indigenous peoples in 
particular tend to be disproportionately impacted by climate change. Native communities in the 
United States for instance already face rapidly changing ecological conditions, which undermine 
indigenous ways of life. Examples include the loss of traditional foods, changing water 
availability, and the prospect of relocation from historic homelands. Most Native populations in 
the United States also face socioeconomic barriers to adaptation such as pervasive poverty, lack 
of health services, and inadequate infrastructure (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2014). 
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Unfortunately for these vulnerable populations in both developed and developing 
countries, impacts from climate change will only worsen in the absence of drastic reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions. While the upcoming United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties in Paris is likely to result in a global 
agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, analysts have already indicated the stated 
commitments are highly unlikely to prevent global warming in excess of 2°C (Boyd et al., 2015). 
In light of insufficient mitigation efforts, some scientists and policy makers have begun 
advocating for serious consideration of climate engineering technologies (Crutzen, 2006; Keith, 
2013; Keith et al., 2010).  
In response to these calls, the National Research Council (NRC) of the U.S. National 
Academy of Sciences recently released two major assessments of climate engineering.2 They 
define climate engineering as, “purposeful actions intended to produce a targeted change in some 
aspect of the climate (e.g., global mean or regional temperature)” (NRC, 2015, p. 2). Each of the 
NRC reports examines one of two categories of climate engineering: carbon dioxide removal 
(CDR) or efforts to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere; and solar radiation 
management (SRM), or efforts to increase the amount of sunlight reflected into space by the 
earth. The reports concluded that while reducing greenhouse gas emissions was by far the best 
                                                 
2 The NRC reports (2015) actually use the term climate intervention to refer to the same general concept. 
Other terms that have been utilized in by various authors in the past include ‘intentional climate change’ 
(Jamieson, 1996), ‘climate remediation’ (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), and most frequently 
‘geoengineering’ (Keith, 2000). I have chosen to use the term climate engineering because it was the term 
used throughout the data collection process and previous social science research indicates it is a more 
intuitive term than geoengineering (Mercer et al., 2011). There is no social science research available on 
other variations of the term. 
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way to prevent dangerous warming, climate engineering techniques did warrant further research 
(NRC, 2015).  
As scientists, policy makers, and the media have begun paying more attention to climate 
engineering, a number of commentators have pointed out that discussions about research and 
policy are taking place almost exclusively in wealthy, developed nations (Preston, 2012; Suarez 
et al., 2013). The fact that large-scale experimentation and/or deployment of certain climate 
engineering technologies would affect everyone on the planet means that there is a need to 
engage with populations outside of wealthy, developed countries, as well as with indigenous 
populations within developed countries (Whyte, 2012a). Vulnerable populations, whose lives 
and livelihoods are already threatened by climate change, potentially have the most to gain or 
lose if climate engineering technologies are developed. On the one hand, climate engineering 
technologies could help reduce climate-induced suffering; while on the other hand vulnerable 
populations have the least capacity to adapt to any negative impacts from climate engineering 
(Suarez et al., 2010).  
As such, social scientists, ethicists, humanitarian and environmental organizations, and 
members of the public have all advocated for the inclusion of more geographically and culturally 
diverse perspectives in future climate engineering research and decision-making (Carr et al., 
2013; Preston, 2012; Whyte, 2012a; Washington Geoengineering Consortium, 2013). For 
example, Suarez et al. (2013, p. 4) have argued, “There is a moral imperative to facilitate 
involving the most vulnerable in decision-making about [climate engineering]. … to help inform 
a more inclusive and nuanced conversation about what can go wrong—and what must go right.” 
Unfortunately, there have been few documented efforts to do so. As Cairns (forthcoming, p. 4) 
points out, “This is clearly problematic, not least because the impacts of both climate change and 
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proposed [climate engineering] interventions would likely disproportionately affect countries in 
the Global South.” The research presented here examines what members of certain vulnerable 
populations think about climate engineering and how their perspectives can inform future 
research and governance efforts. 
More specifically, drawing on 89 in-depth interviews with Solomon Islanders, Kenyans, 
and Alaska Natives, this research examines perspectives on climate engineering from three very 
different regions of the world already experiencing substantial impacts from climate change. One 
of the most striking findings was that many interviewees expressed similar views despite 
considerable geographic and cultural diversity within the sample. These commonalities centered 
around reluctant and conditional acceptance of climate engineering. As detailed below, 
interviewees were only willing to consider climate engineering because of their deep seated 
concerns about current climate change impacts. Furthermore, while interviewees expressed 
support for continuing research on climate engineering, their support was contingent upon 
several conditions being met. 
After reviewing existing social science literature on climate engineering from both 
developed and developing countries, this paper explains the methods utilized to gather and 
analyze the interview data, and then utilizes interview excerpts to explore and explain how the 
concepts of reluctant and conditional acceptance provide a useful analytical tool for 
understanding diverse perspectives on climate engineering. The paper concludes with 
suggestions for how these findings could enhance future social science research and policy-
making on climate engineering. 
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Perspectives from wealthy, developed nations 
While the idea of intentionally modifying the earth’s albedo to reduce impacts from 
climate change dates back to at least the 1960’s (President’s Science Advisory Committee, 
1965), social science research on climate engineering has only entered into the discussion in the 
past six years. This small body of social science has utilized a variety of methodologies including 
quantitative surveys, qualitative interviews, and ‘upstream engagement’ methods (or deliberative 
group exercises such as citizen’s juries and focus groups) to examine perspectives on climate 
engineering (Corner et al., 2012).3 
To date, a handful of surveys have focused on public awareness of and attitudes towards 
climate engineering, primarily in the United States and United Kingdom (Corner et al., 2012). 
Perhaps the most consistent finding across these studies is that public awareness of climate 
engineering is low. Estimates vary, but anywhere from 65-75% of respondents in a number of 
studies indicate that they have never heard of climate engineering, and fewer than 7% claimed to 
know a fair amount or great deal about it (Government Accountability Office, 2011; Mercer et 
al., 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2012; Spence et al., 2010). These studies also found that people are 
generally opposed to climate engineering as a stand-alone solution to climate change and/or are 
much more supportive of mitigation and adaptation efforts (Bellamy & Hulme, 2011; Borick & 
Rabe, 2012; GAO, 2011). Survey respondents have tended to distinguish between different types 
                                                 
3 Referring to a range of methodologies, upstream engagement processes have been increasingly utilized 
over the past two decades to facilitate dialog and deliberation between potentially affected publics, 
scientists, and decision-makers around controversial technologies in early stages of research and 
development (Rogers-Hayden & Pidgeon, 2007; Wilsdon & Willis, 2004). Upstream engagement efforts 
on climate engineering have built off previous work on other issues such as genetically modified foods 
and nanotechnology (Macnaghten et al., 2005; Rogers-Hayden & Pidgeon, 2007). 
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of climate engineering, expressing greater support for carbon dioxide removal than solar 
radiation management (GAO, 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2012).  
Respondents have also distinguished between research and deployment, with much 
greater support for research (GAO, 2011; Mercer et al., 2011). A number of studies have found 
that individuals expressing greater concern about climate change tend to be more supportive of 
climate engineering, while those who are more skeptical of climate change are less supportive 
(Borick & Rabe, 2012; Corner & Pidgeon, 2015; Mercer et al., 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2012). 
Finally, findings have indicated that different ways of framing climate engineering can impact 
public perceptions. For example, framing climate engineering as analogous to natural processes 
(e.g. describing CDR techniques acting like “artificial trees”) appears to garner more support 
than standard scientific language (e.g. describing CDR as involving chemical processes and 
industrial machinery) (Corner & Pidgeon, 2015).  
Several engagement processes conducted in the United Kingdom have utilized 
methodologies such as deliberative focus groups, and complement survey findings by 
highlighting a number of questions and concerns about climate engineering raised by various 
stakeholders and members of the public. These include concerns about the controllability of 
climate engineering technologies, the reversibility of impacts, the uncertainty of potential 
outcomes, potential inequalities in outcomes (specifically impacts on vulnerable populations), 
and inequalities in decision-making (Corner et al., 2013; Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Parkhill & Pidgeon, 
2011).  
According to Bellamy and Lezaun (2015) these public engagement exercises have 
included deliberate attempts by researchers and practitioners to ‘unframe’ climate engineering, or 
present climate engineering not as a concrete, self-evident policy option, but rather as a matter 
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for open debate. Interviews with the scholars and practitioners who helped organize and run 
these engagement processes revealed a concern that science and policy reports, particularly the 
influential Royal Society (2009) report, had imposed a set of assumptions and presuppositions on 
public dialogue that needed to be opened up and challenged to avoid reifying a certain vision of 
what climate engineering is and can do for society. 
 
Perspectives from Vulnerable Populations 
Unfortunately, opportunities for vulnerable populations to learn about and engage with 
climate engineering have been rare. However, recent workshops in Africa and the South Pacific 
have produced summary reports providing some insight into non-Western perspectives on 
climate engineering.  
In 2012 and 2013, the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI), in 
conjunction with the African Academy of Sciences (AAS) hosted three workshops in Dakar, 
Senegal, Boksburg, South Africa, and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (AAS & SRMGI, 2013).4 The 
meetings included over 100 participants from 21 African countries, including academics, 
policymakers, journalists, NGO representatives, and members of the public. A meeting report 
indicated that there was broad support among participants for African involvement in SRM 
research and governance, including public oversight, stakeholder engagement, and capacity 
building. Those present also advocated for increased support for African research and 
emphasized the role the African Union could play in facilitating involvement across the 
continent. The report concluded with a recommendation for, “inclusive international discussion 
                                                 
4 SRMGI has also worked with regional partners to host workshops in Pakistan, India, China, and 
Singapore, however the perspectives discussed at these workshops have not been published to date. 
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of SRM, particularly in developing countries” as, “the more people engage in discussions of the 
technology, and the more that international cooperation is an integral part of the development of 
SRM research governance, the greater the chances that SRM research and governance will be 
handled with humility, wisdom, and prudence” (AAS & SRMGI, 2013, p. 13). 
An event with similar aims was hosted by the Pacific Centre for Environmental and 
Sustained Development and the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies in Fiji in August, 
2013. The workshop included over 300 participants from Pacific Island Countries and Territories 
(PICTs) from government, international and regional organizations, and local NGOs. Beyerl and 
Maas (2014) report that participants generally agreed on several key points: first, mitigation is 
and should remain the top priority; second, there should be further research on climate 
engineering provided further regulation is put into place for that research; and finally, PICTs 
could play an important role in stressing the moral and ethical aspects of climate engineering. In 
addition, participants voiced concerns that climate engineering would be implemented by 
wealthy, developed nations as a substitute for mitigation; concerns about unintended 
consequences and unforeseen impacts; questions about who would govern climate engineering; 
and concerns about the financial capability of PICTs to participate and/or contribute. Participants 
thought there was a need to ensure free, prior, and informed consent with climate engineering 
research and deployment, consensus in decision-making, and the need for awareness building, 
consultations, and trainings in PICTs. Participants assumed industrialized nations would push for 
climate engineering and would probably control policy debates, so PICTs would need to form a 
unified voice and push moral and ethical obligations of Annex I countries.  
 Winickoff et al. (2015) recently released the only peer-reviewed journal article focusing 
on perspectives from the Global South. They analyzed comments made in a deliberative exercise 
69 
 
held at the University of California-Berkeley by participants from Africa, South America, and 
Asia. These participants argued that the Global North should not use climate engineering to 
deflect ‘moral responsibility’ for its role in the climate problem. Participants also expressed 
concerns about scientists’ levels of confidence in promoting climate engineering field 
experiments based largely on potentially insufficient climate models. In addition, participants 
wanted to see accountability and credible oversight established for the governance of even small 
scale climate engineering experiments. And finally, participants indicated that future research 
must include experts from both the Global North and South. 
The lack of social science studies in developing countries makes direct comparison with 
perspectives from developed countries difficult at this time. The study presented below was 
designed to expand knowledge of geographically and culturally diverse perspectives on climate 
engineering, with an overarching goal of indicating how the inclusion of diverse perspectives can 
enhance future research and policy discussions. 
 
Methods 
To accomplish these aims I first identified three regions of the world currently 
experiencing disproportional impacts from climate change: the South Pacific, North American 
Arctic, and Sub-Saharan Africa (IPCC, 2014a; ND-GAIN, 2014). While Cairns (forthcoming) 
emphasizes the global North/South divide in terms of both climate change and potential climate 
engineering impacts, I decided to include the North American Arctic to focus specifically on the 
perspectives of minority, indigenous populations who are also disproportionately vulnerable to 
climate change despite their residence within wealthy developed nations (U.S. Global Change 
Research Program, 2014). I partnered with regional and local research institutions in these three 
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regions to develop a study plan for conducting interviews in both urban and rural areas. This 
collaborative process resulted in the selection of the Solomon Islands as my research site in the 
South Pacific, Alaska in the North American Arctic, and Kenya in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
I expected potential interviewees to possess limited prior knowledge of climate 
engineering. Therefore, in addition to being provided with information about climate engineering 
in the form of a short animated film (discussed in greater detail below) the sample focused on 
individuals working on climate change in some capacity or a closely related field (such as 
wildlife conservation or ecotourism). Prior to and upon arrival in each study site I worked with 
research partners, internet databases, and area phonebooks to assemble a list of potentially 
relevant government agencies and ministries, NGOs, private companies, and university 
departments. These various organizations were then contacted directly by phone, email, or in 
person to determine interest in participating in an interview. Every attempt was made during this 
process to ensure diversity within the sample in terms of age, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic 
class, and type of involvement on climate related issues.  
I utilized in-depth semi-structured interviews based on a pre-tested interview guide to 
gather qualitative data on participant perspectives on climate change and climate engineering. In-
depth interviews provided the opportunity for interviewees to discuss their perspectives on 
climate engineering at length and in their own words (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). The 
interview guide was composed of open-ended questions with a number of probes and follow-up 
questions designed to encourage depth and detail in participant responses. The interview guide, 
combined with a semi-structured approach, ensured that all of the major themes of this study 
were covered in every interview, while allowing me to explore unique ideas and personal 
contexts that emerged during individual interviews (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006; Rubin & 
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Rubin, 2005). Using a semi-structured format also allowed for the flexibility necessary to follow 
up on unanticipated concepts that arose in the interview process itself, while simultaneously 
assuring comparability across interviews as all interviewees were asked the same questions over 
the course of the conversation.  
The interviews consisted of three parts, a series of questions about climate change, a short 
informational film about climate engineering, and a series of questions about climate 
engineering. The first section of the interview focused on interviewees’ views on climate change 
and what they would consider optimal responses. These initial questions, in addition to providing 
critical context for understanding perspectives on climate engineering, also enabled and 
encouraged interviewees to embed their views on climate engineering within their own social, 
cultural, and political expertise, and existing knowledge about climate change. After this series 
of questions about climate change, interviewees were asked whether or not they had heard of 
climate engineering before, and if so what they knew and thought about it. 
After this initial series of questions, interviewees were shown a brief animated film (7:35 
minutes in length) introducing the topic of climate engineering. The film indicated that scientists 
have begun researching climate engineering as a potential response to climate change, introduced 
the different branches of climate engineering (CDR & SRM), and highlighted two specific SRM 
approaches (marine cloud brightening and sulfate particle injection). The film went on to indicate 
why some scientists and policymakers have become interested in climate engineering, while also 
raising several social, political, and ethical questions.5  
                                                 
5 The film used in the interviews was a modified, preliminary version of a film produced by the Climate 
Media Factory for the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies and used for research purposes with 
permission. The final version of the film entitled “Engineering the Climate” can be viewed here: 
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After viewing the film interviewees were asked a series of questions about climate 
engineering. Specific questions examined what they thought about climate engineering as a 
potential response to climate change, their views on social, political, and ethical considerations, 
and ways to potentially improve geographic and cultural diversity in climate engineering 
research and decision-making. The film and subsequent questions focused on SRM as the scope 
and scale of potential impacts from technologies in this branch of climate engineering have 
resulted in greater controversy around social, ethical, and political implications of research and 
development. However, interviewees often asked about and discussed CDR techniques as well, 
and were never discouraged from doing so. 
As several recent articles on perceptions of climate engineering have pointed out, 
attempts at eliciting perspectives on emergent technologies that the large majority of people are 
not familiar with presents methodological complications and potential pitfalls (Cairns, 
forthcoming; Corner et al., 2012). One key consideration is the framing of information provided, 
with several studies to date indicating different framings of climate engineering that likely 
influence perceptions (Corner et al., 2011; Corner & Pidgeon, 2015). This study embraced a 
framing-for-deliberation approach (Friedman, 2007; Walmsley, 2009), to frame both the 
information presented to interviewees, as well as the questions they were asked. This created 
space for them to express diverse opinions and draw on different forms of knowledge. 
I ultimately conducted 32 interviews with 33 individuals in the Solomon Islands in March 
and April, 2013; 24 interviews with 29 Alaska Natives in July and August, 2013; and 33 
                                                 
http://www.iass-potsdam.de/researchclusters/sustainable-interactions-atmospheresiwa/news/climate-
engineering-trump-card. 
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interviews with 38 individuals in Kenya in January, 2014, for a total of 89 interviews with 100 
individuals.6 Interviewees in all three study sites came from across the public, private, and not-
for-profit sectors. They included high-level government officials in charge of research on climate 
policy at national and international levels, staff members of local, national, and international 
NGOs, ecotourism business owners and operators, agricultural operators, hunters, researchers 
and graduate students at universities or working with conservation organizations, and 
administrators at regional scientific organizations. All of the interviews were digitally recorded 
and professionally transcribed. Interviews lasted between 35 and 110 minutes with an average of 
64 minutes. 
Data analysis consisted of an iterative process of reading interview transcripts multiple 
times, coding transcripts through the identification of themes, writing analysis memos, and 
exploring relationships between the data and relevant literature and theory (Patterson & 
Williams, 2002). Data excerpts from the interviews are presented below, primarily in the form of 
block quotes, to both illustrate views discussed by interviewees and serve as evidence for later 
conclusions.7 Interviewees were given the option of anonymity, and though the majority 
indicated that they were comfortable having their names used in any subsequent publications, 
enough interviewees preferred anonymity that I decided not to use any names to protect their 
identities.  
                                                 
6 While I always scheduled one-on-one interviews, in several instances in all three sites co-workers or 
family members joined the conversation. 
7 Supplemental data for results presented throughout the following section can be found in Appendix B. 
The supplemental data in that appendix has been organized into tables corresponding to sections of the 
article. Supplemental quotes are indicated by parentheticals, which contain a combination of a letter and 
two numbers (e.g. B-1.03). This code indicates the appendix (B), table (1), and quote (03). 
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Results 
As previously mentioned, the research presented in this paper was designed to build 
knowledge and understanding of what members of vulnerable populations think about climate 
engineering. The analysis revealed that views on climate engineering were very much informed 
by interviewees’ experiences of climate change more broadly. Therefore in order to 
contextualize and fully explain interviewee perspectives on climate engineering, the following 
section first sets the stage by examining interviewees’ concerns about climate change. 
 
Climate Change 
When asked about climate change impacts, the vast majority of interviewees spoke at 
length about impacts that were already posing serious threats to lives and livelihoods in their part 
of the world. Interviewees shared story after story about the ways climate change was already 
affecting them, their friends and family, and their fellow community members. For instance, one 
Alaska Native, who was an active subsistence hunter discussed the following impacts from 
climate change: 
For the subsistence users, the people who live off the land in rural Alaska, the biggest 
concern is the effect [climate change] has on the plants and animals that they rely on. … 
It’s been tough on hunters. We used to go 60, 80 miles to get walrus, and now we’re 
going sometimes 200 miles. The pattern of the ice has really changed. The thickness, the 
quality of ice, it’s not the quality it used to be. Pulling up a boat on a piece of floating ice 
to butcher a walrus, it’s not like it used to be. It’s more dangerous. 
 
In addition to changes in Artic sea ice, Alaska Natives frequently discussed melting permafrost 
and shifts in subsistence species locations and behaviors. Solomon Islanders on the other hand 
tended to focus on sea level rise, changes in rainfall patterns, and increased rates of vector-borne 
diseases (B-1.01). Meanwhile Kenyans most frequently described changing weather patterns, 
with particular emphasis on increased intensity and frequency of extreme drought and flooding 
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events (B-1.02). Interviewees from all three study sites also emphasized the economic, social, 
and cultural toll of these physical impacts. For instance, another lifelong hunter in Alaska 
explained that the loss of sea ice, in addition to affecting subsistence hunting practices, was 
disrupting intergenerational relationships and knowledge transfer. 
I remember when I was growing up the ice never used to leave. … That gave us more 
opportunities to teach our younger men how to hunt on the ice. But within the last 15 to 
20 years, with global warming, the ice leaves our shore in the early part of July and it 
never comes back. It melts. … When the ice is not there, the opportunity to bond and be 
with the young men at a critical time is gone—especially during those younger teenage 
years where they learn so much. The lost opportunity to associate out on the ice because 
of global warming really affects how young men are learning about the environment and 
the dangers of the ice. 
 
Similarly, many interviewees felt strongly that climate change was already altering their 
individual and communal ways of life. It was disrupting behaviors and relationships that have 
been central to their social systems and cultural identities for generations. The loss of Arctic sea 
ice was making hunting more difficult and dangerous. This had economic ramifications as people 
had to rely on expensive (and many argued less nutritious) store bought food. It was also taking a 
social and cultural toll as the loss of hunting opportunities weakened social ties and hampered 
the transfer of traditional knowledge and practices to younger generations. While these particular 
examples were specific to Alaska, similar concerns were expressed in the Solomon Islands and 
Kenya (B-1.03, B-1.04). Most importantly for the purposes of this paper, these concerns 
reflected a pervasive sentiment across the sample that climate change was not only happening 
but having serious, negative impacts on people in the Arctic, the South Pacific, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
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In addition to discussing deep seated concerns about climate change impacts, the large 
majority of interviewees also expressed disappointment with major emitters. For instance, when 
asked what his preferred solution to climate change would be, one Solomon Islander responded: 
Number one, Americans stop their greed. That’s the number one thing. They better stop 
their greed. … I just ask America and China and India—they’re creating lots of emission 
of gas—to stop creating those emissions. I think that is my call for all the big countries. 
Because we in the Solomon Islands, we can do our part … but still we produce very little, 
probably not very significant level of emission or sequestration of carbon.  
 
Many interviewees similarly wanted to see major emitters step up and take responsibility for 
climate change. They were understandably angered by a sense that they were being harmed by a 
problem that they did not create (B-1.05). Furthermore, interviewees indicated that they were 
working very hard to adapt and mitigate where possible, but that they ultimately felt helpless to 
solve the problem (B-1.06, B-1.07). As such one of the most frustrating aspects of climate 
change for many interviewees was a sense of dependence upon others to prevent future harm.8 
This sense of dependence, alongside concerns about impacts, laid the foundation for responses to 
climate engineering.  
 
Prior Awareness 
As expected, the large majority of interviewees across all three study sites had not heard 
of climate engineering prior to being interviewed. Of the 100 interviewees, 88 had either never 
heard of climate engineering before, saying things like “it’s a totally new concept for me” or “I’d 
                                                 
8 While the large majority of interviewees were extremely concerned about climate change, there were 
several interviewees who expressed skepticism that climate change was human caused, and also went on 
to indicate that they were less concerned about climate change as a result. For more information on these 
perspectives and how they related to perspectives on climate engineering see the “Similarities and 
Differences in Perspectives across the Sample” section of the Conclusions Chapter. 
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heard about climate engineering but I didn’t know what is was” (B-2.01, B-2.02). Nine 
individuals (six in Kenya and three in Alaska) were familiar with the basic premise of climate 
engineering, and even some of the particulars of different technologies, stating, for instance, “I 
read it in a book … this idea of releasing, what was it—sulfates? As a shield to bounce off and 
reduce the warming. Yeah, I’ve heard of it.” These individuals had encountered climate 
engineering in professional settings such as conferences, or in popular media and personal 
reading (B-2.03, B-2.04). However, they had not engaged with it in any formal way. Four 
interviewees (two in Alaska and two in Kenya) were knowledgeable about climate engineering. 
These individuals had been exposed to the topic in either an academic setting or as participants in 
a conference or workshop where climate engineering was a primary focus. For instance, the two 
interviewees in Kenya with extensive prior knowledge had participated in at least one of the 
SRMGI organized workshops discussed above (B-2.05).9  
Despite these low levels of prior awareness, interviewees were eager to hear more about 
climate engineering and discuss their perspectives on it. Consistent with previous research on 
this topic, when provided with a basic introduction to climate engineering, interviewees 
expressed complex and nuanced ideas (Corner et al., 2013; Macnaghten & Szerszynski, 2013). 
As described above, several commonly held perspectives emerged across the three study sites, 
despite their considerable geographic and cultural diversity. These similar perspectives included 
reluctant acceptance of the need to consider climate engineering as a response to climate change, 
                                                 
9 None of the interviewees in the Solomon Islands knew much if anything about climate engineering prior 
to the interviews. The workshop in Fiji discussed above, which did include two representatives from the 
Solomon Islands, took place several months after the interviews for this project were completed in that 
location. None of the interviewees from this study participated in the workshop in Fiji. 
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concerns about impacts from climate engineering, and conditions that future research on climate 
engineering should strive to meet. 
 
Reluctant Acceptance 
Due to their concern about climate change impacts and frustration with what they viewed 
as lackluster mitigation efforts the majority of interviewees across all three sites indicated they 
were willing to consider climate engineering. In fact many interviewees felt that they did not 
have a choice at this point, as poignantly described by one interviewee from Alaska: 
I think that due to the devastation that’s occurring with climate change already, that we 
see here, we have to look at other means. With the delays that we’ve had with our 
national will to decrease carbon emissions, that’s the reality of where we are. And the 
international process is unwilling to change activities and reduce carbon emissions when 
they’re already causing devastation and so many changes here and there. Those kinds of 
things shouldn’t be occurring. But because of that … unless we get some international 
leadership in this process that forces all of our states to get engaged in the process of 
prevention, we’re way beyond where prevention activities could have made some 
significant impacts. 
 
As evident in the quote above, interviewees were simply willing to consider anything that might 
help alleviate the “devastation” they were experiencing from climate change. Because mitigation 
efforts were not addressing the problem in any meaningful way, interviewees felt they had to be 
open to other options (B-3.01, B-3.02). However, they were far from thrilled at the need to even 
consider climate engineering—or as the interviewee quoted above went on to say later, “I am 
reluctant, but accepting.” The large majority of interviewees shared this sentiment of ‘reluctant 
acceptance’ of the need to consider options like climate engineering. 
A small minority of interviewees, four individuals, spread across the research sites, 
indicated that they simply did not think climate engineering was an appropriate response to 
climate change and did not express any willingness to consider it as a potential option. For 
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example, one interviewee from Kenya, who had played a pivotal role in helping to organize a 
nationwide group working on climate related issues said the following: 
We would be the first champions to shoot it down. There are so many other ways we can 
deal with climate change, other ways which are very real, tangible. … from the policy 
level, I don’t think anybody would buy that. And if they would, I think there are other 
priorities from the country perspective, because we already have a national climate 
change action plan which governs the way this country should go in terms of climate 
change. That’s not on the low-carbon pathway.  
 
This interviewee indicated a number of reasons why he, and he suspects his colleagues in Kenya, 
would be firmly opposed to climate engineering. First, this interviewee did not think that climate 
engineering was a technologically feasible option. He stated elsewhere in the interview that he 
considered it wishful thinking that we could develop technologies capable of reliably or 
predictably manipulating the global climate. Furthermore, he did not view it as a politically 
feasible option, as many countries have already developed and adopted climate change action 
plans focusing on mitigation and adaptation. Finally, as indicated in the quote above, he thought 
that climate engineering would ultimately result in more emissions—exacerbating rather than 
addressing the cause of the problem. Interestingly, similar concerns where expressed by the 
majority of interviewees who indicated they were willing to consider climate engineering. In 
fact, part of the reason interviewee perspectives are characterized as ‘reluctant acceptance’ is 
because every interviewee who expressed willingness to consider climate engineering also went 
on to discuss serious reservations or concerns. Those concerns are explored in greater detail 
below.   
This idea of reluctant acceptance emerged from the interviews. However, reluctant 
acceptance is also an established concept in social science research on controversial 
technologies. Bickerstaff et al. (2008) first used the term to describe focus group responses in the 
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United Kingdom to the re-framing of nuclear energy as essential to sustainable, low-carbon 
energy policies and futures. More specifically, a reluctant acceptance discourse was evident in 
the focus groups on nuclear energy as, “a resignation verging on frustration that there was no 
avoiding some continued dependence on the nuclear sector” (Bickerstaff et al., 2008, p. 159). In 
other words, nuclear energy was seen as a highly undesirable, but potentially indispensable 
means for addressing climate change (Corner et al., 2011).  
In this study, reluctant acceptance was expressed as a willingness to consider the need for 
alternative means for addressing climate change—like climate engineering—based on deep-
seated concerns about climate change. However, this reluctant acceptance should not be 
misunderstood as support. Rather, many indicated, as in the quote above, that they were willing 
to consider nearly any alternative that could provide relief from climate change at this juncture, 
and were therefore open to discussing climate engineering as one such option. However, once 
they learned more about climate engineering from the informational film, most interviewees 
were less than enthusiastic about it. 
More specifically, 28 interviewees described feelings of unease about the idea of humans 
intentionally manipulating the climate, or interfering with nature or natural processes (B-3.03, B-
3.04). One interviewee from the Solomon Islands discussed his concerns in the following way: 
To be honest, anything that involves manipulation of nature makes me nervous. I tend to 
think that there’s going to be side effects and it’s going to go terribly sideways. It would 
be nice to see the resources that would be utilized to do this stuff used and directed 
towards developing clean energy so you can go straight to the root of the problem, rather 
than try to develop instruments and technology to fix the problem and still allow it to 
happen. … It doesn’t sit well with my stomach. 
 
This sense of discomfort about manipulating nature has been well documented in past research 
on climate engineering (Corner et al., 2013). In fact, data from this study has been used in a 
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forthcoming publication to indicate how concerns about manipulating nature were embedded in 
spiritual and religious beliefs for quite a few interviewees (see Appendix I for a copy of Carr, 
forthcoming.) Furthermore, the negative gut reaction described in the quote above also appears 
in past research on reluctant acceptance of nuclear energy. Corner et al. (2011), utilizing a 
nationally representative in-person interview questionnaire, found that certain respondents 
increased their support of nuclear energy as a response to climate change only if they could also 
explicitly express unease and continuing dislike for it.  
The ability to simultaneously express dislike and willingness to consider climate 
engineering was also important to interviewees in this research. In fact one interviewee who 
frequently facilitated conversations with Alaskan Natives around science, policy, and 
environmental issues, said that her organization intentionally built space into every discussion 
for what she described as the ‘primal scream’: 
It’s hard to dwell on the negative for me, because we do a lot of work around strength, 
assets, and empowerment. As I’ve been talking and sharing my concerns and kind of 
doing what we call in our work the “primal scream” … We actually make room for it in 
our dialogues, because it’s human nature. It’s not a judgment … we just know that if we 
don’t give people room to air their concerns, the risks that they perceive or have 
experienced, we’ll never really get full buy-in on the solution. 
 
In other words, this interviewee and her colleagues had found that making space for people to 
express their reluctance is, in many cases, the only way to make space for expressions of 
tentative acceptance or support.  
Reservations and concerns about climate engineering ran much deeper for interviewees 
than initial affective responses. In fact, interviewees expressed deep-seated fears and frustrations 
about the type of world they thought climate engineering could bring about—namely a world in 
which they and other vulnerable peoples were even more dependent upon outsiders to determine 
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their climate futures. Interviewees most frequently couched these fears in terms of concerns 
about negative and unanticipated impacts. 
  
Negative and Unanticipated Impacts 
Roughly four-fifths of interviewees expressed concerns about potential negative impacts 
from climate engineering. While generic concerns about negative and/or unanticipated impacts 
have been noted in many previous studies on climate engineering, participants in this study 
expressed concerns related to their particular part of the world (B-4.01). For instance, a marine 
biologist in the Solomon Islands explained her concerns in the following way: 
Our population is almost 80% rural, subsistent. They live on agricultural products. If 
we’re changing the earth’s climate and temperature, how would that affect agriculture? 
Food crops? Diseases? There are lots of diseases that are temperature-related as well. 
 
She returned to this concern later in the interview stating: 
Malaria—you seem to find it in warm, tropical areas. If you change the weather, what 
will that develop into? Will it form a new strain that stabilizes at a different temperature? 
There are so many unknowns with this climate engineering. … Apart from agricultural 
subsistence, most people live in a coastal environment. How will the temperature change 
the marine life? A cooler environment, does that mean we don’t have as much diversity? 
… How will that change the marine life? Less coral? Things dying out? More fish? Less 
fish? We don’t know. 
 
Interviewees were concerned about unanticipated impacts from climate engineering first and 
foremost because of the potential damage to the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable people. As 
articulated in the above quote, the large majority of the population in the Solomon Islands is 
dependent upon subsistence farming and fishing for their survival. As another interviewee from 
the Solomon Islands put it, impacts to marine resources, “means death and life for our people.”  
Interviewees recognized that many of these same resources were already being negatively 
impacted by climate change, which, as discussed above, is why they were willing to take climate 
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engineering under consideration in the first place. However, past experiences, like those 
described by one Alaska Native below, made interviewees want assurances that potential impacts 
from climate engineering to critical resources would be taken into consideration. 
You know, with what we’ve experienced already in terms of our past history and outside 
influences dictating more than local people are dictating, it gets to be being a bit more 
protective in the sense of, is this the right thing? How much risk are we going to be 
subjecting ourselves to if this is something that’s being introduced within the Arctic? 
Like I said early on, I’m a hunter. How is this going to impact the resources that I depend 
on for subsistence? I would like to see that there’s no impact and how do we benefit? 
How would the benefits to the resources and the humans be identified? What are the real 
benefits for this? … I tend to get a little protective of the resources, because I need those 
resources to be able to feed my family, feed myself, continue doing what we’re doing 
with our children, teaching them the importance of these resources. 
 
As the quote above highlights, the source of greatest anxiety among interviewees was that their 
perspectives and concerns would not be accounted for. This anxiety was grounded in a clear 
sense that the ideas and technologies involved in climate engineering were coming from outside 
of their communities, cultures, and perspectives. One interviewee from the Solomon Islands said 
simply, “It’s not a local idea, it’s a foreign idea.” As such, interviewees expressed fears that 
large-scale interventions would not even take into consideration different resources and 
livelihoods, the loss of which could affect not only individuals but entire social, cultural, and 
economic systems.  
In other words, interviewees utilized concerns about impacts to specific resources they 
depended upon as a means of questioning whether or not their perspective was represented in 
research and decision-making. The questions underlying concerns about impacts were: Who is 
designing climate engineering interventions? What do they know about my part of the world and 
what matters to us here? What worldviews and assumptions are they including, and what are they 
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leaving out? In this way, interviewees utilized concerns about negative impacts to indicate that 
their support for climate engineering was not only reluctant, but also conditional.  
 
Conditional Acceptance 
Macnaghten and Szerszynski (2013) employed the term ‘conditional acceptance’ to 
suggest that public support or approval of a novel technology may in fact be highly contingent 
upon certain ‘conditions of acceptability.’ These conditions are often embedded in a 
sophisticated recognition of social, political, and economic realities and the problematic futures 
climate engineering could bring about within those realities. Participants in this study displayed 
keen sensitivity to local, national, and international social, political, and economic realities. As 
described above, they were very concerned about the impacts that climate engineering would 
have on the resources they depended upon daily, and questioned whether or not scientists 
currently researching climate engineering would take such impacts into account.  
Therefore, one condition of acceptability for interviewees in this study was the inclusion 
of diverse perspectives in future climate engineering research and governance initiatives. Many 
interviewees indicated support for inclusive research. One interviewee from Kenya, for instance, 
said, “I think for sure there should be continuing research involving as many people as possible, 
even from developing countries, in order to enable them to understand how we may be impacted 
and how we could contribute to it.” Interviewees wanted to know that they would not only be 
made aware of potential impacts, but that the weather patterns and plant and animal species they 
depended on would be explicitly considered.  
A second condition for support was that climate engineering not distract or detract from 
other efforts to address climate change. Quite a few interviewees, like the one quoted below from 
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the Solomon Islands, were concerned that the prospect of climate engineering would encourage 
or allow major emitters to maintain their current practices. 
Would that encourage developed countries and their industries and factories to reduce 
emissions of gasses? Or will they be increasing their production, increasing the 
emissions? I’m thinking if the engineering continues and they are successful, that would 
encourage them to make more gasses because people would think, “Oh yes, we can do 
more because this engineering thing will solve this problem.” 
 
As such interviewees in this study did express concerns about climate engineering creating a 
‘moral hazard’ whereby climate engineering would undermine mitigation and adaptation efforts 
(Hale, 2012; Lin, 2013). While interviewees were concerned that climate engineering would 
allow or encourage major emitters to keep emitting, they were also concerned that research and 
development of climate engineering technologies would take much needed resources away from 
adaptation initiatives that were already underway. In the words of one interviewee from Kenya: 
My question is, if for argument’s sake we decide that climate engineering is the way to 
go, what happens to the adaptation and development projects? Do we pause? Already we 
know that if some miracle happens, and America suddenly saw the light, and we reduced 
our [emissions] levels to the 1990 levels, we would still suffer impacts for the next 
hundred years. So it is not really the issue of climate engineering, mitigation, or 
adaptation. No. Adaptation must. … With adaptation, we don’t have a choice. There’s no 
option. Do we pause while people die from hunger and famine and what have you?  
 
This interviewee and others indicated that a clear condition of their willingness to consider 
climate engineering was that it only serve as a supplement to ongoing mitigation and adaptation 
efforts, and never as a replacement for them. As in the quote above, interviewees felt that they 
were already being so severely impacted by climate change that mitigation and adaptation could 
neither be diminished nor delayed. This same interviewee went on to express frustration that 
major emitting countries responsible for climate change in the first place had not fulfilled their 
existing financial commitments to developing countries. She feared that these same countries 
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would use climate engineering as an excuse to focus on grandiose, technological solutions rather 
than actually helping those people suffering from climate change. 
A third condition for support that many interviewees discussed was that any climate 
engineering technologies be designed to address climate change at local, national, or regional 
geographic scales. One interviewee from Kenya expressed this hope in detail. 
I want something that I can actually take home and actually get engaged in it and practice 
it. The only thing I can ask a climate engineer is, what are some of the tools, 
technologies, and ideas that you can give me that I can actually go and implement at very 
minimal costs, so the communities, the people I interact with on a daily basis can easily 
adopt it, and get the process going? When you’re talking about massive capital 
investment, that sort of erodes the whole process again, because that is capital that they 
do not have. But I’m sure there are other simplified technologies that you can give me 
that I can share with the people I work with … So why don’t you give me something I 
can work with right now, and we’ll get moving? We’re all about action.  
 
This interviewee’s hopes for climate engineering operated at two levels. At a very practical level, 
this individual, who worked with vulnerable communities in forested regions in Kenya, wanted 
to be able to address people’s immediate needs. This particular interviewee went on to discuss a 
number of barriers to the successful local implementation of policies and environmental 
interventions designed at the international level. He contextualized these concerns in relation to 
the UN Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) initiative (B-
5.01). More specifically, he indicated that a number of rural communities in Kenya were 
struggling to participate in the program. Many forested communities had rushed to take part 
early on, only to find out later that their efforts would not qualify for the program or that the 
community did not have the capacity to meet the technical evaluation and monitoring 
requirements to receive benefits. As such, this interviewee indicated that vulnerable populations 
are often skeptical of large-scale international programs, because they do not actually address the 
most pressing needs of vulnerable communities, and promised benefits are often elusive.  
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Twenty-one other interviewees (11 from the Solomon Islands and 10 from Kenya) also 
discussed the UN-REDD initiative. Similarly to the interviewee quoted above, they used REDD 
to contextualize questions about whether and how vulnerable populations would benefit from 
climate engineering. As in the previous quotation, interviewees also questioned the economics 
they saw embedded in current climate engineering proposals. Techniques like using artificial 
trees to sequester carbon, much less inject aerosols into the upper atmosphere, are likely to be 
technology and capital intensive. They will not be implemented by vulnerable populations. As a 
result, interviewees thought climate engineering technologies were unlikely to empower the 
people being most impacted by climate change. The above quote then is not only about cost, it is 
also about control. Will climate engineering empower vulnerable populations to take control 
over their own climate futures, or make them even more dependent upon wealthy, developed 
nations to ultimately dictate their climate fates? 
 Many interviewees expressed hopes that climate engineering technologies could be 
developed in such a way as to empower vulnerable communities, nations, or regions to address 
the climate change impacts they were most concerned about (B-5.02). However, interviewees 
recognized that these were not the geographic scales at which current climate engineering 
proposals would work. As such, rather than empowering vulnerable communities to improve 
their lives by reducing climate change impacts, interviewees feared that climate engineering 
would be used in a way that exacerbated existing global inequalities and/or made vulnerable 
populations even more dependent upon the decisions and actions of others. One interviewee from 
Alaska emphatically expressed this fear: 
It’s scary as hell to be dependent on some other person to dictate the weather or climate 
change. Like I mentioned, if it ever happens, whoever’s rich enough is going to control it. 
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That’s the way I look at it. Whoever’s got the dollars to do it, they’re going to do it for 
their own benefit. 
 
Interviewees therefore expressed a distinct preference that alternative solutions to climate change 
be ones that empowered vulnerable individuals, communities, nations, and/or regions to deal 
with climate change on their own terms. In other words, interviewees wanted more from 
alternative solutions to climate change than the mere reduction of impacts; they also wanted to 
see options that enhanced their self-determination. As such a second key condition for supporting 
climate engineering was that future research and governance efforts empowered vulnerable 
communities rather than making them even more dependent upon relief from wealthy, developed 
nations. 
 
Conclusion 
As discussed at the outset of this paper, there have been numerous calls to include more 
diverse perspectives in climate engineering research and governance initiatives. In a step in that 
direction, interviews conducted with individuals from the Solomon Islands, Alaska, and Kenya 
revealed several commonly held concerns about both climate change and climate engineering 
among individuals from vulnerable populations around the world.  
First and foremost nearly every interviewee expressed concern about current impacts 
from climate change. Interviewees were also frustrated by the lack of effort by major emitters to 
mitigate these impacts. These two factors led the large majority of interviewees to be willing to 
consider alternatives to mitigation and adaptation, including climate engineering. However, this 
willingness to consider climate engineering was a far cry from unqualified support. Rather, 
interviewees expressed both reluctant and conditional acceptance, echoing findings from 
previous social science research on controversial technologies. 
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As discussed above, these previous studies found reluctant acceptance of nuclear energy, 
whereby individuals viewed nuclear energy as a highly undesirable, but potentially indispensable 
means for addressing climate change (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Corner et al., 2011). As such, 
reluctant acceptance of nuclear energy provides a clear analogy to prevalent discourses around 
climate engineering. More specifically, climate engineering is frequently described as a highly 
undesirable, but potentially indispensable means for addressing climate change—a framing that 
dates back to Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen’s (2006) article in Climatic Change, which is 
frequently cited as prompting contemporary discussions on the topic.  
It is perhaps unsurprising then that the concepts of reluctant and conditional acceptance 
have also appeared in two previous social science examinations of climate engineering. One of 
these studies found that members of the British public indicated reluctant acceptance of a 
proposed field trial of prospective climate engineering technology (Pidgeon et al., 2012). As the 
authors pointed out, tentative support for a small scale field trial should not be misconstrued as 
unconditional acceptance for a field trial, much less climate engineering more broadly. 
Macnaghten and Szerszynski (2013) similarly showed how conditional acceptance complicated 
the idea of ‘support’ for climate engineering, suggesting that support may be highly contingent 
on real world conditions that may or may not come to fruition.  
Similarly, the results from this study complicate the idea of support for climate 
engineering. The reluctant acceptance expressed in all three research sites indicated, more than 
anything else, how desperate people in vulnerable regions are for solutions to climate change. 
Interviewees in this study frequently stated that they felt the severity of climate change impacts 
necessitated further research on climate engineering. However, they also expressed a number of 
reasons why they disliked climate engineering—sometimes in the very same breath. Therefore, 
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while some early survey research on climate engineering purported to find clear ranks of climate 
engineering ‘supporters’ and ‘detractors’ (Mercer et al., 2011), this study reinforces the 
conclusion drawn across more recent studies that perspectives on climate engineering tend to be 
more nuanced and complicated than these binary categories indicate (Corner et al., 2013; 
Macnaghten & Szerszynski, 2013). 
As such, this research points to the importance of intentionally creating space for people 
to signal tensions or even contradictions in their views on climate engineering. Allowing and 
even encouraging interviewees to express and explain tensions and contradictions served to draw 
out their hopes and fears about both climate change and various responses to it. One interviewee 
also suggested that creating this type of space would be particularly important in discussions 
with individuals from historically vulnerable and marginalized populations, who would likely 
want to indicate how they view climate engineering proposals in the context of past experiences 
of outsiders (including researchers) coming in and either taking advantage of them, messing up 
their environment, or both. Airing out, and having researchers and policymakers acknowledge 
these histories and their accompanying fears and concerns, will be critical for building trust and 
enabling meaningful inclusion of vulnerable populations moving forward. 
Along these lines, the concepts of reluctant and conditional acceptance indicate how 
perspectives on climate engineering are embedded in sophisticated recognition of social, 
political, and economic realities. Macnaghten and Szerszynski (2013) found that discussions 
around conditions for acceptability of climate engineering were in fact deliberations about the 
type of world that climate engineering could bring about. Interviewees in this study were acutely 
aware of existing social, political, and economic structures and processes. More often than not, 
they were concerned that those structures and processes would work to preclude voices from 
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developing countries and/or minority and indigenous populations within developed countries 
from being heard with regard to climate engineering. They were also concerned that climate 
engineering would ultimately reinforce structural inequalities.  
Therefore, interviewees indicated three key conditions for the acceptability of future 
climate engineering research and governance. The first was that future research must include 
more diverse perspectives in order to provide assurances that the needs and knowledge of 
vulnerable populations were being taken into account. Second, interviewees wanted assurances 
that climate engineering would not diminish attention to mitigation and adaptation. This 
condition resonates strongly with a concern Winickoff et al. (2015) also noted, that climate 
engineering not be used as a means for countries from the Global North to deflect attention from 
their ‘moral responsibility’ for the problem of climate change. Interviewees in this study took 
this concern even further, indicating that their third condition for acceptance would be that future 
research and decision-making on climate engineering actively embody a vision of empowering 
vulnerable populations. In other words, climate engineering should actually draw attention to, 
rather than deflect attention away from, the current inequalities of climate change. Some 
potential challenges to achieving such a vision are explored in detail in Chapter Four. Taken 
altogether, these three conditions for acceptability put forward by interviewees indicate that they 
wanted to see the causes of climate change addressed. First and foremost this meant assuring that 
emissions are actually reduced rather than masked. Second, interviewees wanted to see solutions 
being put forward that also addressed underlying social, political, and economic problems and 
inequalities.  
A number of commentators have pointed out that climate engineering could represent a 
‘technological fix’ to climate change (Hamilton, 2013; Scott, forthcoming). Technological fixes 
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are defined in part as attempts to circumvent difficult social problems by reducing them to mere 
technological problems (Weinberg, 1967). As such, technological fixes cut away many of the 
social implications of both the problem and proposed solutions. While not using the term 
technological fix, interviewees were clearly concerned that major emitters might try to use 
climate engineering to constrain the conversation about solutions to climate change and thereby 
circumvent the challenging social, political, and economic causes of the problem. Scott 
(forthcoming), in discussing the idea that technological fixes like climate engineering avoid 
important engagements with the social and natural world that ought to be required in solving 
problems like climate change, raises the question, “All things considered, does this particular 
proposal take away burdens we ought not be rid of?” (p. 8). The three conditions for 
acceptability outlined by interviewees, in conjunction with some similar findings by Winickoff et 
al. (2015), indicate that vulnerable populations are concerned that climate engineering will be 
used to take away burdens on wealthy, developed countries to not only reduce their emissions, 
but also address underlying social, political, and economic inequalities that make certain 
populations more vulnerable to climate change.  
Stepping back, one of the primary justifications for this study was the idea that a pressing 
need exists for greater inclusion of culturally and geographically diverse perspectives in research 
and decision-making on climate engineering. The findings presented in this manuscript help to 
concretely illustrate the depth and breadth of potential insights that more inclusive processes 
could produce. Despite low prior awareness, interviewees from all three study sites provided 
insights on climate engineering, and particularly the potential ramifications of climate 
engineering in different parts of the world, that have largely been overlooked by experts so far. 
As such, the empirical data presented in this manuscript bolsters the argument that vulnerable 
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populations around the world can substantively contribute to ongoing climate engineering 
science and policy discussions (Carr et al., 2013; Preston, 2012). Of course researchers and 
practitioners must carefully consider how best to enable meaningful participation in diverse 
contexts moving forward. A number of barriers to successful participation, even within wealthy 
developed countries, have been identified in recent years. Any attempt at broader engagement 
would certainly need to be sensitive to issues such as how information provided to participants is 
framed, who participates in the process, and how results feed into policy-making (Corner et al., 
2012).  
Despite these difficulties, the scale and scope of current climate engineering proposals 
necessitate the inclusion of more geographically and culturally diverse perspectives in research 
and governance. Decisions about modifying the global climate must incorporate the diverse 
views and concerns of those who stand to gain or lose the most. Therefore, the most critical 
conclusion to be drawn from this study is that diverse populations around the world are ready, 
willing, and able to engage in meaningful dialogue about the future of climate engineering. 
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Chapter 4: Skewed Vulnerabilities and Moral Corruption in Global 
Perspectives on Climate Engineering 
 
 
Introduction 
In his influential book The Perfect Moral Storm Stephen Gardiner (2011) referred to 
climate engineering10 as, “an idea that is changing the world.” Frequently defined as deliberate, 
large-scale interventions in the earth’s climate system to lessen impacts from climate change 
(Royal Society, 2009), climate engineering has moved from the periphery to a more prominent 
role in climate change science and policy discussions in the past decade, as evidenced by the 
inclusion of the topic for the first time in the latest Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2014b). Ethicists have also paid greater attention climate 
engineering in recent years and have been quick to point out, in the words of Christopher Preston 
(2012, p. 78), that climate engineering, “adds a number of new and difficult moral challenges to 
climate change. Among all of these challenges, concerns about global justice loom particularly 
large.”  
More specifically, due to the fact that many proposed technologies would be designed to 
have regional to global effects, the scale of potential climate engineering impacts raises concerns 
about both distributive and procedural justice at the international level. As discussed in greater 
                                                 
10 Gardiner (2011) actually uses the term geoengineering to refer to the same general concept. Other terms 
that have been utilized in addition to climate engineering include ‘intentional climate change’ (Jamieson, 
1996), ‘climate remediation’ (Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), and ‘climate intervention’ (National 
Research Council, 2015). I have chosen to use the term climate engineering because it was the term used 
throughout the data collection process and previous social science research indicates it is a more intuitive 
term than geoengineering (Mercer et al., 2011). There is no social science research to date on other 
variations of the term. Where quoting authors using other terms, I have changed their wording to climate 
engineering for consistency, and noted any changes to direct quotes using brackets. 
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detail below, distributive justice concerns, or those related to how harms and benefits ought to be 
shared, are of particular import as climate engineering will not affect everyone around the world 
uniformly. Rather, while most would likely see some improvement in their conditions, there is a 
distinct possibility that some populations who are already being disproportionately harmed by 
climate change could be further harmed by climate engineering (Svoboda et al., 2011). Similarly 
(and also examined in detail below), climate engineering raises questions of procedural justice, 
or questions about how decisions ought to be made. A particular concern is that those 
populations who have had the least say in decision-making on climate change will again have 
their interests overlooked or ignored (Preston, 2012; Suarez et al., 2013; Whyte, 2012a). 
Due to the potential for climate engineering to exacerbate existing global injustices, 
ethicists, social scientists, humanitarian and environmental organizations, and members of the 
public have advocated for the inclusion of more geographically and culturally diverse 
perspectives in climate engineering research and decision-making (Cairns, forthcoming; 
Jamieson, 1996; Royal Society, 2009; Washington Geoengineering Consortium, 2013). Many of 
these calls have advocated specifically for including perspectives from those populations who are 
especially vulnerable to climate change. For example, Suarez et al. (2013, p. 4) have argued, 
“There is a moral imperative to facilitate involving the most vulnerable in decision-making about 
[climate engineering] … to help inform a more inclusive and nuanced conversation about what 
can go wrong—and what must go right.” Unfortunately there have been few efforts to fulfill this 
moral imperative (Whyte, 2012a; Winickoff et al., 2015). 
The social science research presented in this paper was designed to help fill that gap and 
build knowledge about how vulnerable populations think about climate engineering. In-depth 
interviews indicated that the concerns of certain vulnerable populations closely resembled those 
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outlined by ethicists examining climate engineering from a global justice perspective. However, 
the perspectives expressed by interviewees also extended previous ethical treatments of the 
climate engineering. The goal of this paper, therefore, is to bring the ethics literature on the 
relationship between climate engineering and vulnerable populations into dialogue with 
empirical data documenting the actual hopes and fears of members of some of those populations.  
In an article titled “What can the social sciences contribute to the study of ethics?” 
sociologist Erica Haimes (2002) suggests that, 
By virtue of their theoretical as well as their empirical interests, the social sciences have 
more to contribute than just ‘the facts’. The social sciences see legal and ethical issues as 
primarily social issues and … can contribute not only to the understanding of ethical 
issues but also to the understanding of the social processes through which those issues 
become constituted as ethical concerns. (p. 91) 
 
The empirical data and corresponding analyses presented below are intended to contribute some 
‘facts’ to future ethical examinations of global justice questions related to climate engineering. 
However, the data and analyses presented below are also intended to cast light on how and why 
interviewee hopes and fears about climate engineering, examined and understood as social 
processes, are ethical concerns. More specifically, after discussing relevant literature and 
explaining project methodology, I assert that members of vulnerable populations are concerned 
about skewed vulnerabilities and moral corruption (of developed world decision-makers) with 
regard to climate engineering. Furthermore, while climate engineering is an emerging 
technology, interviewee concerns about it are inseparably linked to their past experiences of 
exploitation by dominant societies. While ethicists have made some links between climate 
engineering and the legacies of colonial and imperialistic political and economic relations, the 
discussion that follows draws upon the words of interviewees to provide a deeper and more 
nuanced examination of the ways that climate engineering could compound existing global 
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injustices. In order to connect the findings of this research with previous ethical examinations, 
the following section provides a detailed review of existing arguments from the ethics literature 
regarding the potential moral concerns that climate engineering raises in relation to vulnerable 
populations. 
 
Skewed Vulnerabilities 
In one of the earliest examinations of the ethical dimensions of climate engineering, Dale 
Jamieson (1996) also issued what was perhaps the first call for the inclusion of vulnerable 
populations in climate engineering research and governance, stating: 
A decision to undertake [climate engineering] would likely be made by the same people 
who are causing inadvertent climate change and have reaped most of the benefits from 
fossil fuel driven industrialization: people in rich countries and their political, social, and 
economic leaders. But if the world belongs to anyone, it belongs to the poor as much as 
to the rich, and no decision to go forward with [climate engineering] could be morally 
acceptable that did not in some way represent all of the people of the world. (p. 329) 
 
Jamieson goes on to argue that global participation in decision-making is one of three 
requirements that must be met for research on, much less deployment of, climate engineering to 
be considered ethically justifiable. In addition to recognizing that climate engineering has the 
potential to affect everyone on the planet—rich and poor alike—Jamieson also points out that 
those who have been the most negatively impacted by climate change have simultaneously had 
the least say in discussions about solutions. Without concerted efforts to bring perspectives and 
concerns from vulnerable populations into research and governance initiatives, Jamieson warns 
that there is little reason to expect decisions about climate engineering will be made in a more 
democratic or just manner. 
Gardiner (2011) picked up and expanded upon this same concern many years later, using 
the term ‘skewed vulnerabilities’ to refer to the global inequities of climate change. He reiterated 
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that responsibility for the problem lies with richer, more powerful nations and their historic and 
current greenhouse gas emissions. However, he developed the argument even further by pointing 
out that these same nations are less vulnerable to climate change, due in part to of the wealth and 
infrastructure provided by fossil fuel driven industrialization. But also in part because of 
geographic good luck, and being located in temperate zones which are likely to experience less 
severe impacts from climate change, at least in the short to mid-term. Poor, less developed 
nations on the other hand are the most vulnerable to negative impacts from climate change due in 
part to geographic bad luck whereby the tropical and sub-tropical zones of the world are already 
experiencing more severe climate change impacts. These same nations also hold little power to 
hold those responsible for the problem accountable.  
Gardiner (2011) also expands upon Jamieson’s argument by pointing out that climate 
change injustices are embedded within a long history of exploitation and marginalization of 
vulnerable populations. Drawing heavily on Shue (1992), Gardiner highlights the fact that 
climate change compounds existing global inequalities resulting from colonialism, and military 
and economic imperialism. This historical context and the resulting disparities in wealth, power, 
and the ability to influence international institutions and decisions are all factors that contribute 
to the ‘crucible of inequality’ (Cuomo, 2011) that climate change both emerges out of and further 
contributes to.  
Preston (2012) elaborates on the theme of skewed vulnerabilities by examining four ways 
in which climate engineering could further compound existing climate change injustices. First, 
Preston suggests that populations already geographically predisposed to disproportionate impacts 
from climate change may also be geographically vulnerable to climate engineering. He refers 
specifically to a number of modeling studies indicating that various climate engineering 
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proposals have the potential to negatively impact African and Asian monsoons (Moreno-Cruz et 
al., 2012; Rasch et al., 2008; Robock et al., 2008). A second, and closely related concern by 
Preston’s account is economic vulnerability. Changes in precipitation patterns in particular, “will 
impact developing world farmers and those who live subsistence lifestyles the most” (Preston, 
2012, p. 82) In other words, just as poorest of the poor possess the least capacity to respond to 
negative impacts from climate change, so too will they be the least able to recover from negative 
impacts from climate engineering. 
Third, Preston discusses political vulnerability in terms of power imbalances in current 
global decision-making processes and structures, like the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. He suggests that it currently looks unlikely that vulnerable populations will 
be treated as equal partners in the governance of climate engineering. Finally, Preston states that 
vulnerable populations are unlikely to have their interests well-represented in the research and 
development of climate engineering technologies. Those wealthy countries primarily responsible 
for the problem of climate change in the first place are also funding and facilitating the large 
majority of research. This imbalance heightens the possibility that climate engineering 
techniques and technologies will serve the interests of those already in power.  
Taken altogether, Preston (2012, p. 83) argues that, “the most vulnerable nations are not 
only suffering the greatest climate injustice today, in some cases they risk having those injustices 
compounded tomorrow as the development of [climate engineering] technologies and 
discussions about governance unfold.” Gardiner (2011) utilizes even more provocative language 
to suggest that climate engineering is currently being contemplated in an atmosphere wherein 
citizens, scientists, and decision-makers in wealthy developed nations are prone to moral 
corruption. 
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Moral Corruption 
Moral corruption, according to Gardiner (2011, p. 304) can be defined as, “illegitimate 
taking advantage of a position of power for the sake of personal gain.” He asserts that current 
generations in affluent, developed nations are especially prone to engaging in manipulative or 
self-deceptive behavior in relation to climate change and climate engineering because of their 
positions in power as the current politically, economically, and militarily dominant societies. 
One particularly insidious form of corruption that Gardiner worries about is selective attention or 
“corruption that targets our ways of talking and thinking, and so prevents us from even seeing 
the problem in the right way” (Gardiner, 2011, p. 301). The complex web of inter-related 
problems that undergird climate change and climate engineering make it easy to be attracted to 
weak or deceptive arguments that present only surface-level solutions, while selective attention 
obscures other, more difficult aspects of the problem. 
With respect to climate change, Gardiner provides an insightful example of the 
complexity current generations face. He suggests that by focusing on issues of global politics and 
scientific uncertainty while trying to negotiate global accords on climate change, current 
generations may feel as though they are addressing the problem in a serious manner. However, 
focusing, for instance, on what different nations consider politically feasible emissions reduction 
targets may prevent current generations from committing to deep enough emissions cuts to 
prevent serious harm to future generations. As such, a focus on the global geopolitics of climate 
change has the potential to obscure intergenerational aspects of the problem. In other words, the 
political complexity of climate change prevents people from seeing the problem in its entirety 
and responding appropriately.  
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Gardiner (2011) argues that current generations in affluent, developed nations must be 
wary of this same type of moral corruption in relation to climate engineering. More specifically 
they must be on guard against arguments that appear morally strong and compelling at first 
glance, but upon closer examination actually conceal more complex and difficult problems. What 
on the surface may appear to be a persuasive argument for climate engineering, could actually 
constitute a means of further exploiting a position of power. This, according to Gardiner (2011) 
would amount to offering vulnerable populations a bad way out of a worse situation.  
If someone puts others in a very bad situation through a moral failure, we usually do not 
think it enough for her to respond by offering the victims an evil way out. Instead we 
believe the perpetrator has substantial obligations to help the victims find better 
alternatives, and also, if the alternatives are costly or harmful, to compensate them for 
making this necessary. (p. 360) 
 
In other words, the wealthy, developed nations responsible for climate change may owe 
vulnerable populations who are bearing the worst impacts a better solution than climate 
engineering—particularly in light of all the ways Preston (2012) asserts that climate engineering 
could negatively impact those same groups of people and further compound existing inequalities. 
Therefore, current generations in affluent nations must be on guard against disguising or 
simply overlooking ways in which climate engineering would constitute further exploitation of 
the vulnerable. As the results from this study indicate, one apparently reasonable but latently 
problematic argument for pursuing climate engineering could be that vulnerable populations are 
desperate for solutions to climate change and willing to consider climate engineering as an 
option. However, before turning to those findings in detail, the following section explains who 
the interviewees were, the questions they were asked, and how their responses were analyzed. 
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Methods 
This research project was originally conceived of by an interdisciplinary team of ethicists 
and social scientists at the University of Montana in 2009. At the time there had been very few 
investigations of the social and ethical aspects of climate engineering, and no research looking at 
vulnerable populations’ perspectives. To begin to examine these types of perspectives, I worked 
with this team to identify regions of the world currently experiencing disproportional impacts 
from climate change. We decided to focus on the South Pacific, North American Arctic, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (IPCC, 2014a; ND-GAIN, 2014). While several commentators have 
emphasized a global North/South divide in terms of both climate change and potential climate 
engineering impacts, we decided to include the North American Arctic to focus specifically on 
the perspectives of minority, indigenous populations who are also disproportionately vulnerable 
to climate change despite their residence within wealthy developed nations (Marino, 2012; U.S. 
Global Change Research Program, 2014). Having identified these three regions, I partnered with 
regional and local research institutions to develop a study plan for conducting interviews. 
This collaborative process resulted in the selection of the Solomon Islands as my research 
site in the South Pacific, Alaska as the site within the North American Arctic (where I only 
interviewed indigenous persons, referred to as Alaska Natives), and Kenya as the site in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Prior to and upon arrival in each study site I worked with research partners, 
internet databases, and area phonebooks to assemble a list of potential interviewees. Anticipating 
that the large majority of people in each of the sites would not know about climate engineering 
prior to the interview, the sample focused on individuals working on climate change in some 
capacity or a closely related field (such as wildlife conservation or ecotourism). Specific 
government agencies and ministries, NGOs, private companies, and university departments were 
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then contacted directly by phone, email, or in person once I arrived on site to determine whether 
or not relevant personnel would be willing to participate in an interview. Every attempt was 
made during this process to ensure diversity within the sample in terms of age, ethnicity, gender, 
socio-economic class, and type of involvement on climate related issues. 
I utilized in-depth semi-structured interviews to gather qualitative data on participant 
perspectives on climate change and climate engineering. In-depth interviews provided the 
opportunity for interviewees to discuss their perspectives on climate engineering at length and in 
their own words (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). Using a semi-structured format also allowed for 
the flexibility necessary to follow up on unanticipated ideas that arose in the interview process 
itself, while simultaneously assuring comparability across interviews as all interviewees were 
asked the same questions over the course of the conversation. 
 The interview guide was composed of open-ended questions with a number of probes 
and follow-up questions designed to encourage depth and detail in participant responses. The 
interviews consisted of three parts, a series of questions about climate change, a short 
informational film about climate engineering, and a series of questions about climate 
engineering. The first section of the interview focused on interviewees’ views on climate change 
and what they would consider optimal responses. These initial questions, in addition to providing 
critical context for understanding perspectives on climate engineering, also enabled and 
encouraged interviewees to embed their views on climate engineering within their own social, 
cultural, and political expertise, and existing knowledge about climate change. After this series 
of questions about climate change, interviewees were asked whether or not they had heard of 
climate engineering before, and if so what they knew and thought about it. 
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After this initial series of questions, interviewees were shown a brief animated film (7:35 
minutes in length) introducing the topic of climate engineering. The film indicated that scientists 
have begun researching climate engineering as a potential response to climate change, and 
highlighted two specific SRM approaches (marine cloud brightening and sulfate particle 
injection). The film went on to indicate why some scientists and policymakers have become 
interested in climate engineering, while also raising several social, political, and ethical questions 
such as who would be in control of climate engineering technologies if developed.11  
After viewing the film interviewees were asked a series of questions about climate 
engineering. Specific questions examined what they thought about climate engineering as a 
potential response to climate change, their views on social, political, and ethical considerations, 
and ways to potentially improve geographic and cultural diversity in climate engineering 
research and decision-making.  
I conducted 32 interviews with 33 individuals in the Solomon Islands; 24 interviews with 
29 Alaska Natives; and 33 interviews with 38 individuals in Kenya between March 2013 and 
January 2014, for a total of 89 interviews with 100 individuals.12 Interviewees in all three study 
sites came from across the public, private, and not-for-profit sectors. All of the interviews were 
digitally recorded and professionally transcribed. Interviews lasted between 35 and 110 minutes 
with an average of 64 minutes. 
                                                 
11 The film used in the interviews was a modified, preliminary version of a film produced by the Climate 
Media Factory for the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies and used for research purposes with 
permission. The final version of the film entitled “Engineering the Climate” can be viewed here: 
http://www.iass-potsdam.de/researchclusters/sustainable-interactions-atmospheresiwa/news/climate-
engineering-trump-card. 
12 While I always scheduled one-on-one interviews, in several instances in all three sites co-workers or 
family members joined the conversation. 
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Data analysis consisted of an iterative process of reading interview transcripts multiple 
times, coding transcripts through the identification of themes, writing analysis memos, and 
exploring relationships between the data and relevant literature and theory (Patterson and 
Williams, 2002). Data excerpts from the interviews are presented below, primarily in the form of 
block quotes, to both illustrate views discussed by interviewees and serve as evidence for later 
conclusions.13 Interviewees were given the option of anonymity, and though the majority of 
interviewees indicated that they were comfortable having their names used in any subsequent 
publications, enough interviewees preferred anonymity that I decided not to use any names to 
protect their identities.  
 
Results & Discussion 
As discussed previously, this paper is intended to bring the ethics literature on the 
relationship between climate engineering and vulnerable populations into dialogue with 
empirical data documenting the actual hopes and fears of members of some of those populations. 
The perspectives expressed by interviewees correspond to a surprising degree with many of the 
concerns articulated in the ethical literature examined above. More specifically, the results 
presented below indicate that members of vulnerable populations share concerns about skewed 
vulnerabilities and moral corruption of decision makers in developed nations. However, 
interviewee perspectives also extend the arguments found in the ethics literature by revealing an 
                                                 
13 Supplemental data for results presented throughout the following section can be found in Appendix C. 
The supplemental data in that appendix has been organized into tables corresponding to sections of the 
article. Supplemental quotes are indicated by parentheticals, which contain a combination of a letter and 
two numbers (e.g. C-1.03). This code indicates the appendix (C), table (1), and quote (03). 
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overarching concern that interviewees often expressed, namely that climate engineering could 
further erode their already weakened self-determination in the face of climate change. As such, 
populations in affluent, developed nations must be careful not to offer the vulnerable a bad way 
out that leads them to an even worse situation. 
 
Skewed Vulnerabilities 
Interviewees across all three research sites emphatically stated that climate change was 
already posing serious threats to individual and shared ways of life in their geographic regions. 
Interviewees discussed numerous examples of climate change impacts on their lives and 
livelihoods. Solomon Islanders, like the interviewee quoted below, frequently discussed impacts 
from sea level rise.  
We lost most of the trees which are mainly our anchorage on the front of the seas, 
especially because we depend on coconut as our cash crop for our income. We lost them 
because they no longer have fruits, and most of them are killed because every year the 
sea level rises. Most of the coconut trees have fallen. 50% of the coconuts are gone 
between 2000-2012. So we lost all these things given the sea level rise. We live only a 
meter and a half from the sea level at the moment. 
 
This interviewee, along with many others, detailed severe shoreline erosion and the loss of 
freshwater supplies and subsistence farming areas to saltwater encroachment (C-1.01). He 
suspected the three small villages on his island in the Western Province of the country would 
have to be relocated to a larger island within the next decade (C-1.02).  
The particular impacts of concern varied across the three research sites. Alaska Natives 
most often talked about the physical, economic, and cultural impacts of retreating Arctic sea ice, 
among other issues (C-1.03). Kenyans, meanwhile, frequently emphasized changes in the 
frequency and severity of extreme weather events—specifically floods and droughts (C-1.04). 
Despite variations in the impacts of concern, a common sentiment across the sample was that 
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climate change was already having harsh effects on subsistence hunters, fishers, and farmers (C-
1.05).  
While discussing their concerns about climate change impacts, many interviewees also 
expressed frustration with a feeling that they were bearing the brunt of a problem created by 
others. For instance, another interviewee from the Solomon Islands felt that the countries she saw 
as responsible for the problem did not care about the impacts their actions were having on others. 
To a Pacific Islander like myself and I would say probably many other people here, when 
you talk about climate change, we tend to blame India, China, the U.S., Japan, all these 
European countries. It feels like we’re feeling the effects more here in the small island 
states. We don’t have the mechanism to deal with all the effects of climate change, and 
we don’t have the capacity. We don’t have resources to deal with any of these things. So 
we do feel that we are not contributing to climate change and its effects as much as all 
these big countries, but they don’t seem to care much … they have resources to help their 
communities, their people, if they have any effects from climate change. 
 
In other words, interviewees were not only sensitive to, but often quite frustrated about their own 
‘skewed vulnerability’ to climate change (C-1.06). More specifically, as the quote above 
indicates, interviewees thought that they were living out the geographically and economically 
increased vulnerability to climate change described by Preston (2012). Many of these same 
interviewees went on to describe a sense of powerlessness to do anything about the situation. The 
interviewee quoted above, for instance, went on to say the following: 
For small Pacific countries, we can really only make noises. Whether we are able to 
change any policy or make useful contributions to how policies are changed, I really 
don’t know. We’re too small. We can completely be ignored on the world stage. 
 
As such, interviewees also felt frustrated by what Jamieson (1996) and Gardiner (2011) both 
described as the crux of global injustice—responsibility for the problem lies with dominant 
societies in rich and powerful nations and their past and current emissions of greenhouse gases, 
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while those being most affected not only bear the least historical responsibility, but also have 
little to no power to hold major emitters accountable.14 
However, several interviewees also emphasized that these skewed vulnerabilities to 
climate change extended beyond just historic and current emissions. For instance, several Alaska 
Natives discussed the difficult position that many indigenous villages located along the coastline 
currently find themselves in. 
85% of our communities here are coastal communities, and … people really are having to 
consider moving their communities. A lot of these villages and their location where 
they’re at now—they’re in those particular areas not of their own choosing. The Bureau 
of Indian Affairs located them, because they’re on navigable waters. It was easy to barge 
freight and other stuff into those communities. Our communities were either nomadic or 
semi-nomadic, moved depending on seasons, on whatever food sources were available. 
Living by the water is not one of the things that we would have probably chosen for a 
lifetime commitment, because we recognized that there are issues that are bound to 
happen … the problem with that is that no one accepts the responsibility for having 
located these communities in the areas that they now find themselves in. We’re having a 
real problem and sort of a catch-22 … because everybody is saying, “You’re going to be 
gone in the next 10 years anyhow, why should be build you a new school? Why should 
we fix that sewer and water system that’s not working anymore?”  
 
As the above quote details, interviewees in this study situated their perspectives on climate 
change and climate engineering within the ‘background state of global injustice’ or the history of 
colonialism, global poverty, and inequality also highlighted by Gardiner (2011) (C-1.07). For 
Alaska Natives, this background included, among other things, largely involuntary 
sedentarization as part of an effort by the United States government to ‘civilize’ indigenous 
                                                 
14 While the large majority of interviewees were extremely concerned about climate change, there were 
several interviewees who expressed skepticism that climate change was human caused, and also went on 
to indicate that they were less concerned about climate change as a result. For more information on these 
perspectives and how they related to perspectives on climate engineering see the Similarities and 
Differences in Perspectives across the Sample section of the Conclusions Chapter. 
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communities in the early to mid-1900’s (Marino, 2012). The siting of many ‘permanent’ villages 
was done without consulting Alaska Natives. As a result not only did the sedentarization process 
inhibit mobility, which had been a highly successful livelihood strategy, it also placed villages in 
locations vulnerable to flooding and coastal erosion. Now villages such as Sishmareff and 
Kivalina, which are threatened by coastal erosion and sea level rise, find federal agencies 
resistant to help them relocate.  
Against this background of what Marino (2012) describes as ‘historically constructed 
vulnerability,’ it is unsurprising that interviewees also expressed serious concerns, as have 
ethicists, about the potential for climate engineering to further compound existing injustices. In 
fact, interviewees spoke to each of the four ways Preston (2012) suggested that climate 
engineering might worsen existing inequities by exacerbating: geographic vulnerability, 
economic vulnerability, political vulnerability, and lack of influence in technology development. 
However, interviewees also extended Preston’s treatment of each of these four concerns by 
suggesting they are inextricably linked. In doing so, interviewees revealed an overarching 
concern that links the other four, a concern neither Jamieson, Preston, nor Gardiner anticipated. 
That concern, expressed by interviewees across all three research sites, was that climate 
engineering could constitute an extension of the exploitation and marginalization that vulnerable 
populations have been subject to as a result of colonialism, economic and military imperialism, 
and most recently, climate change. 
While not part of the literature discussed above, this overarching concern about climate 
engineering extending exploitation and marginalization has been raised by another ethicist. Kyle 
Powys Whyte (2012a), member of the Citizen Potawatomi Nation and philosophy professor at 
Michigan State University, has poignantly argued that indigenous populations would be 
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concerned that climate engineering, “will be part of a process whereby members of dominant 
societies could increase their influence and control over Indigenous peoples' political and cultural 
systems for meeting basic needs” (p. 71). The results and discussion presented below indicate 
that this concern about dominant societies extending their control holds true not just for 
indigenous populations within wealthy, developed nations, but also for other vulnerable 
populations around the world. To illustrate this point, it is helpful to examine how interviewee 
concerns correspond with and expand each of the four areas of vulnerability described by Preston 
(2012). 
 
Geographic vulnerability 
Interviewees were concerned that, in addition to bearing disproportionate impacts from 
climate change, they would not only be negatively impacted by climate engineering, but bear 
disproportionate negative impacts from research and/or deployment. As in the quote below, 
quite a few interviewees framed these concerns in terms of the potential for climate engineering 
to have different impacts on different climatic zones or regions. 
I don’t know how it will affect, let’s say, the natural climatic systems that people are used 
to in particular climatic regions. I’m just worried what impact it will have on the normal 
regional climatic systems, that’s all. … Solomon Islands is a tropical country. We might 
become a subtropical country or something like that. If changes like that do happen to 
regional climatic systems, it’s a huge, huge shift of how people live, how they do things, 
whether it’s gardening or fishing or whatever activity. …It’s going to have a big impact 
on the climatic system, rainfall patterns, wind directions. People live within them. … If it 
helps in lessening the atmospheric temperature globally, that’s the goal. But looking at 
regionally is the issue here. Whether doing that can still make the balance on nature, on 
particular regions, or will it make an imbalance to climatic regions? That is just my 
worry.  
 
As the quote above indicates, interviewees were concerned about impacts that climate 
engineering would have on their regional and local climates. This concern arose in recognition of 
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the fact that the large majority of climate engineering research to date has been conducted by 
scientists from the temperate climate zones of the Northern Hemisphere. Interviewees across all 
three sites were concerned that researchers who hailed from different regional climate systems 
than their own would not understand or account for the climatic variables that they were most 
dependent upon (C-1.08). More specifically, interviewees thought that current climate 
engineering proposals embodied too narrow of a vision of ‘climate’ that focused too much on 
temperature without taking into account other factors that they considered more critical, 
especially to subsistence ways of life (C-1.09). 
Therefore, while Preston (2012) and previous modeling studies have indicated that 
vulnerable populations might bear disproportional impacts from geographic bad luck, 
interviewees in this study, including the individual from Kenya quoted below, indicated that their 
concern ran deeper.  
If you look at the climate change and the impacts of climate change, a lot of the pollution 
has come from the West, and a lot of the suffering is in Asia and Africa. Whatever 
intervention that might happen, again might mean that a lot of technologies are developed 
in the West and then the impact again, following the same line of thinking, the people 
who are less polluters might be the ones to suffer if there was any negative consequences. 
 
As in the above quote, many interviewees expressed anxiety that researchers from other parts of 
the world were not only utilizing too narrow a definition of climate, but that they would overlook 
critical differences between climates in different regions. In other words, interviewees thought 
that negative impacts would result not just from bad luck but also from the limited perspectives 
of those researching and designing the technologies. Interviewees were concerned that scientists 
in affluent, developed nations would intentionally or unintentionally embed problematic 
priorities and worldviews into climate engineering technologies, resulting in negative physical 
impacts to key resources for vulnerable populations. 
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Economic Vulnerability 
Preston (2012) suggests that changes in temperature, precipitation, and other variables 
resulting from climate engineering would have the greatest impacts on the livelihoods of 
vulnerable peoples. Interviewees expressed similar concerns. Not only did they expect to bear a 
disproportionate share of negative impacts from climate engineering, they also recognized that 
people in their regions had little capacity to adapt to any additional perturbations in weather 
patterns. As such, any unforeseen and/or negative impacts from climate engineering would 
unduly burden the most vulnerable. 
They’re saying that they want to put sulfur into the atmosphere. If later on we begin to 
have acid rain, sulfuric acid, because we don’t know what is going to happen up there, 
who is going to pay for that? Africa is a continent that relies on climate-sensitive sectors. 
That’s the backbone of our economies. … I always say that dealing with the uncertainties 
of climate change is already such a big headache. Why add on? And at what cost? 
 
As the quote above indicates, the question for many interviewees was ‘who is going to pay for 
negative impacts?’ Interviewees felt that compensation mechanisms were necessary considering 
they were neither the cause of the problem in the first place, nor likely to be the ones developing 
and deploying climate engineering technologies (a point I will return to in greater detail below). 
The interviewee quoted above went on to state she had little faith in affluent, developed countries 
to provide restitution for any negative impacts from climate engineering based on how little 
money had been forthcoming for climate change adaptation efforts to date. 
Many interviewees also discussed concerns about an additional form of economic 
vulnerability not found in the ethical literature to date. Twenty-three interviewees, spread across 
all three research sites, were afraid that the high cost of research would mean that only wealthy 
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people, corporations, and/or countries would have a say. One interviewee from Kenya stated this 
concern in the following way: 
Countries that couldn’t afford to do it, would they still benefit from it? Would they have 
negative consequences of not being part of it? And where would the power be in terms of 
who decides what to do? In the past, countries with not as much wealth and the 
indigenous populations always get put on the back burner and don’t get to decide these 
things. Would that be the same case? 
 
In other words, if poor countries and indigenous groups cannot afford to put money towards 
climate engineering research, which many interviewees were adamant they could not, will they 
have a say in how technologies are developed or used (C-1.10)? In articulating this concern, 
interviewees illustrate the inseparability of economic vulnerability (i.e. their lack of financial 
resources) and political vulnerability (i.e. their lack of influence over decision-making), thus 
blurring the lines between physical, economic, and political vulnerability as outlined by Preston 
(2012). The quote above also illustrates that interviewees viewed the cost of researching, 
developing, and/or using climate engineering technologies as a means through which affluent, 
technologically advanced societies would justify their control over the climate and by proxy over 
vulnerable populations. In other words, climate engineering would be a case where vulnerable 
populations could not afford to participate and as such would once again have their interests put 
on the back burner. Interviewees indicated that this concern had deep roots in past experiences of 
not having a say in the scientific and technological decisions that ultimately had serious 
implications for their lives. 
 Interestingly, and by way of contrast, one interviewee from Kenya indicated that climate 
engineering could in fact be a cost-effective approach to addressing climate engineering because 
it could be done at larger scales than the localized, and in his opinion, largely ineffective 
mitigation and adaptation efforts he saw taking place. He said, “It looks like it’s at a big scale. A 
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bigger area can be covered. The economics will be cheaper than doing it here, doing it there. … 
To me it looks very good in those terms.” This individual worked a lot with subsistence and 
smallholder farming operations. He saw how these individual and household scale endeavors 
were being devastated by climate change, with little ability to adapt. He was therefore interested 
in interventions that could be implemented by larger entities, such as a government or large NGO 
for the benefit small-scale farmers. However, of the 20-plus individuals who spoke about the cost 
aspect of climate engineering in this sample, this interviewee was the only one to indicate that it 
seemed like an economically feasible option for vulnerable populations.  
 
Political Vulnerability 
 The concerns described above clearly resonate with Preston’s (2012) suggestion that, 
“when these observations about the location of [climate engineering] research and development 
are coupled with glaring imbalances of power in international decision-making structures, it 
begins to look highly likely that the poorer nations will not be treated as equal participants.” 
Based on their experiences with current climate change negotiations, interviewees, in line with 
Preston and Jamieson (1996), expressed little hope that they would have a meaningful say in 
climate engineering. For instance, an interviewee from Kenya who had personal experience 
working with United Nations agencies and programs, stated the following: 
My concern for Africa is that we always get the short end of the stick. Look at the climate 
change negotiations. We are not getting anywhere. Already now we’re moving from 
talking about a two degree world to a four degree world because two degrees is already 
happening. … So what I’m saying is that I’m wary of these grand projects, because when 
it comes to international policy, look at the adaptation fund. Look at the CDM. The 
developed countries are not doing their bit.  
 
Interviewees across all three research sites agreed with Preston and Jamieson that current 
international forums do not provide fair representation of vulnerable populations (C-1.11). 
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However, they also indicated the importance of recognizing the consequences of these 
inequalities. With regards to climate change and climate engineering, political power in 
international forums equates to the ability to cause or prevent physical harm to the resources 
people depend upon for their daily lives. The concerns expressed by interviewees in this regard 
resonate with those of Whyte (2012b, p. 175), who states, “For many Indigenous peoples, 
[climate engineering] represents a particular, global path-dependence for responding to climate 
change that will simply sweep them up before they have had any chance to influence or 
meaningfully consent to various courses of action.” Questions about who will have a say in 
climate engineering decisions, according to Whyte and interviewees (C-1.12), are fundamentally 
about whose capabilities to dominate the climate and as a result other people, will be 
strengthened or weakened.  
 
Lack of influence in technology development 
In addition to unequal power in international politics, Preston (2012) suggests that given 
the uneven distribution of economic and scientific resources between developed and developing 
nations, it is unlikely that vulnerable populations will have much say in the research and 
development of climate engineering technologies. He goes on to state that even researchers with 
the best of intentions are prone to inherent bias and self-interest. Interviewees were also 
concerned about inherent bias and self-interest as discussed above in relation to geographical 
vulnerability and the assumptions of researchers about differences in regional climates. 
However, their concerns once again ran deeper.  
One interviewee in Alaska stated that, “As a Native person … there has been too much 
horrible stuff done to us in the name of science to trust it. To us personally, to us as a culture, to 
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us as peoples, to us as inhabitants of the environment.” According to Whyte (2012b) this lack of 
trust is grounded in past experiences of science and technology serving as expressions of 
political domination. Furthermore, Whyte argues that vulnerable populations have been 
disproportionately impacted by environmental disasters resulting from technologies that they 
neither had a say in nor benefitted from. Interviewees felt the same way. They viewed climate 
engineering as embedded in a legacy of post-colonial power relations wherein vulnerable 
populations not only bore disproportional negative impacts from Western science and 
technology, but were also often unwilling test subjects. For instance one interviewee in the 
Solomon Islands spoke about nuclear weapons testing on atolls in the South Pacific as an 
example of powerful nations exposing already vulnerable populations to even greater 
environmental risks in the name of scientific advancement (C-1.13). Unfortunately, Reynolds 
(2011) has indicated this comparison may be accurate, “Perhaps the best historical analogy to 
[climate engineering] is above-ground nuclear weapons testing. It carried significant risks to the 
health of humans, who essentially were non-consenting research subjects, and to the 
environment, including major irreversible harm” (p. 130).  
In sum, interviewees shared the concerns expressed by Jamieson, Gardiner, and Preston 
in the ethics literature examined above. In fact, interviewees spoke directly to each of the four 
ways that Preston suggested climate engineering could compound existing climate injustices. 
However, interviewees also indicated that ethicists have by-and-large overlooked the ways in 
which these aspects of vulnerability interact, reinforcing one another in important ways. Further, 
they are linked by an overarching concern. Perhaps the most troubling way climate engineering 
could compound existing injustices is by extending the influence and control dominant societies 
already exert over many vulnerable populations. In the words of one interviewee from Alaska, 
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“It’s scary as hell to be dependent on some other person to dictate the weather or climate 
change.” Interviewees were concerned that outsiders would have the ability to manipulate their 
climates, causing detrimental physical impacts, but also disrupting livelihood and cultural 
practices. Even if climate engineering produced only benefits, interviewees suggested that it 
would then render them dependent upon outsiders to maintain the intervention (C-1.14). These 
concerns about extension of control, influence, and dependence are evident throughout each of 
the other for specific forms of vulnerability examined by Preston and expanded upon by 
interviewees. 
Whyte (2012a/2012b) has explored this concern from the perspective of indigenous 
populations, however the results presented and discussed above indicate that other vulnerable 
populations share the same apprehension. People in developing nations as well as indigenous 
peoples in developed nations have been exploited and marginalized through colonialism, 
imperialism, and climate change, and science and technology have played a central role in all of 
these processes (Arnold, 2005; Shue, 1992; Whyte, 2012a). It should not be surprising then that 
interviewees viewed climate engineering through a lens very much colored by these histories and 
experiences. As one interviewee from Alaska stated, “When you’re so disempowered and 
disenfranchised for so long, you get used to being the outlier.” Many interviewees in fact simply 
assumed that climate engineering would be another manifestation of outsiders exerting control to 
their detriment. In the words of another interviewee from Alaska, “Regardless of what happens 
with climate engineering, we’ll be taking the brunt of the problem again.” The key questions for 
interviewees then, were: what is the vision for climate engineering and who is determining it; 
will climate engineering improve our self-determination, or further erode it; and what impacts 
will climate engineering have on the resources we depend on for daily survival as a result? 
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Willingness to Consider and Moral Failure 
With the breadth and depth of the concerns interviewees expressed regarding climate 
engineering, perhaps the most surprising finding in this study was that the large majority of 
interviewees indicated that they would be willing to consider climate engineering as a potential 
response to climate change. The quote below from an interview in Alaska illustrates why so 
many interviewees held this seemingly paradoxical perspective. 
I think that due to the devastation that’s occurring with climate change already, that we 
see here, we have to look at other means. With the delays that we’ve had with our 
national will to decrease carbon emissions, that’s the reality of where we are. And the 
international process is unwilling to change activities and reduce carbon emissions when 
they’re already causing devastation and so many changes here and there. Those kinds of 
things shouldn’t be occurring. But because of that … unless we get some international 
leadership in this process that forces all of our states to get engaged in the process of 
prevention, we’re way beyond where prevention activities could have made some 
significant impacts. 
  
In other words, even though they were afraid that climate engineering could result in unevenly 
distributed negative impacts and potentially even extend outsider control over their lives, 
interviewees indicated that they still thought it deserved consideration because climate change 
was already having such “devastating” impacts. In fact, quite a few interviewees said that they 
were “desperate” for solutions to climate change at this point and therefore willing to consider 
nearly any means of addressing the problem (C-2.01).  
Clearly a willingness to consider borne out of desperation for solutions to climate change 
and in light of the concerns discussed above is a far cry from unfettered support. In fact, 
interviewees expressed what might be characterized as a ‘reluctant acceptance,’ or a frustrated 
resignation that highly undesirable options like climate engineering may be necessary to 
adequately address climate change (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Corner et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
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and most critically, interviewees indicated that they were really only willing to consider climate 
engineering if certain conditions were fulfilled.  
More specifically, one condition of acceptability for interviewees was the inclusion of 
diverse perspectives in future climate engineering research and governance initiatives. One 
interviewee from Kenya, for instance, said, “I think for sure there should be continuing research 
involving as many people as possible, even from developing countries, in order to enable them to 
understand how we may be impacted and how we could contribute to it.” A second condition for 
support that many interviewees discussed was that any climate engineering technologies should 
be designed to address climate change at local, national, or regional geographic scales (C-2.02). 
In other words, interviewees wanted climate engineering technologies to embody a vision of 
empowering the people being most impacted by climate change to act on their own behalf. 
Clearly both conditions are embedded in (or follow from) the overarching concern expressed by 
interviewees that climate engineering would further erode their self-determination.  
Recognizing their own political vulnerability and probable lack of influence over climate 
engineering research, interviewees were often skeptical that either of these conditions would be 
met (C-2.03). In the words of one interviewee from the Solomon Islands, “I think the bigger 
richer nations or more developed countries, they’re going to have a say and basically it’s going 
to be, ‘This is the way forward, and this is what we’re going to do, and that’s that. Take it or 
leave it.’” As such, interviewees felt that climate engineering put them in a precarious position, 
one in which they were being severely harmed by a problem they did not create, while also being 
offered a solution that may or may not actually alleviate climate impacts, but either way could 
very well exasperate underlying inequalities. Presented in this light, climate engineering typifies 
Gardiner’s concern about offering vulnerable populations a bad way out of a worse situation.  
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Writing only four years ago, Gardiner (2011) was primarily concerned that current 
generations in affluent nations might put future generations around the world in a position where 
they would be willing to consider climate engineering, and referred to this as indicative of a 
moral failure. However, as the interviews conducted for this research demonstrate, the current 
and past generations in affluent nations may very well have already put vulnerable populations 
around the world in such a position. If current generations in affluent, developed nations have 
committed a moral failure by preventing harm to vulnerable populations when they had the 
chance, then Gardiner argues, they have an even greater responsibility to help provide solutions 
that do not make the vulnerable worse off.  
 
Conclusion: Avoiding Moral Corruption 
According to Gardiner (2011) climate change constitutes a ‘perfect moral storm’ insofar 
as the problem is so complex that focusing on any one aspect tends to obscure other equally if 
not more important considerations. As a result, it is easy for those in positions of power to put 
forward seemingly morally justified ‘solutions,’ that upon closer examination actually make the 
problem worse for someone else. As such, current generations in wealthy, developed nations are 
particularly prone to moral corruption, or illegitimately taking advantage of their position of 
power, by intentionally or unintentionally focusing on one facet of the problem at the expense of 
another. 
 Climate engineering does not reduce the moral complexity of climate change. In fact, as 
Jamieson (1996), Gardiner (2011), Preston (2012), and Whyte (2012a/2012b) all contend, the 
prospect of climate engineering actually layers on additional ethical conundrums and pitfalls. 
The results presented in this paper draw on perspectives from vulnerable populations to highlight 
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an additional concern—namely that dominant societies will utilize the desperation of vulnerable 
populations for solutions to climate change to justify accelerated research and development of 
climate engineering technologies and thereby decrease the self-determination of vulnerable 
populations.  
The fact that members of vulnerable populations around the world indicated that they 
were desperate for solutions to climate change, and hence willing to seriously consider climate 
engineering as a viable solution could be viewed by current generations in wealthy, developed 
nations as a morally persuasive argument for promoting the development of controversial 
technologies. However, focusing on providing relief from physical impacts from climate change 
via climate engineering could obscure other, more complicated ways in which climate 
engineering could actually make vulnerable populations worse off, further compounding existing 
inequalities. Interviewees spoke specifically to the potential for climate engineering to cause 
further physical and economic harm to the most vulnerable. They also indicated ways in which 
climate engineering could exacerbate power imbalances and further marginalize vulnerable 
populations in international policy arenas. However, the overarching concern that interviewees 
expressed was that climate engineering would be a means through which dominant societies 
would extend their control over the lives of the vulnerable.  
By focusing on the potential to provide much needed relief from physical impacts, 
scientists, decision-makers, and members of the public in developed nations could overlook (or 
intentionally ignore) the fact that climate change is a problem embedded within a long history of 
exploitation and marginalization of vulnerable populations. By overlooking the crucible of 
injustice that climate change emerges out of, dominant societies would also be overlooking ways 
that climate engineering would exacerbate existing global inequalities. Therefore, while this 
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study does indicate a desperate need to focus on alleviating the severe and worsening physical 
impacts of climate change on the most vulnerable, it also indicates that those in positions of 
power must be very careful to be sure that climate engineering proposals do not ultimately make 
vulnerable populations worse off in the process. In other words, current generations in wealthy, 
developed countries must guard against moral corruption in the form of inadvertently or 
intentionally using climate engineering to extend control over the lives of the world’s most 
vulnerable populations.  
 Cautioning against moral corruption is not meant in any way to dismiss the immediate 
concerns of vulnerable populations. There is no question that the impacts from climate change 
are already having serious physical, psychological, economic, and cultural impacts on many 
people and communities around the world. Individuals interviewed for this research were 
literally faced with losing homes, livelihoods, communities, and cultural practices if climate 
change impacts are not mitigated soon. Indeed, interviewees were consciously weighing these 
potential outcomes against all of the reservations they had about climate engineering. 
Interviewees expressed reluctant acceptance fully cognizant of the fact that climate engineering 
could bring about a future in which they felt even more dependent upon and controlled by 
dominant societies. That is why, as examined above, interviewees indicated they were only 
reluctantly and conditionally supportive of climate engineering. More specifically, they wanted 
to see their perspectives being actively incorporated into research and policy making to ensure 
that climate engineering would not only address physical impacts from climate change in a 
beneficial way, but also improve (or at least not further degrade) their self-determination. 
In addition to highlighting how interviewee perspectives expand upon previous ethical 
considerations of climate engineering, the above results and discussion also indicate the utility of 
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future interdisciplinary treatments of the topic. As discussed above, Haimes (2002) suggests that 
bringing social science data and analyses into discussion with ethical considerations can help to 
elaborate how different issues become constituted as ethical concerns for different populations. 
Borgmann (2006, p. 15) indicates the importance of connecting social science and ethics runs 
even deeper, “Social science without ethics is aimless; ethics without social science is hollow.” 
By connecting the ethical literature on vulnerable populations and climate engineering with 
perspectives from members of those populations, this paper indicates several ways in which 
future ethical examinations of climate engineering can be even more substantial, as well as ways 
that future social science can be more purposeful. First, by comparing and contrasting the 
concerns expressed by ethicists and interviewees, this paper indicates that the ethics literature to 
date (with the notable exception of Whyte, 2012a/2012b) has largely overlooked a key ethical 
consideration—that climate engineering has the potential to extend the control dominant 
societies already exert over the lives and cultures of vulnerable populations. Highlighting this 
concern will hopefully lead to further ethical examinations of ways to prevent moral corruption 
on the part of current generations in wealthy, developed nations.  
From the perspective of social science, this dialogue between the disciplines helps to 
reinvigorate calls for the inclusion of vulnerable populations in future climate engineering 
research and governance initiatives. More specifically, this study suggests that members of 
vulnerable populations are likely to view climate engineering though a lens that is very much 
colored by past injustices. As such, future studies should intentionally incorporate theories and 
analytical approaches that pay close attention to post-colonial experiences of power and 
marginalization. Similarly, future engagement efforts should create space for participants from 
vulnerable populations to voice these types of concerns, and help scientists and decision-makers 
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from dominant societies recognize the importance of these contexts for developing more 
inclusive and just technology and policy options. 
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Chapter 5: Regional Organizations and Climate Engineering Governance  
 
 
Introduction 
In 2009 the Royal Society published a report titled Geoengineering the climate: Science, 
governance and uncertainty. This report marked the first major assessment of geoengineering or 
climate engineering15 (the term used throughout the remainder of this paper), and helped propel 
the topic from the realm of science fiction into mainstream science and policy discussions about 
how to solve climate change. The report laid out what is probably still the most widely cited 
definition of climate engineering as, “the deliberate, large-scale intervention in the earth’s 
climate system in order to moderate global warming” (Royal Society, 2009, p. ix). The authors 
went on to suggest that climate engineering proposals are most usefully thought of as falling into 
two categories: 1) carbon dioxide removal (CDR) techniques, which aim to remove CO2 from 
the atmosphere; and 2) solar radiation management (SRM) techniques which would alter the 
earth’s albedo to reflect some of the sun’s heat and light back into space. 
After a thorough review of existing CDR and SRM proposals, the authors concluded that 
while reducing greenhouse gas emissions would be the safest response to climate change, climate 
engineering could help augment such efforts and should be further researched. One of the 
report’s other primary conclusions was that,  
                                                 
15 Other synonymous terms include ‘intentional climate change’ (Jamieson, 1996), ‘climate remediation’ 
(Bipartisan Policy Center, 2011), and ‘climate intervention’ (National Research Council, 2015). I have 
chosen to use the term climate engineering because it was the term used throughout the data collection 
process and previous social science research indicates it is a more intuitive term than geoengineering 
(Mercer et al., 2011). There is no social science research to date on other variations of the term. Where 
quoting authors using other terms, I have changed their wording to climate engineering for consistency, 
and noted any changes to direct quotes using brackets. 
126 
 
The acceptability of [climate engineering] will be determined as much by social, legal 
and political issues as by scientific and technical factors. There are serious and complex 
governance issues which need to be resolved if [climate engineering] is ever to become 
an acceptable method for moderating climate change (Royal Society, 2009, p. ix). 
 
One such ‘serious and complex governance issue’ identified by the authors was the need to 
develop an international program of public and civil society dialogue to identify potential 
concerns about climate engineering. A number of commentators from a variety of disciplines 
have indicated that any international program of public and civil society dialogue should pay 
particular attention to the views of vulnerable populations who could be disproportionately 
negatively impacted by climate engineering (Banerjee, 2010; Corner & Pidgeon, 2010; Jamieson, 
1996; Suarez et al., 2010; Whyte, 2012a). Blackstock and Long (2010, p. 527), for instance 
assert that, “Vulnerable developing countries so far absent from SRM discussions must be 
engaged, and all stakeholders need to consider whether existing frameworks can facilitate this 
process, or whether new forums, treaties and organizations are required.”  
As Blackstock and Long (2010) point out, despite numerous calls for their inclusion, 
vulnerable populations have been largely absent from discussions about climate engineering to 
date. Furthermore few studies have attempted to examine how existing or future governance 
frameworks could better account for their perspectives. The goal of this study was to help 
address this gap, and do so by actually asking members of vulnerable populations how they 
would like to see their perspectives included in future research and governance discussions, and 
how they believe governance should be structured to best address their views.  
Drawing on data from in-depth interviews with Solomon Islanders, Alaska Natives, and 
Kenyans, this paper asserts that regional organizations, which have been largely overlooked to 
date, could play a critical role in governing climate engineering. More specifically, regional 
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organizations may operate at a ‘meso-scale’ of governance (Maslow, 2009) that helps to resolve 
a number of key concerns expressed by both governance scholars as well as members of 
vulnerable populations. However, before turning to interviewee perspectives, it is important to 
first help situate their concerns and ideas within broader debates around climate engineering 
governance. 
 
Can Existing Governance Structures Accommodate Climate Engineering?  
 Much of the governance literature to date has focused on assessing whether and how 
climate engineering may fit under the auspices of existing international organizations (IOs) and 
international environmental agreements (IEAs). More specifically, governance scholars have 
assessed whether or not existing IOs and IEAs with mandates that might apply to certain aspects 
of climate engineering (e.g. certain materials involved) or certain impacts of various proposals 
(e.g. effects on the ozone layer) might be ‘co-opted’ to regulate research or deployment (Low et 
al., 2013). This co-opting would likely involve the adaptation and/or amendment of existing 
treaty rules or organizational mandates to regulate research, as no single treaty or institution 
currently addresses all aspects of climate engineering (Blackstock & Ghosh, 2011).  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has received 
the most attention as a potentially ‘co-optable’ institution for climate engineering governance. 
Climate engineering seems to fall logically within the purview of the UNFCCC. As a proposed 
response to climate change, it makes sense that climate engineering could or even should be 
governed by the preeminent international body currently attempting to address the problem (Lin, 
2009). Furthermore, many would argue that the UNFCCC currently possesses greater legitimacy 
as a governance body in the climate arena than any other institution owing to the fact that, “The 
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UNFCCC’s membership is near-universal and its profile in environmental governance currently 
unrivalled” (Blackstock & Ghosh, 2011, p. 16; see also Lin 2009). However, governance 
scholars have also been quick to point out potential downsides to the UNFCCC. First, the 
Framework Convention has yet to demonstrate an ability to fulfill its mandate of preventing 
dangerous human interference with the climate system by stabilizing greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere (UNFCCC 1992). Furthermore, acting as both a cause and 
product of this failure, the UNFCCC is rife with substantial mistrust and disagreement, 
predominately between the Global North and South, on a host of issues including, among others, 
climate finance, unfulfilled commitments by developed countries, and future commitments by 
developing countries. As such, “There is no reason for a majority of the UNFCCC’s membership 
to believe any political promises made or international norms exhorted on a cautious approach to 
SRM research” (Blackstock & Ghosh, 2011, p. 16).  
Other IOs that scholars have indicated may be relevant include the United Nations 
Environment Program (UNEP), the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). Existing IEAs that have been analyzed in relation to 
climate engineering include: the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD treaty); the Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP); the London Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter; and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer. There is not space here to review the potential applicability of each of 
these IOs or IEAs (see Low et al., 2013; Reynolds, 2013; or Virgoe, 2009 for thorough reviews). 
However, the predominant conclusion across the literature to date has been that no existing 
international regime is up to the task of governing climate engineering (Blackstock & Ghosh, 
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2010; Dalby, 2015; Low et al., 2013). As a result, governance experts have developed a number 
of suggestions for what good governance frameworks could look like, with quite a bit of the 
discussion focused on how inclusive such frameworks should be.  
 
How Inclusive Should Governance Be? 
There appears to be widespread agreement in the literature that climate engineering must 
be governed on a multi-lateral basis, but what exactly that means remains a point of contention. 
Some commentators have argued that governance should be global in nature, either through an 
existing or newly created UN-affiliated institution (Horton & Reynolds, forthcoming). Others 
have suggested that governance of climate engineering need only involve a small group of states 
(Lloyd & Oppenheimer, 2014; Victor, 2008). 
Lloyd and Oppenheimer (2014) have argued for an international agreement initially 
inclusive of 30 or fewer nations. Pointing to unsuccessful international negotiations on climate 
change, they assert that, “restricted membership will be more effective: smaller groups may have 
a reduced heterogeneity of preferences compared to larger groups, and are more likely to reach 
collective goals” (Lloyd & Oppenheimer, 2014, p. 47). They suggest that the initial group of 30 
include all of those countries likely to have the economic and technical capacity to implement 
SRM. Non-SRM capable states vulnerable to climate change could be represented via temporary, 
rotating membership of regional groups such as the African Coalition or Association of Small 
Island States. Lloyd and Oppenheimer argue that this type of governance structure would have 
‘practical legitimacy’ insofar as decisions would be timely and effective, and non-climate 
engineering capable nations would be afforded some form of representation. 
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This type of constrained membership regime appears to conflict with core values 
encapsulated in perhaps the most well-respected set of norms proposed to date for the 
governance of climate engineering research—the Oxford Principles (Rayner et al., 2013). 
Principle One (of five) dictates that climate engineering be regulated as a public good for all of 
humanity, while Principle Two asserts a requirement for broad based public participation. One of 
the lead authors of these principles, Steve Rayner (2011, pp. 9-10) has indicated that, “The idea 
behind these principles is that they should provide real assurance that the entire process from 
initial research through development, field trials, and eventual deployment are conducted openly 
and in the public interest of all affected countries.” As such, legitimacy is also a key 
consideration in the Oxford Principles—but one addressed through inclusion rather than 
exclusion. 
Rayner et al. (2013) go on to argue that the inclusion of diverse perspectives is especially 
important in early phases of research governance to help address what Collingridge (1980) 
dubbed, ‘the technology control dilemma.’ 
It is all but impossible in the early stages of a technology’s development to know how it 
will turn out in its final form. Mature technologies rarely bear close resemblance to the 
initial ideas of their originators. By the time technologies are widely deployed, it is often 
too late to build in desirable characteristics without major disruptions. However, this 
dilemma can be overcome. Various characteristics of technologies that contribute to 
inflexibility and irreversibility can be identified. … Flexibility must therefore be built 
into the governance of [climate engineering]. An incremental, bottom-up process, guided 
by values and mindful of problems such as the control dilemma is most likely to deliver 
it. (Rayner et al., 2013, p. 508) 
 
The authors of the Oxford Principles and others (Banerjee, 2010; Macnaghten & Szerszynski, 
2013; Stilgoe et al., 2013) have indicated that opening up discussions about climate engineering 
to diverse perspectives, including those of vulnerable populations, offers opportunities to 
critically assess the trajectory of different technologies. In other words, it is crucial to bring 
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diverse perspectives into the research and development process early so they can actually affect 
the resulting technologies. This justification for early inclusion directly contradicts Lloyd and 
Oppenheimer’s (2014) assertion that early phases of research governance can and should include 
the fewest participants and strive for homogeneity of interests and preferences.  
While rarely consulted to date, vulnerable populations have also indicated that they 
would like to be included as early as possible in research and decision-making. For example, 
during a series of informative workshops hosted across Africa, the Solar Radiation Management 
Governance Initiative (SRMGI) and African Academy of Sciences (AAS) found broad support 
for African involvement in SRM research and governance, including public oversight, 
stakeholder engagement, and capacity building (AAS & SRMGI, 2013). Workshop participants 
also advocated for increased support for African research via the AAS and emphasized the role 
the African Union could play for broader involvement across the continent. Similarly, an 
informative workshop hosted in Fiji by the Pacific Centre for Environmental and Sustainable 
Development and the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies reported widespread 
agreement among participants on the need to ensure procedural and distributive justice with 
climate engineering governance by guaranteeing free, prior, and informed consent and consensus 
in decision-making (Beyerl & Maas, 2014). Participants in that workshop also suggested 
coordination of national regulation at the regional level via organizations such as the Secretariat 
of the Pacific Regional Environment Program (SPREP). 
In a follow-up editorial article on the Fiji workshop, Lefale and Anderson (2014) argued 
that climate engineering represents another global issue likely to have major effects on PICTs 
though they will have limited knowledge about, or influence over, the outcomes. As such, they 
insist that,  
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One way of ensuring small islands perspectives on climate engineering are taken into 
account is for the international community to establish, without delay, an 
intergovernmental body, under the auspices of the UN system, tasked with the 
development of an international governance mechanism for climate engineering research 
and deployment (Lefale & Anderson, 2014, p. 3). 
 
While recommending the immediate development of an international regulatory regime at the 
global level, Lefale and Anderson (2014, p. 3) also recognize that PICTs are, “small and stand to 
gain little from large UN-sponsored negotiations unless they work together as a coalition.” In 
other words, they argued that developing countries, and particularly small island developing 
states, may find themselves in a double-bind whereby global governance mechanisms are 
necessary to ensure their inclusion, but also operate at a too big a scale for individual nations to 
have a meaningful voice.  
Recently, Winickoff et al. (2015), utilizing comments made in a deliberative exercise 
held at the University of California-Berkeley by participants from Africa, South America, and 
Asia, indicated that populations in the Global South wanted to see accountability and credible 
oversight established for the governance of even small-scale climate engineering experiments. 
Participants in the exercise also suggested that: 
The production of science and governance that are credible on a global level will 
probably require the inclusion of Global South actors in four activities that combine 
technical and value-based dimensions: defining the most relevant climate engineering 
problems; designing models and experiments that best study them; collecting climate data 
where there are current gaps; and facilitating the exchange between experts and the 
broader society. These activities will require the development of networks of scientists 
and civil society actors within and across countries of the Global South (Winickoff et al. 
2015, p. 633).  
 
In other words, legitimacy may require not only broad based inclusion of perspectives from the 
Global South in decision-making, but also participation in defining the problems and generating 
knowledge about them. Winickoff et al. (2015) also suggested that region-specific knowledge 
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generation would be critical for making sure the Global South plays a meaningful role in policy-
making.  
Furthermore, they found that participants thought requirements for global participation in 
climate engineering research extended to even small scale field experiments. Questions about the 
regulation of outdoor experiments, and whether oversight mechanisms should be established for 
climate engineering research versus deployment have been central to ongoing governance 
debates (Morgan et al., 2013; Parson & Keith, 2013). Winickoff et al. (2015) found that study 
participants wanted to see oversight and transparency established for even small scale 
experiments. While recognizing that the physical impacts of some experiments would not have 
international ramifications, study participants expressed concerns about the potential slippery 
slope from small experiments to larger scale experiments and eventually deployment. As such, 
Winickoff et al. (2015) assert that there is, “a scalar mismatch between the physical scope of 
small experiments and their potential social impact” (p. 631), a finding corroborated by previous 
studies in the United Kingdom (see Stilgoe et al., 2013). In other words, the line between 
governance of climate engineering research and governance of deployment may be perceived as 
rather blurry. Winickoff et al. (2015) concluded their study with a description of ongoing efforts 
by the AAS to promote an African research center focused on SRM governance, and suggestions 
that this could serve as an example for other such efforts in the Global South.  
 
Regional Governance 
Every previous effort to examine how vulnerable populations think climate engineering 
should be governed has mentioned specific regional organizations (ROs). Yet none of them have 
explored why regional organizations, or the regional scale more broadly, seem relevant to 
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members of vulnerable populations. Similarly, there has been very little exploration of the role 
that ROs could play in the governance literature on climate engineering. While absent from 
climate engineering discussions so far, a growing number of international relations (IR) scholars 
have recently argued that regional organizations can and should play a role in the governance of 
global environmental problems (Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2012; Selin, 2012). Connecting this 
emerging literature about ROs to the current discussion of climate engineering governance could 
yield new insights into how to structure decision-making.  
According to Hurrell (1995), terms like region and regionalism are polysemous and often 
used ambiguously. However, the terms are most commonly used to refer to a territory that is 
bigger than a single nation with certain shared characteristics. More specifically, regions are 
distinctly ‘less than global’ groupings of nations that are geographically proximate and share 
some combination of social, economic, political, or organizational cohesion. Regions are built 
through processes that name and give purpose to a certain geographical area via the creation of 
new, or strengthening of existing governance institutions (Van Langenhove, 2013).  
The recent rise in attention to regions and regional governance, from the powerful 
European Union to the nascent ASEAN Community initiative, can be largely regarded as a 
political response to globalization. According to Maslow (2009, p. 165): 
Regionalism in the study of international relations and its conception as the feasible 
supplement to or even complement of the current system of governance at the 
international level needs to be seen in direct correlation with the challenges globalization 
inflicted on nation-states and nation-societies and the (in)efficiency of global governance 
composed of its intergovernmental networks in addressing these challenges. 
 
The rise of regionalism then, is directly linked to what Slaughter (2004) has called, “the 
globalization paradox.” This paradox stems from the fact that states cannot address global 
problems like climate change in isolation. Contemporary environmental problems are often 
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generated or at least exacerbated by processes of globalization and growing social, ecological, 
and economic interdependence across traditional political boundaries (Hurrell, 1995). However, 
international institutions also struggle to address global problems because primary political 
authority still rests at the national level. In other words, international organizations rely heavily 
on national governments to implement and enforce multi-lateral agreements. As a result, both 
national and international attempts to address the growing number of transboundary 
environmental problems have proven largely ineffective (Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2012).  
This inefficacy of the current world order has led international relations scholars, as well 
as practitioners to begin to look for a ‘meso-level’ of governance that could improve local, 
national, and international governance efforts. IR scholars have suggested that regional 
governance may fit this bill by bridging nation-states and global governance institutions 
(Maslow, 2009; Thakur & Van Langenhove, 2006). In fact, Van Langenhove (2013) goes so far 
as to suggest that regions are the ‘stepping-stones to fairer globalization’ and that regional 
governance holds the promise of contributing to a more just world. 
While there is a growing body of research indicating the potential of regional 
organizations to contribute to more effective governance of international environmental 
problems (Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2012; Lian & Robinson, 2002; Selin, 2012), governance 
scholars have yet to assess how such frameworks might apply to climate engineering. As Egede-
Nissen and Venema (2009) point out, climate engineering appears to be exactly the type of issue 
that regional governance could prove useful for addressing: “It is at once a local action with 
global effects, and global changes with local effects” (p. 16). As such, this paper draws on the 
regionalism literature to provide a theoretical grounding for assessing why members of 
vulnerable populations point to regional organizations as relevant to the governance of climate 
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engineering. Drawing on interviewee perspectives, this paper also points to new directions for 
future theorizing on the role that regional organizations can play in relation to environmental 
issues more broadly. Before diving into the results though, the following section explains how 
the data for this study was collected and analyzed. 
 
Methods  
The term ‘vulnerable populations’ has appeared frequently in the climate engineering 
literature, but has rarely been defined (see for example Banerjee, 2010; Preston, 2012; Suarez et 
al., 2013; WGC, 2013). This study drew heavily on Suarez et al.’s (2010, p. 3) definition:  
Vulnerable populations are those with the least physical or political leverage to mitigate 
the carbon emissions driving climate change, and who equally have the lowest adaptive 
capacity to deal with the impacts of climate change … these same vulnerable 
populations—those close to the margin of tolerance for climate variability and change, 
with the least capacity to adapt—are also likely to be those most detrimentally impacted 
by any negative side effects of [climate engineering]. 
 
The term vulnerable populations has been applied almost exclusively to developing countries in 
the Global South in the climate engineering literature. This limited geographical focus is 
problematic because it overlooks vulnerable populations, particularly indigenous groups, in the 
Global North. According to Whyte (2012a, p. 65),  
Indigenous peoples have yet to be addressed responsibly about their possible consenting 
and dissenting views on early SRM research. There is little to no identifiable commitment 
to establish substantive fora or events for Indigenous peoples to engage with others about 
whether such research should be conducted in the first place and, if so, what to research 
and how to conduct empirical inquiries. 
 
Taking this concern seriously, this study sought out perspectives on climate engineering 
governance from vulnerable populations in both the Global North and South. More specifically, 
the definition of vulnerability above informed a process of cross-referencing the literature on 
climate change impacts with studies on potential climate engineering impacts to identify three 
137 
 
regions containing vulnerable populations: the South Pacific; North American Arctic; and Sub-
Saharan Africa (IPCC, 2014a; Moreno-Cruz et al., 2012; ND-GAIN, 2014; U.S. Global Change 
Research Program, 2014). Having identified these three regions, I partnered with regional and 
local research institutions to determine research sites and develop a study plan for conducting 
interviews. 
This collaborative process resulted in the selection of three specific research sites: the 
Solomon Islands in the South Pacific, Alaska in the North American Arctic (where only 
indigenous persons, referred to as Alaska Natives, were interviewed), and Kenya in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Anticipating that the large majority of people in each site would not know about climate 
engineering prior to the interview, the sample focused on individuals working on climate change 
in some capacity or a closely related field (such as wildlife conservation or ecotourism). Specific 
government agencies and ministries, NGOs, private companies, and university departments were 
identified in each site, then contacted directly by phone, email, or in person. Every attempt was 
made during this process to ensure diversity within the sample in terms of age, ethnicity, gender, 
socio-economic class, and type of involvement on climate related issues. 
Semi-structured interviews were utilized to gather qualitative data on participant 
perspectives on climate change and climate engineering. In-depth interviews provided the 
opportunity for interviewees to discuss their perspectives on climate engineering at length and in 
their own words (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). Using a semi-structured format also allowed for 
the flexibility necessary to follow up on unanticipated concepts that arose in the interview 
process itself, while simultaneously assuring comparability across interviews as all interviewees 
were asked the same questions over the course of the conversation. 
138 
 
 The interview guide was composed of open-ended questions with a number of probes 
and follow-up questions designed to encourage depth and detail in participant responses. 
Interviews consisted of three parts, a series of questions about climate change, a short 
informational film about climate engineering, and a series of questions about climate 
engineering. The film (7:35 minutes in length) introduced the topic of climate engineering; 
indicated that scientists have begun researching climate engineering as a potential response to 
climate change; and highlighted two specific SRM approaches—marine cloud brightening and 
sulfate particle injection. The film went on to indicate why some scientists and policymakers 
have become interested in climate engineering, while also raising several social, political and 
ethical questions such as who would be in control of climate engineering technologies if 
developed.16 After viewing the film interviewees were asked a series of questions about climate 
engineering. Specific questions examined what they thought about climate engineering as a 
potential response to climate change, their views on social, political, and ethical considerations, 
and ways to potentially improve geographic and cultural diversity in climate engineering 
research and decision-making.  
I conducted 32 interviews with 33 individuals in the Solomon Islands; 24 interviews with 
29 Alaska Natives; and 33 interviews with 38 individuals in Kenya between March 2013 and 
January 2014, for a total of 89 interviews with 100 individuals.17 Interviewees in all three study 
                                                 
16
 The film used in the interviews was a modified, preliminary version of a film produced by the Climate 
Media Factory for the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies and used for research purposes with 
permission. The final version of the film entitled “Engineering the Climate” can be viewed here: 
http://www.iass-potsdam.de/researchclusters/sustainable-interactions-atmospheresiwa/news/climate-
engineering-trump-card. 
17 While I always scheduled one-on-one interviews, in several instances in all three sites co-workers or 
family members joined the conversation. 
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sites came from across the public, private, and not-for-profit sectors. All of the interviews were 
digitally recorded and professionally transcribed. Interviews lasted between 35 and 110 minutes 
with an average of 64 minutes. Data analysis consisted of an iterative process of reading 
interview transcripts multiple times, coding transcripts through the identification of themes, 
writing analysis memos, and exploring relationships between the data and relevant literature and 
theory (Patterson & Williams, 2002). Data excerpts from the interviews are presented below, 
primarily in the form of block quotes, to both illustrate views discussed by interviewees and 
serve as evidence for later conclusions.18 Interviewees were given the option of anonymity, and 
though the majority of interviewees indicated that they were comfortable having their names 
used in any subsequent publications, enough interviewees preferred anonymity that I decided not 
to use any names to protect their identities. 
 
Results 
While interviewees expressed a range of views both within and across sites, there was 
also substantial overlap in their perspectives on how climate engineering should be governed, 
and perhaps more importantly why climate engineering should be governed in certain ways. The 
results and analysis presented below first examine the broader context in which interviewees 
discussed their hopes and fears about different governance frameworks. The focus then turns to 
interviewee perspectives on the pros and cons of global governance options, with an emphasis on 
the UNFCCC. This discussion of the pros and cons of the UNFCCC highlights two key aspects 
                                                 
18 Supplemental data for results presented throughout the following section can be found in Appendix D. 
The supplemental data in that appendix has been organized into tables corresponding to sections of the 
article. Supplemental quotes are indicated by parentheticals, which contain a combination of a letter and 
two numbers (e.g. D-1.03). This code indicates the appendix (D), table (1), and quote (03). 
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of any governance regime that interviewees indicated were indispensable—the inclusion of 
vulnerable populations and the ability for them to influence decisions. Finally the results section 
examines how interviewees thought regional organizations could help to improve climate 
engineering governance at both the national and international level by facilitating the inclusion 
and influence of vulnerable populations. 
 
Concerns Embedded in Governance Recommendations 
The majority of interviewees across all three research sites emphatically stated that 
climate change was already posing serious threats to their individual and shared ways of life.19 
As a result, many interviewees expressed a willingness to consider alternatives to traditional 
adaptation and mitigation measures—alternatives like climate engineering. However, 
interviewees also expressed a number of concerns about climate engineering. As such, the 
majority of interviewees across all three research sites expressed what might be characterized as 
a ‘reluctant acceptance,’ or a frustrated resignation that highly undesirable options like climate 
engineering may be necessary (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Corner et al., 2011).  
One specific concern interviewees expressed was that climate engineering would distract 
or detract from mitigation and adaptation efforts. For instance, one interviewee from Kenya said:  
We are interested in solving our immediate problems. As you well know, Africa is most 
vulnerable to climate change. We are already beginning to see those impacts on the 
ground. The cause of climate change is global warming due to the emission of 
                                                 
19 While the large majority of interviewees were extremely concerned about climate change, there were 
several interviewees who expressed skepticism that climate change was human caused, and also went on 
to indicate that they were less concerned about climate change as a result. For more information on these 
perspectives and how they related to perspectives on climate engineering see the Similarities and 
Differences in Perspectives across the Sample section of the Conclusions Chapter. 
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greenhouse gases. Why don’t we deal with this problem by reducing these emissions 
initially? It’s clear, it’s proven that is the path. That is really what we need to do, because 
we’re already suffering those consequences. But if we now begin to divert money to look 
at how we can basically treat the symptoms, then we are likely not to solve this problem. 
We don’t want to go on forever having to pump things into the atmosphere. It’s an 
unstable and insecure way to order your life. … Even right now, the developed countries 
are not showing commitment towards tackling this problem on the level which would be 
desirable for anyone with a moral conscience about what has happened. 
 
Fifty-seven interviewees, roughly two-thirds of the sample, expressed similar concerns to the 
ones captured in the quote above. They were afraid that major emitters would divert resources 
away from mitigation and adaptation efforts—resources that were already not nearly sufficient to 
meaningfully addressing the problem. They were also concerned that developed countries would 
use climate engineering as an excuse to not reduce their emissions levels. Finally, interviewees 
felt that vulnerable populations had more pressing problems to deal with, and could not devote 
their attention or already strained resources to climate engineering. 
 At the same time, interviewees also felt as though vulnerable populations had to pay 
attention to climate engineering, and participate in research and governance discussions because 
decisions made therein were likely to impact them. Another interviewee from Kenya discussed 
this in the following way: 
If we don't get involved with this climate engineering, we'll be so ignorant that other 
countries will come here and take advantage of us. We’d be making decisions out of 
ignorance. Out of ignorance comes a lot of repercussions, which later on, apart from 
regrets, leaves a lot of damage.  
 
Interviewees from all three research sites discussed past examples of feeling like guinea pigs for 
Western science and technology. They also discussed examples of finding themselves on the 
receiving end of disasters from environmental interventions that they neither had a say in nor 
benefitted from. As a result, interviewees thought that climate engineering presented a number of 
challenges and potential tradeoffs for vulnerable populations. One such tradeoff was not wanting 
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to devote any resources to climate engineering, when resources were already so lacking in efforts 
to address immediate climate change impacts. However, interviewees also wanted vulnerable 
populations to be involved in climate engineering discussions to help ensure that past instances 
of scientific and environmental exploitation were not repeated.  
 Furthermore, based off past experiences of scientific exploitation, interviewees indicated 
that they would want strong oversight of any research efforts. For example, one interviewee from 
Alaska said,  
We’ve borne the brunt of too many of these scientific experimentations—from physical 
and medicinal aspects, to landscape and natural parts of it. It just makes me very leery. If 
it were to go forward, it would have to have a lot of very strong Native people involved 
and have them in a position where they could be a decision-maker, not just a bureaucrat 
pushing papers, not just a yes-man or a yes-woman.  
 
In other words, if outdoor experiments were to begin to take place, this individual indicated that 
she would want to see indigenous people involved in oversight processes. She and other 
interviewees argued that vulnerable populations had been victims of too many experiments in the 
past to trust any process where they were not provided a meaningful voice in the process. A 
different interviewee from the Solomon Islands spoke about nuclear weapons testing on atolls in 
the South Pacific as an example of powerful nations exposing already vulnerable populations to 
environmental risks in the name of scientific advancement (D-1.01).  
Based on these types of experiences, interviewees felt that the lines between research and 
deployment were not clear cut for vulnerable populations, who could be intentionally or 
inadvertently harmed during the research process. Similar to participants in the Winickoff et al. 
(2015) study discussed above, interviewees in this study also indicated that even small scale 
experiments would require strong oversight and transparency that extended well beyond the scale 
of the physical impacts from any outdoor experiments. Interviewee perspectives on different 
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governance frameworks were clearly enmeshed in these types of concerns and perceived 
tradeoffs, as explored below. 
 
Pros and Cons of Global Governance Frameworks 
For 35 interviewees, the UN was the logical focal point for climate engineering 
governance, and more specifically the UNFCCC. In the words of an interviewee from the 
Solomon Islands, “The United Nations is comprised of more countries than any other 
organization. … It’s a whole earth problem, so I was mentioning specifically United Nations on 
the ground that they have more members.” The fact that the UN was already addressing climate 
change was a consideration. However, a far more important aspect was the near universal 
membership of the UN, because that meant even the most vulnerable countries would have a seat 
at the table (D-1.02). Another interviewee from the Solomon Islands indicated that the key was 
making sure that everyone who would be affected would be included in the decision-making 
process, stating: 
Solomon Islands is a member of the UN, so probably something through the UN, through 
their existing structures. Then it would come to the national level, and then down to the 
people. That would be best, because it will also be discussed in consultation with those 
affected. So I think it’s good that everyone has to be part of the decisions. 
 
As the quote above suggests, it was not just universal membership that mattered to interviewees, 
it was specifically the opportunity for vulnerable peoples to have a seat at the table. In other 
words, while talking about the UN, interviewees were actually discussing criteria for legitimacy. 
Due to the potential for climate engineering to impact vulnerable populations around the world, 
interviewees indicated that any governance regime would have to embody global representation 
to be considered legitimate (D-1.03). 
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In keeping with the suggestion that legitimacy requires inclusion, a number of 
interviewees expressed concerns that governance would be based on exclusive or restricted 
membership. One Alaska Native interviewee articulated this concern in the following way: 
Who has the resources to invest in doing it and then as a result, who gets to make the 
decision about who’s going to feel the worst impacts? Generally it’s the poor people, the 
brown people and black people on the planet who will not have the resources to pony up 
for this kind of work. Or maybe politically they would never be involved in it, and as a 
result, they would probably have the worst consequences of the changing weather and 
climate patterns. It’s the people who are most disenfranchised and disadvantaged now 
who will bear the burden of it.  
 
In other words, interviewees were apprehensive that governance structures would be constructed 
in such a way as to either intentionally or inadvertently marginalize their perspectives. Based off 
past experiences, interviewees argued that exclusive governance structures would inevitably 
promote the interests of dominant societies in wealthy, developed nations. In fact, a handful of 
interviewees from all three sites thought countries like the United States were likely to deploy 
climate engineering without consulting the rest of the world if they thought it was in their own 
best interests. For instance, one interviewee from the Solomon Islands said, “I feel like if the 
U.S. had the chance to do something like this, they would just do it. If they had the technology, 
they would just do it.” When asked why she felt this way, this interviewee responded: 
I feel like the U.S. is very grounded in the worldview of economic impacts. … A lot of 
people in power, a lot of people at the table would be considering doing something like 
this because then they can continue doing what they’re doing, using oil. They don’t have 
to reduce carbon emissions. They wouldn’t have to lose their economic system in place 
already because they’re already at the top of the world.  
 
Other interviewees who expressed similar concerns indicated that developing nations and 
indigenous populations felt powerless to stop these types of actions by powerful actors in 
developed countries (D-1.04). As a result, many interviewees advocated for the UN because they 
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felt it provided accountability for powerful nations and at least guaranteed representation for 
vulnerable populations. 
 While interviewees frequently indicated that they thought the UN was the perhaps the 
most legitimate decision making body, they also expressed concerns about the UN, sometimes in 
the same breath (D-1.05). For example, one interviewee from Kenya said, “The UN, of course, 
has its own downsides. In reality, who has the largest voice, even in the UN? But the UN would 
be best. At least we feel that everyone has a voice.” One of the main concerns interviewees 
expressed about the UN was that developed countries, like the United States, had a 
disproportional influence on decisions. 
Several Alaska Native interviewees were also quick to point out that the UNFCCC does 
not provide a seat at the table for indigenous populations (D-1.06). One interviewee from Alaska 
spoke about her frustration with being ‘represented’ by the U.S. State Department at Conference 
of the Party (COP) meetings, stating, “We don’t control who the delegations are, that’s 
controlled by the State Department. Unless you’re a U.S. State Department employee, you’re not 
going to be part of the delegation.” She returned to this idea later in the interview stating: 
I’ve been trying to be part of the delegation for the last seven or eight years. I’ve done 
everything I can think of to do … it would be nice to have an indigenous person. They 
say, “You’re not a State Department employee.” Well maybe you can find an indigenous 
State Department employee, then. I don’t care, it just would be really nice to have 
somebody there who can fulfill that role. 
 
Hence for Alaska Natives, the issue was that they felt wholly misrepresented by the government 
entity that was supposed to be acting on their behalf. This finding illustrates how restricting the 
definition of vulnerable populations to developing countries in the Global South, as past studies 
have done, overlooks the experiences and perspectives of vulnerable indigenous groups in the 
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Global North. Though living within perhaps the most powerful nation in the world, interviewees 
in Alaska still felt completely powerless in the UN climate framework.   
Similarly, interviewees also indicated that while having a seat at the table was necessary, 
it was not sufficient for good governance. Interviewees from all three sites, including the 
interviewee from Alaska quoted below, discussed experiences of having a seat at the table but 
still being ignored (D-1.07).  
Other governments are really good at [saying], “We’ll listen to you. We’ll take what you 
have to say into consideration.” That’s called “consultation.” And that’s as far as it goes. 
There’s only a few times, a very few mechanisms … where as a tribal participants or 
representative, you actually have a vote and a voice in the decision that’s being made. 
 
This particular interviewee was discussing her experiences in relation to state and federal 
governments within the United States, and using these smaller scales of governance to suggest 
that it was even less likely for vulnerable populations to be heard at the international level. As 
such, interviewees did not just want a seat at the table, they also wanted to know that their 
perspectives would meaningfully contribute to decision-making. This was the second key criteria 
for governance that interviewees discussed across all three sites—power to impact decisions 
about climate engineering.  
Interviewees thought that vulnerable populations in particular were unlikely to have the 
capacity to contribute to, or power to affect, decisions at the global level—at least under current 
arrangements. As an interviewee from the Solomon Islands who had participated in number of 
Conference of the Parties meetings over the years explained:  
It’s a bit tough being small with only a few officials in the delegation. It’s a bit difficult. 
… Small countries compared to developed countries, the U.S. or even Canada or 
Australia, where they have huge numbers of delegates attending, and you’ve got two 
people addressing one issue, so they are quite strong in terms of negotiation. 
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As the quote above suggests, interviewees saw wealthy, developed nations dominating 
international discussions while vulnerable populations were being stretched thin to marshal even 
minimal participation (D-1.08). Interviewees indicated they expected similar dynamics would 
prevail with climate engineering, particularly with a format where individual nations come to 
global meetings to negotiate international agreements.  
As they discussed the UNFCCC, interviewees often wrestled with a perceived tension 
between the need for inclusion on the one hand and the need for efficacy on the other—both 
efficacy in terms of the ability for vulnerable populations to affect decisions, and the ability to 
come to meaningful agreement (D-1.09). This was perhaps most evident in the way that 
interviewees discussed the consensus-based decision mechanism used by the UN. One 
interviewee from Kenya spoke about this at length, stating, 
The UN has got its own problems, but it also has its own positives. The obvious positive 
aspect is that at least it’s able to bring the global community to one forum. … But we 
have to understand the issue of consensus, because in the UN system, most of the forums 
you don’t vote. You have to reach consensus. … Consensus means, if I don’t like it and 
I’m alone, 52 parties vote to adopt a decision or an idea, and I alone say, “I am not for 
that idea,” there is no decision, there is no agreement. Where is the fairness? 
 
In other words, this individual perceived the consensus process to have unfairly prevented action 
on climate change because single nations were able to prevent decisions from moving forward, 
even if supported by large majorities. In contrast, another interviewee from Kenya vehemently 
insisted that consensus was the only way to guarantee fairness with regard to climate 
engineering. 
Before we even think of implementing climate engineering, we must talk of ethics. We 
must say that if a country says, “No, I am against this,” then you cannot do it. It must be 
done by consensus. Even if one country dissents, then we do not implement it. Because 
the adverse impacts, if there are any, and there will always be, who is going to clean up? 
Who is going to pay for that mess? … Even though the poorer countries might not be 
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represented in this dialogue, what we should ensure is that if there is no consensus, if 
there is one dissenter, that’s enough to kill the project. I feel that’s the best we can do.  
 
For this interviewee, consensus-based decision making, and the ability of a vulnerable nation to 
exert power over global decisions on climate engineering was a critical requirement for fair and 
ethical outcomes. These contrasting viewpoints, alongside the quotes preceding them in this 
section, indicate how interviewees grappled with the prospective role of the UN in governing 
climate engineering. However, these struggles to determine what role the UNFCCC could or 
should play all highlight the two key conditions interviewees wanted to see in climate 
engineering governance—broad based inclusion in a forum where vulnerable populations have 
the power and ability to affect decisions (D-1.10). It was with these two criteria in mind that 
quite a few interviewees suggested that regional organizations should play a role in climate 
engineering governance. 
 
A Role for Regional Organizations? 
Thirty-two interviewees from across all three sites spoke about a number of existing ROs 
in varying levels of detail. All of these interviewees appeared to view regional organizations very 
positively and discussed a number of reasons why they thought the regional scale was relevant to 
climate engineering governance. Not coincidentally, inclusion, capacity, and power were three of 
the primary reasons interviewees recommended regional governance. For example, one 
interviewee from the Solomon Islands discussed the role that two specific ROs in the South 
Pacific could play in lending legitimacy to decisions about climate engineering:  
There are existing regional bodies in my part of the world, and they too have climate 
change programs in place. … SPREP [Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme] and SPC [Secretariat of the Pacific Community]. Those can be forums 
which can be used to gain the opinions of other small island states or other countries of 
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the globe. … These are existing avenues which I see that would give the opportunity to 
hear what other smaller states that make up the entire globe think of this engineering. 
 
Interviewees, like the one quoted above, thought a network of regional organizations 
contributing to climate engineering governance could help ensure that perspectives from 
vulnerable populations were being included at the international level (D-2.01). Interviewees also 
indicated that there are a number of regional organizations—like SPREP and SPC—already 
working on climate change. As such, existing ROs embodied the same key benefits of the 
UNFCCC in terms of related topical focus and the inclusion of vulnerable populations.  
As the quote above also suggests, an additional perceived benefit to regional governance 
was that ROs had been working on climate change at a smaller geographic and political scale. As 
such, they were perceived to be more in touch with local and national climate change impacts, as 
well as opportunities and barriers to addressing them (D-2.02). In relation to climate engineering 
then, interviewees thought that regional organizations would be better positioned than the UN to 
assess potential impacts from various proposals because of their familiarity with local and 
national climates, cultures, economies, and politics. 
Interviewees in Alaska spoke about several regional organizations they perceived to have 
greater legitimacy than the UN because indigenous populations were not only included, but 
provided a meaningful voice in decision-making. The most widely discussed example was the 
Arctic Council, as in the quote below. 
The UN has no place at the table for indigenous people. They have the permanent forum 
for indigenous issues that’s part of the UN, but when the UN meets, there are no seats at 
the table. There are only countries seated. The Arctic Council is different in that it’s the 
Arctic states and the indigenous people’s organizations that are seated at the same table. 
 
Interviewees from Alaska discussed how regional organizations, like the Arctic Council, but also 
the Inuit Circumpolar Council, not only offered opportunities for indigenous peoples to represent 
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themselves, but to do so in a forum more familiar with the political contexts and struggles of 
indigenous groups living within powerful, developed nations (D-2.03). Hence, while discussing 
vastly different ROs, interviewees from all three sites indicated regional governance was 
favorable not only because it could be inclusive of vulnerable populations, but also because it 
offered greater sensitivity to the contexts in which vulnerable populations would encounter and 
respond to climate engineering. 
In fact, some interviewees indicated that they thought regional organizations could be 
even more legitimate representatives of the perspectives of vulnerable populations than national 
governments in international negotiations. For example, one Solomon Islander indicated that 
regional organizations may be less prone to corruption than the governments of individual 
developing nations: 
A lot of times Pacific Island groups go to these meetings and say, “We vote as a bloc so 
that we can have an impact on or influence a decision.” And then China gives somebody 
a few dollars here and there and they vote against the bloc. … So a group like USP 
[University of the South Pacific] or these regional organizations, they represent the 
region. So they—especially like USP, the Secretariat [of the Pacific Community], the 
[Pacific Islands] Forum—they represent the governments of the Pacific, and they have 
more stable policies that can’t be dissuaded. … So I do feel that negotiations, in a way, 
regional organizations would maybe better represent countries than the countries 
themselves. It’s just my feeling. Many of the small island states, they are easily swayed 
with a few dollars here and there. And by going to regional organizations, you tap into a 
group of people who are already connected at the highest levels within each government. 
 
Interestingly, what this interviewee is suggesting is that regional organizations, rather than 
national delegations, could serve as representatives in global forums on climate engineering (D-
2.04). In other words, this individual envisioned a governance regime wherein nations 
collaborated with each other in regional forums, which would then go on to represent all the 
nations of the region in global forums.  
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Interviewees acknowledged that, at the end of the day, issues like climate change and 
climate engineering that are truly global will still require governance at the global scale. One 
interviewee from Alaska pointed out that while inclusive of key indigenous and national 
perspectives, the Arctic Council has a limited geographical purview. 
The issue, of course, is that it’s eight countries in the entire world. They happen to be 
eight countries that have a significant chunk of the planet in terms of the North. But the 
fact that it’s not global already comes into the discussions a lot. Because for instance, one 
of the arguments that’s been made is that it’s really not worth the time of the Arctic 
Council to try to negotiate an emissions reduction agreement on methane, for example. 
Most of the methane that is in the atmosphere and is affecting the North doesn’t come 
from the northern countries, it comes from elsewhere. So even if the Arctic Council was 
to negotiate a methane reduction agreement amongst the eight Arctic countries, it would 
really not affect the amount of methane that was in the atmosphere very much. 
 
As such, interviewees recognized that even if regional organizations were to play some role in 
the international governance of climate engineering, it would require coordination at the global 
level (D-1.09). Regional organizations were not thought of as replacements for the UN, but 
rather supplements to fill the problematic gap between national and global scale governance. 
In addition to providing inclusion, interviewees also indicated that they thought regional 
organizations could help build capacity. One interviewee from the Solomon Islands discussed 
this directly in relationship to regional universities, stating: 
As it is the government doesn’t have the capacity on its own. Even with climate change 
they don’t have the capacity. So I think it’s important to involve the universities, and not 
just the universities here in the Solomons, but the regional universities like USP 
[University of the South Pacific]. We could create partnerships that can help us 
understand this better and probably influence the government to have a policy that is 
appropriate for us. 
 
As this interviewee points out, regional research partnerships could enhance the ability of any 
one nation to develop an informed national policy on climate engineering. Interviewees were 
often adamant that their countries or indigenous groups were unlikely to have the resources to 
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conduct meaningful research or develop relevant polices in isolation (D-2.04, D-2.05). However, 
they did think that pooling regional resources could increase their ability to be prepared to 
participate in discussions about climate engineering at the international level.  
Interviewees also pointed out that coalitions of developing nations and indigenous groups 
were already working to influence international climate change negotiations. In fact, 
interviewees felt like grouping up was the only way their voices were being heard on the global 
stage, and so those partnerships were already functioning to enhance the power of vulnerable 
population in international climate change discussions (D-2.06). One interviewee expressed this 
thought in the following way: 
Solomon Islands is … in an alliance called the Alliance of Small Island States. All the 
small islands come together and they have a voice, and they can make a block stand on 
issues in the UN meetings. Otherwise it is the delegates that go there, like the Minister of 
Environment. But in such meetings, when you come from a country like Solomons, 
you’re lost. … The islands are too small and insignificant. So if you come there with a 
unified voice, it will have more impact and be a louder voice. 
 
Interviewees thought that their perspectives and concerns were more likely to be heard and taken 
seriously at the regional scale because regional organizations were composed of larger cohorts of 
countries and populations. As such, interviewees thought that regional organizations presented 
the opportunity to for vulnerable populations to shape international policy at the regional level. 
From there, interviewees thought that regional organizations had a better chance of influencing 
international discussions about climate engineering. Therefore, interviewees saw regional 
organization as conduits through which local and national concerns were more likely to find 
resonance with similar perspectives, which could then influence international policy. As such, 
regional organizations were thought to have the potential to increase the capacity of vulnerable 
populations to deal with climate engineering at local, national, and international levels. 
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Discussion 
The results presented above suggest that interviewees were predominately concerned 
about being included in, and able to have an impact on, decisions about climate engineering at 
the international level, and that they saw regional organizations as a promising mechanism to 
achieve those aims. The following discussion attempts to draw some key comparisons between 
interviewee perspectives and the growing literature on regionalism introduced previously. 
 
Critiques of Global Governance Frameworks 
Interviewees often began their consideration of possible governance frameworks for 
climate engineering in the exact same place as many governance scholars—examining the pros 
and cons of the UNFCCC. Governance scholars often start with the UNFCCC because of a 
clearly related topical focus on climate change solutions. Interviewees indicated that this was a 
consideration, but were adamant that their main concern was the inclusion of vulnerable 
populations. In doing so, interviewees firmly agreed with the Oxford Principles that broad 
inclusion would be a primary consideration for evaluating the legitimacy of any governance 
framework (Rayner et al., 2013). Along these lines, Alaska Natives were quick to point out that 
near universal membership still means that certain perspectives are excluded, specifically the 
perspectives of indigenous populations. Whyte (2012b) also suggests this is the experience of 
indigenous populations, as the UNFCCC fails to adequately recognize the sovereignty of 
indigenous populations or the political authority of indigenous governments, which indigenous 
populations consider their legitimate representatives. Thus, while broadly representative of 
vulnerable countries, the UNFCCC may not sufficiently represent those vulnerable populations 
not well represented by their own national governments. 
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Interviewees also agreed with Blackstock and Ghosh’s (2010) concern that the UNFCCC 
is plagued by a ‘context of mistrust’—particularly between countries in the Global North and 
South. Interviewees indicated they had little reason to trust any promises made in global forums 
regarding climate engineering based off past experiences. Findings also confirm Horton and 
Reynolds’ (forthcoming, p. 12) suggestion that, “Independent of whether climate engineering 
would demonstrably harm them, [developing countries] may perceive it as a neo-colonial 
endeavor in which decisions are made by those who are the least exposed to climate engineering 
risks.”  
These findings indicate that vulnerable populations are likely to oppose any governance 
model based on restricted membership, such as that proposed by Lloyd and Oppenheimer (2014), 
even if vulnerable populations are afforded limited representation. However, interviewees were 
sensitive to the fact that the diversity of interests found at the global level impeded effective 
decision making—one of the main concerns Lloyd and Oppenheimer (2014) were trying to 
address in proposing an exclusive membership framework. Because of concerns about the 
impacts of scientific and technological developments and environmental interventions on 
vulnerable populations, interviewees suggested that regional organizations could help facilitate 
effective decision making at the international level while also maintaining inclusivity. 
 
Why Regional Organizations? Theoretical Considerations  
IR scholars have indicated that the regional scale is often overlooked in discussions about 
how to govern transboundary environmental problems (Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2012). Both 
interviewees and regionalism scholars seem to agree that what regional organizations offer is an 
additional level of governance between the national and the global. Thakur and Van Langenhove 
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(2006, p. 235), for example, state, “Neither states by themselves nor the UN as their universal 
collective forum can substitute for regional governance. … At the same time, however, regional 
governance cannot substitute for the UN, particularly in promoting security and development in 
the world.” In other words, neither interviewees nor regionalism experts seem to think that 
regional governance should replace national or global governance arrangements. Rather regional 
forums can and should function as an intermediary between the two, with the goal of enhancing 
the efficacy of both (Selin, 2012).  
Maslow (2009), writes that one reason regional governance frameworks are able to 
enhance the efficacy of national governments to deal with international environmental issues is 
because they, “are more familiar with the nature of the problem and its causes, because they are 
closer to the parties involved in collective action problems, and they are more sensitive to the 
particular socio-cultural and political-economic conditions of a given region” (p. 176). This 
aligns with interviewees’ suggestions that regional organizations are likely to better understand 
the social, economic, political, and even physical climates that vulnerable populations inhabit. As 
such, regional organizations could be more attentive to the contexts in which vulnerable 
populations will respond to climate engineering than international organizations. At the same 
time, interviewees indicated that this familiarity with local and national issues enhanced the 
perceived legitimacy of regional organizations. Interviewees felt that, unlike the UN, regional 
organizations were in touch with on-the-ground realities for vulnerable populations.  
Governance scholars have also documented examples of regional organizations 
successfully building local and national capacity to respond to global environmental issues in 
much the same way interviewees suggested could be done with climate engineering. Selin 
(2012), for example, has documented the success of regional organizations established 
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specifically in developing countries to help administer two international treaties on the 
international transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes. The regional organizations Selin 
examined have built awareness of key issues among the public and decision-makers, established 
regulatory clarity at the national and international level, and pooled resources to allow 
developing countries to contribute more effectively to international negotiations. Just as 
interviewees discussed, ROs have the potential to help bring together resources to allow 
vulnerable populations to understand complex scientific and technological issues and prepare to 
participate in decision-making at the international level. Furthermore, these same ROs would 
potentially provide a more powerful voice in international negotiations, as they represent larger 
collectives of vulnerable populations and/or nations. 
 
Potential Strengths and Weaknesses of Regional Organizations 
While the growing literature on regionalism aligns well with interviewee suggestions that 
regional organizations deserve more attention in discussions about how to govern climate 
engineering, this literature also contains a number of additional considerations related to both the 
potential strengths and weaknesses of regional-scale governance. For example, an important 
debate in the governance literature is whether or not regional governance helps integrate or 
further fragments international environmental governance efforts (Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2012). 
Both interviewees and governance scholars have emphasized that regional organizations can and 
should function as intermediaries between local, national, and global governance frameworks 
(Maslow, 2009). However, Thakur and Van Langenhove (2006) also indicate that regionalism 
has the potential to weaken an already faltering international system. If regional organizations 
generate stronger and/or shifting regional blocks, such arrangements could weaken the ability of 
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organizations like UN to generate international cooperation. That said, Balsiger and VanDeveer 
(2012) and Thakur and Van Langenhove (2006) ultimately assert that regional governance is 
more likely to strengthen rather than undermine international governance, while also pointing out 
that regional environmental governance arrangements already exist and are proliferating, largely 
under the scholarly radar. As such, they argue that before condemning regional governance as 
too fragmentary, existing examples at the very least warrant greater investigation. 
Governance scholars have also suggested that establishing new regional organizations or 
enhancing the capacity of existing ones often requires substantial support from developed 
nations. More specifically, Selin (2009) and Lian and Robinson (2002) both indicate that even 
when pooling resources, developing nations still require additional financial or technical support 
from either global institutions or developed nations. Selin (2009) goes on to point out though, 
that in the case of hazardous waste treaties, leading donor countries preferred working with 
regional organizations over individual developing countries as such arrangements prevented 
redundancy in efforts at the country level. Additionally, developing countries indicated that it 
was easier to attract additional resources from donors when working together as a region.  
Finally, nearly all of the existing literature on regionalism points out that regional 
governance efforts are not created equal, or in the words of Van Langenhove (2013, p. 2), “The 
ascent of regional governance is worldwide, although not evenly spread across the globe.” As 
such, there is the danger that unequal levels of regional regulation, or capacity to monitor and 
enforce regulation, could lead scientists to seek out the most permissive environments to conduct 
field tests. Rayner et al. (2013) have argued that climate engineering governance must guard 
against developed countries ‘exporting hazards’ to developing countries. As explored in Chapter 
Four, a number of interviewees in this study were concerned that they would become unwilling 
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test subjects in climate engineering field trials—in part because this had happened in the past, but 
also because they were afraid that local or national governments would not have the capacity to 
prevent such tests. However, if regional organizations are able to enhance the capacity of 
developing countries and indigenous populations to develop their own policies and participate 
more meaningfully in international forums, then the argument could be made that the 
development of regional organizations would help prevent the exportation of hazards. 
 
Conclusion  
This manuscript set out to inform ongoing discussions about climate engineering by 
asking vulnerable populations how they would like to see the issue governed. By supplementing 
existing literature with perspectives from vulnerable populations, as well as theoretical 
considerations from research on regionalism, this manuscript not only provides empirical 
documentation of diverse perspectives, but also suggests an overlooked scale of governance that 
could enable future climate engineering decisions to be both more inclusive and more just. 
Building on the connections established in this manuscript, future research could assess 
the potential relevance of different regional organizations to the governance of climate 
engineering. More specifically, as Blackstock and Ghosh (2011) did with respect to existing IOs 
and IEAs, such assessments could examine the mandates or different regional organizations, 
their structures and capacity to tackle climate engineering, and their perceived legitimacy and 
credibility in the eyes of key stakeholders. Future research could also examine how the African 
Academy of Sciences is already attempting to build the capacity of African researchers and 
decision-makers to participate in climate engineering science and policy discussions at multiple 
scales from the local to the international. Finally, future research could also explore past 
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instances of regional organizations supplementing or even standing-in for national delegations in 
international negotiations, and some of the benefits and drawbacks of such an arrangement. 
Balsiger and VanDeveer (2012, p. 1) insist that, “It is time to bring the regional back in to 
the study of global environmental politics.” This research indicates that it is also time to bring 
the regional into the study of climate engineering governance. If the global community is serious 
about making sure climate engineering governance is fair and inclusive, then regional 
organizations deserve serious attention moving forward.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
Numerous commentators from a variety of disciplines have asserted that vulnerable 
populations deserve to have a say in the research and development of climate engineering 
technologies and the policies that will govern them (Banerjee, 2010; Blackstock & Long, 2010; 
Corner & Pidgeon, 2010; Jamieson, 1996; Preston, 2012); however, these calls have gone largely 
unfulfilled (Suarez et al., 2013; Whyte, 2012a). As such a critical question remains, “What role, 
voice or agency will the vulnerable have in [climate engineering] decisions?” (Suarez et al., 
2013, p. 1). This dissertation set out to empirically document and analyze perspectives from 
vulnerable populations on climate engineering, and use the findings from that process into 
inform ongoing conversations about climate engineering research and governance. 
Each of the three preceding manuscripts drew upon qualitative data collected through 89 
interviews with 100 individuals from Kenya, the Solomon Islands, and Alaska. While drawing 
from the same data set, each manuscript is designed to speak back to a different set of current 
discussions about climate engineering. The First Manuscript was designed to bring perspectives 
from vulnerable populations into dialogue with previous social science research on public 
perceptions of climate engineering and other controversial technologies. The First Manuscript is 
referred to as the ‘Perspectives Manuscript’ for the remainder of this chapter to help avoid 
confusion. The Second Manuscript (hereafter the ‘Ethics Manuscript’) was designed to compare 
interviewee perspectives with existing ethical examinations of climate engineering, and 
particularly ethical considerations of the potential impacts of climate engineering on vulnerable 
populations. Finally, the Third Manuscript (hereafter the ‘Governance Manuscript’) was intended 
to inform existing debates about how climate engineering should be governed based on 
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perspectives from vulnerable populations. While each manuscript was orientated towards a 
different body of literature, there are important synergies between them. The goal of this 
concluding chapter is to explore some of these synergies and the insights that emerge from 
examining the findings as a whole. This chapter also suggests directions for future research and 
policy making that following from this exploration.  
In order to facilitate this discussion, the section directly below recaps the key findings 
and conclusions from each manuscript, while examining how they relate to one another. This 
recap is followed by an expanded exploration of recommendations for future research based on 
the three manuscripts. Finally, the chapter then concludes with some closing remarks about this 
study and its place in the broader context of climate engineering research. 
 
Chapter 3: The Perspectives Manuscript 
 The Perspectives Manuscript was most directly informed by, and designed to speak back 
to, previous social science research examining people’s perspectives on climate engineering. As 
noted in that manuscript, there have been quite a few studies to date examining what people in 
wealthy, developed nations think about climate engineering. There have been far fewer 
assessments of what people in developing countries think, and no studies to date of what 
indigenous peoples in developed countries think about climate engineering.  
The Perspectives Manuscript provided the broadest overview of interviewee perspectives 
on climate engineering, touching on prior awareness of the topic, overall responses to it, and 
several common concerns about it. This manuscript also indicated that one of the most striking 
findings in the data set was that interviewees often expressed similar views on a range of 
different issues related to climate engineering, despite the considerable geographic and cultural 
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diversity across the three sites. As such, all three manuscripts focused predominately on 
commonly held perspectives across all three sites rather than comparing and contrasting different 
perspectives between them.  
Specific findings reported in the Perspectives Manuscript included the fact that 
interviewees were largely unaware of climate engineering prior to being interviewed for this 
study. Of the 100 interviewees, 88 held little to no prior knowledge about climate engineering, 
while only four interviewees were very familiar with the topic. Despite these low levels of prior 
awareness, interviewees were eager to learn more and discuss their perspectives. One of the 
primary reasons for their interest was that interviewees were deeply concerned about climate 
change impacts, and economic, psychological, and cultural toll of those impacts. Interviewees’ 
concerns about climate change and frustration with what they viewed as lackluster mitigation 
efforts by major emitters laid a foundation for their perspectives on climate engineering. More 
specifically, interviewees felt like they had to be willing to consider alternative means of 
addressing climate change. As such, the large majority of interviewees expressed reluctant 
acceptance of the need to consider climate engineering.  
This documentation and explanation of the idea of reluctant acceptance was perhaps the 
most critical finding reported in the Perspectives Manuscript. The term originates in social 
science examinations of public perceptions nuclear power (Corner et al., 2011), and has been 
mentioned in one previous study of public perceptions of climate engineering in the United 
Kingdom (Pidgeon et al., 2012). However, these past studies have been conducted in wealthy, 
developed nations. Never before has the term been used to describe vulnerable populations’ 
responses to an emergent technology, much less climate engineering.  
163 
 
The utility of the term suggests that not only is it an apt descriptor, but that it also could 
be developed into a useful conceptual framework for comparing and contrasting perspectives on 
controversial technologies across diverse populations. More specifically, the idea of reluctant 
acceptance appears particularly helpful for examining and explaining seemingly paradoxical 
perspectives when people consider potential benefits and drawbacks to controversial 
technologies (Pidgeon et al., 2012). Future social science research could utilize reluctant 
acceptance to compare and contrast the reasons why different populations express different 
levels of support and/or opposition to climate engineering. In doing so, researchers could work 
towards transforming reluctant acceptance into a conceptual framework that provides both 
explanatory and comparative power in studies of public perceptions of controversial 
technologies. 
A related idea that contributed to the findings presented in the Perspectives Manuscript 
was conditional acceptance. Again appearing in one past study on climate engineering in the 
United Kingdom, but not yet in research outside of wealthy, developed countries, researchers 
have used the term to suggest that public support or approval of a novel technology may in fact 
be highly contingent upon certain conditions of acceptability (Macnaghten & Szerszynski, 2013). 
Conditional acceptance in this study proved a helpful framework for examining ways in which 
interviewees’ perspectives were embedded in a sophisticated recognition of contemporary social, 
political, and economic realities, as well as the future that climate engineering could bring about. 
Three conditions of acceptability were emphasized in this manuscript: the inclusion of diverse 
perspectives in future climate engineering research and governance initiatives; insistence that 
climate engineering not distract or detract from mitigation and adaptation efforts; and that 
climate engineering technologies be developed in such a way as to empower vulnerable 
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populations to address climate change. As such, conditional acceptance also appears to be an 
idea that if intentionally employed in future social science research on emerging technologies 
could be developed into a useful conceptual tool for comparing the circumstances under which 
different people consider the development and use of technologies legitimate and justified. 
Overall, the findings presented in the Perspectives Manuscript push beyond previous calls 
to engage diverse populations in dialogue about climate engineering by beginning to concretely 
indicate some of the substantive ways that diverse perspectives can inform future research and 
governance efforts. Interviewees in this study discussed a number of potential benefits and 
drawbacks to climate engineering that have not previously appeared in the literature. Inclusion of 
diverse perspectives in future research and governance efforts can help ensure that scientists, 
engineers, and decision-makers take into consideration the widest possible potential set of 
perspectives on potential benefits and drawbacks of different technologies. 
 
Connections to the other manuscripts 
The Perspectives Manuscript in many ways lays the foundation for the Ethics and 
Governance Manuscripts by providing an overview of interviewee perspectives on both climate 
change and climate engineering. Appreciating interviewee concerns about climate change, and 
frustration with current mitigation and adaptation efforts is critical to understanding their 
perspectives on all the various aspects of climate engineering explored in the other two 
manuscripts. Similarly, the idea of reluctant acceptance, and its ability to explain interviewees’ 
seemingly paradoxical willingness to consider, but extreme discomfort with, climate engineering 
was central to the findings explored in both the Ethics and Governance Manuscripts. Conditional 
acceptance, and recognition that interviewees suggested certain conditions that would be critical 
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for future support of climate engineering research also featured in both. More specifically, in the 
Ethics Manuscript, reluctant and conditional acceptance helped to explain why interviewees were 
still willing to consider climate engineering while fully recognizing and being concerned about 
the ways in which it could exacerbate existing global inequalities. In the Governance 
Manuscript, reluctant and conditional acceptance helped to explain why interviewees preferred 
certain governance options over others. In other words, the Perspectives Manuscript introduced 
and laid the conceptual groundwork for key concepts used throughout the remainder of the 
dissertation. The utility of reluctant and conditional acceptance suggests that they may be helpful 
concepts for connecting social science research to other disciplines. 
 
Chapter 4: The Ethics Manuscript 
The Ethics Manuscript was designed to bring the empirical findings from this study into 
dialogue with ethical examinations of global justice questions related to climate engineering. The 
data and analyses presented were intended to cast light on how interviewee hopes and fears about 
climate engineering related to concerns expressed by ethicists about potential impacts of climate 
engineering on vulnerable populations. Unfortunately, this type of cross-disciplinary discussion 
is rare. This manuscript provides a unique opportunity for ethicists to see how their thoughts 
about different aspects of climate engineering actually relate to those of the populations on 
whose behalf they have argued. 
The Ethics Manuscript focused on the publications of three ethicists who have asserted 
that vulnerable populations should have a voice in climate engineering research and governance. 
Those three ethicists are Dale Jamieson (1996), Stephen Gardiner (2011), and Christopher 
Preston (2012). All three authors point out that a baseline justification for the inclusion of 
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vulnerable populations is simply that people who are going to be impacted by an experiment or 
environmental intervention deserve a say. However, they also all go on to point out that climate 
engineering research and deployment could compound existing skewed vulnerabilities. Gardiner 
(2011) also suggests that current generations in affluent, developed nations must be on guard 
against ‘moral corruption,’ or the use of seemingly persuasive arguments for climate engineering 
that could actually constitute a means of further exploiting their position of power.  
The perspectives expressed by interviewees corresponded to a large degree with many of 
the concerns articulated by ethicists. As such, one of the primary findings in the Ethics 
Manuscript is that ethicists have anticipated many of the moral issues that are also of concern to 
vulnerable populations. More specifically, both ethicists and interviewees were concerned that 
climate engineering had the potential to exacerbate existing global injustices, particularly 
injustices related to climate change. However, interviewees also spoke extensively about the 
‘background state of global injustice’ or the history of colonialism, global poverty, and 
inequality that climate change arose out of. While ethicists had previously touched on this state 
of affairs, interviewees went even further to indicate that they thought climate engineering could 
constitute an extension of the exploitation and marginalization that vulnerable populations have 
been subject to in the past (Whyte 2012a).  
This was perhaps the most critical finding presented in the Ethics Manuscript as it 
indicated that ethicists have by-and-large overlooked the ways in which climate engineering 
could extend the influence and control dominant societies already exert over many vulnerable 
populations. This finding indicates that future ethical examinations of climate engineering need 
to pay greater attention to the ways that climate engineering is both embedded within and likely 
to further exploit political and cultural inequalities. 
167 
 
The Ethics Manuscript concluded by extending Gardiner’s (2011) consideration of the 
potential for dominant societies in wealthy developed nations to succumb to moral corruption. 
Scientists, decision-makers, and members of the public in affluent, developed nations could 
justify research and development of climate engineering technologies based on the fact that 
members of vulnerable populations around the world are desperate for solutions to climate 
change. However, if dominant societies use this justification of ‘helping the vulnerable’ to 
overlook ways that climate engineering could actually exacerbate other global inequalities, then 
they would be capitulating to moral corruption. Therefore, I argue that people in positions of 
power must be very careful to be sure that climate engineering proposals do not ultimately make 
vulnerable populations worse off.  
Overall the Ethics Manuscript demonstrates the potential benefits of interdisciplinary 
research on climate engineering. The findings in the study indicate that ethicists have anticipated 
many of the concerns that vulnerable populations have about climate engineering. The dialogue 
between ethics and social science is particular productive, as ethical explorations suggest ideas 
that merit social science investigation. At the same time, the findings in the Ethics Manuscript 
reveal gaps in the ethical arguments and extend them in several important ways. Finally, this 
manuscript illustrates how social science data and analyses can indicate how different issues 
become constituted as ethical concerns for different populations, and how the ethical concerns 
proposed by scholars manifest themselves differently in different settings.  
 
Connections to the other manuscripts 
The Ethics Manuscript takes several of the key issues explored in the Perspectives 
Manuscript and provides even greater depth and background. More specifically, the Ethics 
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Manuscript provides a deeper explanation of the context in which vulnerable populations 
encounter and respond to climate engineering. For example, as in the Perspectives Manuscript, 
the Ethics Manuscript discusses the desperation of interviewees to see climate change addressed, 
leading to reluctant acceptance in relation to climate engineering. However, the Ethics 
Manuscript expands the Perspectives Manuscript’s examination of the factors contributing to that 
reluctant acceptance. In addition to the serious concerns interviewees had about the potential for 
negative impacts, as discussed in the Perspectives Manuscript, the Ethics Manuscript explored 
how these concerns were embedded in a deep sense of mistrust of Western science and 
environmental interventions due to long histories of marginalization and exploitation. As such, 
interviewees felt that climate engineering put them in a precarious position, one in which they 
were being severely harmed by a problem they did not create, while also being offered a less 
than ideal solution that could very well exacerbate underlying injustices.  
As with the Perspectives Manuscripts then, the Ethics Manuscript indicates specific ways 
that perspectives from vulnerable populations can enhance future climate engineering research 
and governance efforts. The Ethics Manuscript suggests that future engagement efforts should 
create space for participants from vulnerable populations to discuss the broader historical, social, 
and political backgrounds that their concerns are embedded within. Furthermore, future research 
should help scientists and decision-makers from dominant societies recognize the importance of 
these histories. By examining the broader context in which interviewees encountered climate 
engineering, the Ethics Manuscript also helps explain why interviewees were adamant that they 
have a presence and voice in decision-making about climate engineering as discussed in the 
Governance Manuscript.  
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Chapter 5: The Governance Manuscript 
The Governance Manuscript was informed by and designed to speak back to ongoing 
discussions about how climate engineering should be governed. Commentators largely agree that 
no existing international organizations or international environmental agreements are up to the 
task, at least in their current formulations (Blackstock & Ghosh, 2011; Dalby, 2015; Low et al., 
2013; Virgoe, 2009). Therefore scholars have developed a number of suggestions for what either 
a completely new governance framework, or co-opted version of an existing framework, should 
look like (Lin, forthcoming; Rayner et al., 2013). One of the critical debates in this discussion 
has been how to balance efficiency in decision-making with inclusivity. Some authors have 
suggested that a governance regime based on limited membership would enable more efficient 
decision-making, resulting in legitimacy based on the efficacy of outcomes (Lloyd & 
Oppenheimer, 2014). However, the majority of commentators who have weighed in to date 
appear to favor legitimacy in decision-making based on inclusion, and particularly the inclusion 
of vulnerable populations (Blackstock & Long, 2010; Low et al., 2013; Rayner et al., 2013; 
Suarez et al., 2013). Very few studies have actually asked members of vulnerable populations 
how they would like to see climate engineering governed. This is the primary gap in the 
literature this manuscript was intended to help fill. 
Along those lines, the first key finding reported in the Governance Manuscript was that 
interviewees were adamant that any climate engineering governance regime must be broadly 
inclusive and ensure the representation of vulnerable populations. Interviewees were fearful of 
powerful nations making decisions on climate engineering without consulting them. Interviewees 
therefore indicated that in their opinion, legitimacy in climate engineering governance would 
come from broad representation, not efficiency in decision-making. With this in mind, many 
170 
 
interviewees suggested that the UNFCCC was the most logical governance forum because of its 
near universal membership and consensus based decision-making process.  
However, interviewees also mentioned a number of potential downsides to the UNFCCC. 
Alaska Native interviewees, for example, were quick to point out that indigenous peoples—
particularly in the United States—do not feel represented in UN climate talks. This finding 
illustrates how restricting the definition of vulnerable populations to developing countries in the 
Global South, as past studies have done, overlooks the experiences and perspectives of 
vulnerable groups in the Global North. While interviewees from the Solomon Islands and Kenya 
did value the fact that their countries were afforded a seat at the table in UN climate talks, 
interviewees from all three sites lamented the inability of vulnerable populations to actually 
affect decisions at the global level. As such, interviewees suggested vulnerable populations 
experienced a tension between inclusion at the international level, and capacity to affect global 
decision-making processes. 
Based on this tension, quite a few interviewees from all three sites suggested that perhaps 
regional organizations (ROs) could play a role in governing climate engineering. Interestingly, 
the few past studies that have examined the governance preferences of vulnerable populations 
have all mentioned specific ROs (AAS & SRMGI, 2013; Beyerl & Maas, 2014; Winickoff et al., 
2015). However, none of them have explored why participants thought ROs could play a role in 
governance efforts. Furthermore, the broader literature on climate engineering governance has 
almost completely overlooked the regional scale. As a result, a key contribution the governance 
makes is the explicit examination of how and why regional organizations could play a part in the 
governance of climate engineering. This manuscript draws on a growing body of research on 
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regionalism in the international relations literature to provide some theoretical grounding for 
interviewee perspectives on the matter.  
Both interviewees and regionalism scholars indicate that regional organizations could 
help to bridge national and international governance efforts (Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2012; Van 
Langenhove, 2013). Regional organizations would be able to do so because they work at the 
multi-lateral level, but with a limited geographical scope. Interviewees felt that ROs were 
inclusive of indigenous populations and developing nations. Interviewees also thought that ROs 
would be better positioned to represent their interests and perspectives because they are 
connected to local and national problems, cultures, economies, and politics. At the same time, 
interviewees perceived ROs to have greater influence at the global level because they 
represented multiple countries and populations (Maslow, 2009). In fact, several interviewees 
indicated that they would consider certain ROs even better representatives of their perspectives 
in international forums because they were less corrupt and more influential than national 
governments.  
Interviewees and governance scholars also suggest that ROs could help build the capacity 
of vulnerable populations (Lian & Robinson, 2002; Selin, 2009). By pooling resources and 
acting as an intermediary between the international and national level, regional organizations 
could allow developing countries and indigenous groups to develop their own policies and 
perspectives. By doing so, regional organizations also enable such groups to more effectively 
contribute to research and policy-making at the international level.  
While interviewees focused predominately on potential benefits of enhanced regional 
governance in relation to climate engineering, they did not view it as a panacea for addressing all 
their concerns. IR scholars who have written about regionalism have highlighted several 
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potential downsides to regional organizations that interviewees did not mention, but are 
important to acknowledge in relation to climate engineering. First, there is an active debate about 
whether regional governance forums would help bolster or further fragment international 
environmental governance. Second, even when pooling resources, developing nations and 
indigenous populations still require additional financial or technical support from either global 
institutions or developed nations. Third, unequal levels of regional regulation, or capacity to 
monitor and enforce regulation, could lead scientists to seek out the most permissive 
environments to conduct field tests, resulting in the exportation of hazards. Despite these 
concerns, the overall findings in this study, in dialogue with the growing literature on 
regionalism, strongly suggest a need for greater attention to regional organizations in future 
research on and discussions about climate engineering governance.  
 
Connections to the other manuscripts 
In many respects, the Governance Manuscript puts forward the culminating research and 
policy recommendations that the Perspectives and Ethics Manuscripts lay the groundwork for. 
The Perspectives Manuscript indicates that vulnerable populations are willing to consider climate 
engineering out of desperation for solutions to climate change. However, these same populations 
are reluctant to see climate engineering put forward as a solution, and only willing to see 
discussions on the topic move forward if vulnerable populations are included in future research 
and governance efforts. The Governance Manuscript builds off of those findings to examine how 
vulnerable populations would like to be included in future research and governance efforts, and 
how they want climate engineering governed. The Governance Manuscript also examines the 
specific governance frameworks that interviewees discussed and the potential upsides and 
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downsides to those frameworks, informed by other theoretical considerations in the governance 
literature. 
The Ethics Manuscript in many ways provides even greater context for understanding 
interviewee perspectives on different governance frameworks. More specifically, the detailed 
discussion of how interviewees view climate engineering as embedded in broader histories of 
economic and political marginalization and exploitation helps explain why interviewees are so 
adamant that decision-making processes must be inclusive. These concerns also help explain 
why interviewees were advocating for regional organizations they thought could increase their 
power in decision-making forums. This background also helps explain why interviewees are 
adamant that inclusion, while necessary, is not a sufficient criteria for fair decision-making. 
Rather based on past experiences of dominant societies dictating decisions that affect the lives of 
vulnerable populations, interviewees wanted governance frameworks designed to provide them 
with the power and capacity to meaningfully participate and affect outcomes. In sum, the 
Governance Manuscript provides some of the most concrete recommendations for future 
research and policy-making efforts, but draws heavily on the findings and conclusions of the two 
manuscripts which precede it to provide a broader context for understanding those 
recommendations. 
 
Similarities and Differences in Perspectives across the Sample 
As discussed in the Methods Chapter the three manuscripts focus primarily on 
commonalities in interviewee perspectives across the sample rather than differences within or 
between the research sites. This focus on similarities was largely a product of the data itself. As 
discussed in both the Methods Chapter and Perspectives Article, to a large degree the 
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commonalities in perspectives across the three sites were quite striking during the analysis 
process. It was evident that in many ways that interviewee perspectives on climate change and 
climate engineering were more similar than different, despite the considerable geographic and 
cultural diversity within the sample.  
Furthermore, these commonly held views speak back to ongoing debates in the climate 
engineering literature in critical ways. The analysis process revealed areas where interviewees 
substantiated proposed but undocumented claims about the potential concerns that vulnerable 
populations might have about climate engineering. For instance, the Ethics Manuscript used 
commonly held concerns across the sample to indicate that vulnerable populations are likely to 
be concerned about some of the same issues ethicists have previously discussed. However, 
interviewees also suggested that ethicists have overlooked deeper, underlying concerns about 
control and domination that provide critical context for understanding concerns about other 
issues like lack of political influence.  
In order to convey these critical insights and speak back to gaps and ongoing debates in 
the climate engineering literature, the manuscripts focus to a large degree on similarities rather 
than differences. The goal of this section is to provide some deeper exploration of the range of 
views found within the sample by focusing on some interesting contrasts in interviewee 
perspectives on climate change, and how those differences informed perspectives on climate 
engineering. 
As discussed in all three manuscripts, the vast majority of interviewees were extremely 
concerned about climate change. Interviewee perspectives on climate engineering were in many 
respects deeply embedded in these concerns about climate change. Numerous examples of the 
types of concerns interviewees expressed and linkages to their perspectives on climate 
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engineering can be found in the three manuscripts and the supplemental data. This section 
provides more detail about a small minority of interviewees who expressed skepticism that 
climate change was being caused by human activities. Seven individuals, five Alaska Natives 
and two Kenyans, indicated that while they did think that climate change was happening, they 
also thought that changes were part of natural cycles, as described in the quote below from an 
interviewee in Alaska. 
I think it’s happening. We’ve just got to learn to live with it. That’s the way I look at it. 
There’s nothing I can do about it. I’m not going to stop the sun coming up, or the rain 
from falling. … I’ve got to learn to live with it, learn to live with the change. The way I 
look at it, every animal, including humans, is going to have to adapt one way or another 
with the climate change that’s happening. The ocean mammals, walruses, seals and stuff, 
they just have to adapt. If there’s no more ice, they’re going to have to do something else. 
But they’ll survive. Every species is made to survive. It’s in every animal, every species, 
every human, the instinct to survive is there. They’ll make it. We’ll all make it. 
 
Q: Any thoughts on whether the changes right now are natural or being caused by 
humans? 
 
A: I think it’s a natural cyclical change. It may have taken several hundred thousand 
years since the last time it warmed up like this, and at that time nobody tried anything. 
And I’m glad they didn’t. I just think it’s just a natural cycle that’s going on. You read 
about the Ice Age and stuff like that, eventually there might be another Ice Age or we’re 
at the peak of a warm spell and now heading down. That’s the way I look at it. 
 
As in the above quote, because these seven individuals viewed climate change as part and parcel 
of natural, cyclical processes, they were generally less concerned about impacts and thought that 
the clear focus should be on adaptation rather than mitigation. However, there was also an 
interesting difference between interviewees from Alaska and Kenya in terms of the reasons for 
their climate skepticism. 
In Alaska, the five climate skeptics linked their perspectives, as touched on in the quote 
above, to a pervasive narrative about the resilience and adaptability of indigenous peoples, 
particularly in the Arctic. This narrative was evident across interviews from Alaska, not just in 
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interviews where people expressed climate skepticism. For instance, several Alaska Native 
interviewees, as in the quote below (from one of the climate skeptics), indicated that both their 
oral tradition, as well as scientific evidence, told them that the Arctic had once been a much 
warmer climate.  
If we go back to the stories, at one point we used to be a very mild, moderate place. We 
had dinosaurs living up here; that’s how all the oil got underground and became fossil 
fuel. And then we had the Ice Age and then it went away. 
 
 These interviewees stated that Arctic indigenous peoples had witnessed dramatic climate 
changes in the past, and had successfully adapted to living in one of the harshest environments 
on the planet. As a result, they felt confident that they would be able to adapt to any future 
changes as well. 
 However, several interviewees, who were not climate skeptics, indicated that while the 
history and resilience of indigenous peoples is the predominant narrative, there are also other 
factors at play. More specifically, these interviewees indicated that they thought climate 
skepticism among their fellow Alaska Natives was tied directly to the fact that many 
communities, particularly on the North Slope of Alaska, receive significant income from oil and 
natural gas development and extraction. One interviewee in Barrow discussed this several times, 
stating at one point, “Alaska’s built on oil. … The borough gets all its money from oil, 
basically.” She went on to say that the potential impacts from fossil fuels on the local 
environment was rarely talked about. 
People here don’t like to talk about it. I’ve brought it up a couple times. I’m very careful 
about what I say, because it’s such a political town. But I did bring it up with a cousin 
who lives in Anchorage when I was there a couple weeks ago … she didn’t say anything. 
Silence. No opinion on the topic. It’s such a bad system. I don’t know where to start 
though. 
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This interviewee discussed how frustrated she was that Barrow was being so clearly harmed by 
climate change, but that no one in the town seemed to want to talk about the cause of the 
problem, much less the fact that they were receiving money from the very industry primarily 
responsible for the problem. The more important point for this discussion though, is that 
interviewees expressed complex and nuanced perspectives on climate change. Furthermore, there 
were not only differences in perspectives on climate change within each research site, but even 
disagreement between interviewees on the reason for those differences. While the climate 
skeptics said they thought the changes were natural based on traditional knowledge and 
important cultural narratives, some of their fellow community members said that current 
economic and political factors were also playing a role. 
 The two climate skeptics in Kenya, on the other hand, put forward an entirely different 
justification for their doubts that humans were causing climate change. For them, the underlying 
concern was also economic and political, but had more to do with the way climate change was 
being framed by scientists and politicians in wealthy, developed countries. For instance, one 
interviewee said, 
[Climate change] has been framed in a particular way. And for whose benefit? Because 
ask a simple question, what exactly is the difference between climate change and extreme 
weather variability? Isolate the impacts and you tell me. We have a problem of 
attribution. You attribute something, attribute the impacts to the extreme weather 
variability, and you tell me these are occurring because of the greenhouse gases. … Then 
you look at the market for the carbon credits and the question is, is this hot air? Is climate 
change hot air or is it a reality? 
 
This interviewee thought that climate change was happening, and even thought that humans were 
playing some role. But he also thought that the problem had been framed by both Western 
scientists and politicians in a way that oversimplified the causes and put forward solutions that 
benefitted some at the expense of others. He went on to elaborate how and why: 
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The whole development policy is well-schemed to benefit some people and others remain 
disenfranchised. Development policy, and climate change is becoming a development 
policy, you cannot delink it from development policy. Why? Because it’s a question of 
groupings of nations who are within a certain GDP level and the groupings of others who 
are in the middle and others who are down there, who are very vulnerable. You see now 
we want to almost attribute the poverty experienced by countries to climate change. I 
think that is a gross exaggeration. So when you look at it, it’s of course an economic 
strategy. At the end of it, there will be those who will gain and those who will lose. …  
I also look at it in terms of these arid areas, and everybody’s sending money there. 
But you also kill innovations in terms of fighting the challenges that are there. And what 
you get is patronage. They are rendered into beggars. So if the challenges that are there 
for climate change would actually be addressed within the framework of natural realities, 
so that then the communities adapt in a natural way, which is more sustainable than 
artificial interventions, then I think we would be moving to the right direction. Otherwise, 
some of the interventions cause people to become dependent on the artificial 
interventions, which are sometimes more cosmetic than the actual reality. I hope I’m not 
philosophizing too much. But because I look at the framework within which your 
discourse is positioned, I think that’s a good way of looking at it. 
 
On the whole, this quote provides a powerful display of the intricacy of interviewee perspectives 
on climate change. This interviewee is saying that he thinks climate change has started to be 
viewed as the cause of all the problems in developing countries. He goes on to indicate that not 
only is this a gross oversimplification of the problems in developing countries—which have 
much longer and more complicated histories, as touched on in the Ethics Manuscript—but it also 
leads to problematic ‘solutions’ that actually serve to make the problem worse in the long term. 
More specifically, he views climate related aid as a form of patronage that actually reduces the 
resilience of already vulnerable communities. He thinks that many of these communities would 
in fact be better off thinking about climate change as a natural phenomenon that they need to 
adapt to based off their own knowledge and resourcefulness rather than relying on outside help, 
which is not sustainable.  
 These different rationales for climate skepticism put forward in Alaska and Kenya 
indicate the range of perspectives on climate change found within the sample. They also provide 
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an example of the differences that were evident in interviewee perspectives both within and 
across the three research sites. Finally, they provide a powerful illustration of the complexity and 
nuance found within interviewee perspectives on climate change and climate engineering. 
Interviewees viewed both issues as embedded within long histories and inter-related social, 
political, and economic processes that operated at multiple scales from the local to the global.  
 At the same time, this exploration of climate skepticism in the sample also serves to 
bolster the claim that similarities across the sample dominated the findings. All seven of the 
climate skeptics arguably expressed similar overall perspectives on climate engineering to those 
examined in the three manuscripts. More specifically, all seven climate skeptics expressed 
reluctant and conditional acceptance of climate engineering, despite questioning whether or not 
humans were causing climate change. For example, one of the climate skeptics from Alaska 
expressed the following sentiment as his closing thought to the interview: 
My perspective is just leave it alone. Study it if it’s a possibility, it would be good to 
know if it could be done. But it’s just like making a nuclear bomb. They found out it 
could be done and it killed a lot of people, started a lot of wars. You don’t need to use it 
all the time, but you have it. In some extreme cases where climate engineering would be 
possible, if there’s a possibility of saving lives not at the expense of other lives—I know 
folks are talking about the whole earth cooling down or heating up or whatnot, I think 
that’s a natural cyclical cycle that goes however many thousands of years, every so often. 
But if climate engineering can be done to save lives, like hurricanes and stuff like that, in 
small isolated locations, without affecting the others all over the earth, great. That’s the 
way I look at it. 
 
As in the quote above, these individuals’ more skeptical attitudes towards climate change were 
evident in their perspectives on climate engineering. Viewing climate change as a natural process 
tended to make these interviewees more reticent to support any form of human interference with 
the climate system. At the same time, as in the quote above, these individuals all went on to say 
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that they could see at least some value in learning more about climate engineering. Therefore, 
they were reluctantly supportive of further research on the topic.  
The interviewee quoted above goes on to caution that scientific knowledge, even if 
sought with the best of intentions, can result in undesirable technologies and/or social and 
political outcomes. Referring specifically to the advent of nuclear weaponry (as did other 
interviewees, see the Ethics Manuscript for more detail), he suggests that we may be better off 
not knowing how to engineer the climate. But he goes on to suggest two conditions under which 
he would consider supporting the use of climate engineering: first that it could be used at local 
levels, and not impact people in other places; and second that it would be used to help people 
under direct threat from extreme weather. In sum, while suggesting that climate engineering may 
be a genie we do not want out of the bottle, this interviewee also indicates reluctant and 
conditional acceptance of future research on the topic. 
 In addition to fleshing out some of the range of perspectives within the sample, as well as 
the complexity of interviewee perspectives, the above discussion also provides additional context 
and evidence supporting the focus on commonly held perspectives in the three manuscripts. 
Rather than contradicting or undermining the findings and conclusions in those manuscripts, a 
deeper exploration of the range of perspectives in the sample actually serves to strengthen the 
arguments therein—arguments that critically inform the social science, ethics, and governance 
literature on this topic. 
 This examination of climate skepticism in the sample also speaks back to climate 
engineering literature in several ways not detailed in the three manuscripts. More specifically, 
the findings presented in this section connect with previous social science research on 
perceptions of climate engineering in two interesting ways. First, previous survey studies have 
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suggested that people who are more concerned about climate change are consistently more 
supportive of climate engineering as a potential response (Borick & Rabe, 2012; Corner & 
Pidgeon, 2015; Mercer et al., 2011; Pidgeon et al., 2012), while those who are more skeptical of 
climate change are less supportive of climate engineering.  
The seven climate skeptics in this sample did tend to express less support for climate 
engineering than interviewees who expressed greater concern about climate change. In some 
respects then, this study reaffirms the findings from past survey research. However, as discussed 
in the Perspectives Manuscript and directly above, interviewees from across this range of 
perspectives on climate change all expressed some form of reluctant and/or conditional 
acceptance. At the very least, interviewees who were skeptical of anthropogenic climate change 
sill indicated they saw value in continued research on climate engineering. On the opposite end 
of the spectrum, even those interviewees who were the most concerned about climate change 
expressed serious concerns and reservations about climate engineering. These findings reaffirm a 
conclusion discussed in the Perspectives Manuscript that people are unlikely to fall into clear cut 
categories of supporters or detractors (as suggested by Mercer et al., 2011), and rather are likely 
to express complicated, paradoxical, or even contradictory perspectives that contain elements of 
both support and opposition.  
Second, two previous studies have suggested that encountering the idea of climate 
engineering could actually cause climate skeptics to become more concerned about climate 
change (Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Kahan et al., 2015). However, these two studies purport different 
reasons for this finding. One of the studies, based on a public engagement exercise in the United 
Kingdom, found that participants became more concerned about climate change as they learned 
more about climate engineering. More specifically, they found that the fact that scientists were 
182 
 
talking about climate engineering made study participants take climate change more seriously 
and feel as though the situation must be worse than they previously thought (Ipsos-MORI, 2010). 
Conversely, Kahan et al. (2015) suggest that individuals who identified as less concerned about 
climate change actually become more concerned when presented with climate engineering. The 
researchers suggest climate engineering is a solution to climate change that is less implicative of 
certain values, including a belief in human ingenuity as a force for human flourishing, that 
climate skeptics tend to embrace. 
In this study, only one of the seven climate skeptics indicated that encountering the idea 
of climate engineering made her reconsider her perspective on climate change. This particular 
interviewee, an Alaska Native, stated the following after viewing the informational film: 
Wow! Kind of mind-boggling. What it did make me think is, I would really need to 
educate myself about to what degree mankind is contributing to the acceleration of the 
warming. … It would make me look at it closer, so that I could begin weighing out in my 
own mind how this all would work. It’s just something I never would have thought of. I 
was under the impression that unless we stop all these greenhouse gases, which nobody 
seems to be paying attention to, we’re just going to blow ourselves off the planet. 
Knowing that there’s some thought going into how to counter some of these effects is 
somewhat—I don’t know if the word is ‘comforting’ more than it is ‘reassuring.’ Maybe 
we’re not headed into Doomsville. [laughs] Because at the rate we’re going, that’s where 
I think we’re headed. And again it comes back to this respect that I think we need to re-
instill in humankind towards Mother Earth. 
 
In this rather complicated quote, this interviewee does indicate that climate engineering makes 
her take the problem of climate change more seriously. She says she would like to do more 
research about potential human contributions to climate change. She also indicates that her 
skepticism results in part from receiving mixed messages. On the one hand she hears people 
saying climate change is going to be catastrophic and “blow us off the planet.” On the other 
hand, she does not see people actually paying much attention to emissions, which overall seems 
to have had the effect of making her think that climate change was an overblown concern. 
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However, climate engineering seems to make her reconsider this point, and in fact think that 
perhaps it is true that climate change is a major concern. If so, she is glad that people are 
thinking about alternatives like climate engineering to prevent catastrophe. As such, this 
interviewee’s perspective appears to align more with the findings from the Ipsos-MORI (2010) 
study in the United Kingdom, indicating that climate engineering increases concern about 
climate change by indicating how desperate scientists think the situation is.  
Furthermore, this interviewee indicates that in contrast with Kahan et al.’s (2015) 
findings, her change in perspective is not about finding a solution that champions human 
ingenuity or overcoming environmental constraints. Rather, she is interested in solutions that 
help re-instill a respect for Mother Earth. She went on to speak at length about how she was part 
of several global indigenous networks that were all working on integrating traditional knowledge 
and practices back into indigenous schools.  
What this finding indicates then is that perhaps there is another reason that climate 
engineering allows people to engage with climate change—it provides a source of hope. This 
was in fact a sentiment expressed by interviewees from all three sites. For instance, an 
interviewee from Kenya said, “It is a way of feeling slightly less depressed about the potential 
future for our grandchildren. … On the climate front, we’ve got this massive potential disaster on 
our hands, but climate engineering gives us a little bit of potential hope.” An interviewee from 
the Solomon Islands went into even greater detail, stating: 
Now we have climate engineering here. Okay, someone is going to make clouds that 
bounce off light. You know, I think that’s a light somewhere out there on the horizon for 
islands like us in the Solomons. All we talk about is: there’s nothing much we can do; 
most of the emissions are done by bigger countries and we have no control over how 
much they emit; we are so tiny, our voice is not heard. So all we can do at the local level: 
you don’t burn rubbish; you don’t cut down your trees because they absorb carbon, those 
little things. The other side is, you just have to adapt. Just help yourself so you can work 
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along with the changes. Climate engineering coming onto the scene would make some 
communities think, “Yeah, I think there are some chances for us to keep on staying on 
our islands.”  
 
In both quotes, the interviewees indicated that they were extremely concerned about climate 
change. Both interviewees also spoke at length about frustration that so little was being done to 
address the problem, particularly by large emitters. So while they came at climate engineering 
from a very different perspective than the interviewee from Alaska quoted above, they similarly 
felt that climate engineering at least provided some hope in the face of an overwhelming 
problem. This is certainly a perspective on climate engineering that deserves greater attention in 
future research. 
 
Governance and Public Engagement Recommendations 
As discussed at length in the Governance Manuscript, there are currently no international 
environmental agreements that comprehensively address climate engineering. Similarly, there 
are not any climate engineering specific policies or regulatory structures in place within the 
United States. As such, there are very few climate engineering specific policies for this research 
to speak back to. Furthermore, there are no ongoing processes that I am aware of to develop such 
policies within the United States or internationally. As such, this section follows in the footsteps 
of many of the works cited in the Governance Manuscript and makes recommendations for how 
climate engineering should be governed based on the findings presented in this study. As public 
engagement is likely to play a critical role in any governance framework on climate engineering, 
this section also examines some recommendations for how to improve future engagement efforts 
as well. 
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Governance Recommendations 
The findings from this study, across all three manuscripts, indicate that there is an 
immediate need for formal governance structures to be established to address climate 
engineering at multiple scales. A number of authors from a variety of backgrounds have called 
for formal governance arrangements in recent years (Keith et al., 2010; Morgan et al., 2013; 
Winickoff & Brown, 2013). However, the findings presented in this study add three new 
wrinkles to previous calls for governance. 
First, this study demonstrates more potently than any previous study the potential 
importance of the regional scale in the overall matrix of climate engineering governance. 
Previous calls have focused on the need for individual countries to establish governance 
frameworks (Morgan et al., 2013; Winickoff & Brown, 2013). Other authors have focused on a 
need for global governance, or at least coordination of national efforts at the global scale (Keith 
et al., 2010). This study suggests that there is also a critical level of governance that may need to 
be thoughtfully developed at the regional scale to act as an intermediary between the national 
and international. If done properly, regional governance frameworks could enhance the efficacy 
and perceived legitimacy of both national and international governance efforts. 
Second, this study indicates that one of the key reasons for establishing governance at 
multiple scales should be to help develop mechanisms for the inclusion of vulnerable populations 
in decision-making processes. Previous examinations of perspectives from vulnerable 
populations have contained similar recommendations (AAS & SRMGI, 2013; Lefale & 
Anderson, 2014; Winickoff et al., 2015). However, this study suggests a justification for 
inclusion that other studies have so far overlooked. As discussed in all three manuscripts, 
vulnerable populations may view climate engineering as a means by which dominant societies 
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exert control over their economies and cultures. Formal governance mechanisms therefore, need 
to be established at multiple scales in the near future to ensure that vulnerable populations are 
able to bring these concerns to the attention of scientists and decision-makers. Including 
members of vulnerable populations in governance arrangements can help to prevent climate 
engineering from exacerbating existing global injustices. 
Third, the findings in this study also indicate that governance frameworks, particularly in 
the United States, but in other developed countries as well, need to include indigenous and other 
disproportionately vulnerable minority populations in research and decision-making. Indigenous 
populations in particular have been overlooked to date, even in discussions about the need to 
include vulnerable populations in climate engineering research and governance. This study 
indicates that Alaska Natives share a number of concerns about climate change and climate 
engineering with other vulnerable populations around the world. As such, their perspectives are 
unlikely to feature in discussions about climate engineering within the United States that focus 
on dominant economic and political interests. Future governance efforts must be sure to include 
indigenous voices, and ensure that they have meaningful input into decision-making processes.  
Along these lines, this study strongly suggests that governance models at national, 
regional, and international levels must consider how to ensure that vulnerable populations are 
able to have an impact on the decisions being made. This will likely mean that governance 
bodies will have to actively debate the type of decision-making process that they will embrace 
(i.e. majority rule, a form of consensus, or some other method). As Whyte (2012a) suggests, 
vulnerable populations not only need to have a say in decisions about climate engineering, but 
also in decisions about how decisions will be made. 
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Suggestions for Future Public Engagement Efforts 
Many of the calls for formal governance on climate engineering have also included 
suggestions that broad based public engagement be a part of any governance arrangement 
(Rayner et al., 2013; House of Commons, 2010; Royal Society, 2009). Several public 
engagement exercises have been carried out in the United Kingdom over the past several years 
(Corner et al., 2013; Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Macnaghten & Szerszynski, 2013). But few if any such 
processes have been carried out in other parts of the world. The findings presented in this study 
indicate several specific recommendations for what future engagement efforts should look like. 
First, the results presented in this study indicate that any governance framework 
developed in the United States on climate engineering should involve public engagement 
processes. A growing number of scientists in the United States are actively engaged in climate 
engineering research. Yet there have been no efforts to date to reach out to the public for input 
on what the goals of a domestic research program should be. In the United Kingdom, several 
such efforts have already been carried out (see Bellamy & Lezaun, 2015 for a review). These 
efforts have been conducted to explore public perceptions of climate engineering, but also to 
inform specific decisions about research agendas and proposed field trials (see for instance 
Corner et al., 2013; Ipsos-MORI, 2010; Macnaghten & Szerszynski, 2013; Stilgoe et al., 2013). 
There is a more robust history of public engagement efforts related to emergent technologies in 
Europe, stemming from controversies over genetically modified organisms in the 1990s, which 
by-and-large did not take place in the United States (Gaskell et al., 1999; Wilsdon & Willis, 
2004). As a result, this disparity in engagement processes on climate engineering is not 
surprising. However, there have been calls for greater public engagement in the United States 
with emergent technologies (Leshner, 2003). Furthermore, a successful public engagement 
188 
 
exercise on nanotechnology was recently carried out in the United States and provides a model 
for future efforts at the national level (Guston, 2014).  
As explored in detail in the prior publication in Appendix H, titled “Swimming upstream: 
Engaging the American public early on climate engineering,” there are a number of reasons why 
public engagement could enhance research and policy-making processes and outcomes. For 
instance, public engagement processes could highlight potential risks and uncertainties that 
scientists are currently overlooking, or help inform agendas for federally funded research on 
climate engineering. The findings from this study also indicate that public engagement processes 
in the United States should include indigenous populations. There are multiple avenues for doing 
so, but perhaps the most effective means would be to work with groups like the Alaska Native 
Science Commission or the American Indian Science and Engineering Society to ensure that 
representatives of indigenous communities participate in the design and execution of the 
engagement process.  
In addition to developing processes for public engagement within the United States, 
wealthy developed nations should also begin partnering with developing nations to help build 
their capacity to engage in climate engineering research and governance. Any such effort will 
necessarily involve substantial awareness building for the public, but also for scientists and 
decision-makers within developing countries. As such, and as discussed in greater detail below 
in the recommendations for future research, any future climate engineering research projects in 
the United States should require partnerships with other countries. The United States could work 
with regional organizations or individual nations to help develop awareness building tools to be 
used in diverse settings. These awareness building efforts should ultimately be followed-up with 
public engagement exercises in developing countries. These types of regional and international 
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partnerships between those developed nations already working on climate engineering, and 
vulnerable developing nations will be critical for enabling informed national, regional, and 
global dialogue. 
Finally, as Corner and Pidgeon (2010) and Corner et al. (2012) point out, public 
engagement on climate engineering will face the difficulties encountered by all attempts to 
include publics in decision-making processes. Some challenges include decisions about how 
engagement processes are structured, how information is framed, who participates, and how the 
results feed into actual decisions. The results from this study indicate that public engagement 
exercises will need to pay particular attention to this final concern related to how results feed into 
decision-making. As detailed in the Governance Manuscript, interviewees across all three sites 
indicated that the participation of vulnerable populations, while necessary, would not be 
sufficient for legitimate decision-making. Interviewees did not want to simply be ‘consulted’ in 
decisions that could affect their livelihoods and cultures. They wanted a meaningful say in the 
decisions themselves. As a result, public engagement processes will need to have clear ties to 
decision-making processes and be able to demonstrate how perspectives expressed in the 
engagement exercise influenced outcomes. 
  
Directions for Future Research 
In addition to the recommendations for future research found in each of the manuscripts, 
there are several additional suggestions that emerge as a result of the study as a whole.  
 
Post-Paris Follow-up 
UNFCCC negotiations have recently produced a new global agreement on climate 
change mitigation. It would be interesting to conduct a follow-up study to examine whether or 
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not the Paris Agreement has any effect on perceptions of climate change and/or climate 
engineering among vulnerable populations. On the one hand, the historic achievement of a global 
agreement on emissions reductions could provide a sense of hope for addressing climate change 
that was not present when interviews were conducted for this study. However, it has also been 
widely recognized that the commitments made by the Paris Agreement signatories will not 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic warming. As a result, vulnerable populations may be even 
more open to alternatives like climate engineering based on a sense that mitigation efforts will 
not abate many of the worst impacts from climate change. 
The results of this study, specifically findings related to reluctant and conditional 
acceptance, indicate that vulnerable population perspectives on climate engineering are likely to 
be highly contingent upon how the future unfolds. Depending on the evolution of both climate 
change impacts and policies, future studies could find that the threshold for acceptance of 
climate engineering shifts. If climate change impacts continue to worsen and more stringent 
emissions reductions are not realized, vulnerable populations may become stronger advocates for 
research and/or deployment. As such, it would be interesting to document current perspectives, 
immediately in the wake of the Paris Agreement, and then track changes in those perspectives 
over time as the effectiveness of that agreement becomes more apparent.  
 
The Necessity of Interdisciplinary and International Collaboration 
Because global agreements on mitigation may not prevent dangerous warming, national, 
regional, and international research programs on climate engineering need to be established in 
the near future and built around interdisciplinary and international collaboration. Interviewees in 
this study provided nuanced perspectives and insights that insert new ideas into on social, ethical, 
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and political discussions and debates. Furthermore, as discussed extensively in the Ethics and 
Governance Manuscripts, inclusion of vulnerable populations may be necessary for future 
research and governance efforts to be considered ethically justified and politically legitimate. 
Any future funding for climate engineering research should require international engagement of 
some form. Even if a project is restricted to computer modeling studies, researchers should be 
required to collaborate with colleagues in developing countries or members of indigenous 
groups. Such collaborations would result not only in awareness building among vulnerable 
populations, but also in the enhancement of the research by exposure to new and different ideas 
and perspectives. 
Along these same lines, future research should be built around greater interdisciplinary 
collaboration. The study was designed primarily to fill a gap in the social science literature on 
climate engineering, as very few studies had attempted to examine the perspectives of vulnerable 
populations. This study design was informed by an interdisciplinary team of advisors that 
included experts in both the ethics and governance of climate engineering. Through this 
collaborative effort, the results of the study, though firmly grounded in social science theory and 
methods, also speak back to the ethics and governance literature. For instance, this study 
provides empirical support for Preston’s (2012) assertion that climate engineering could 
exacerbate the already skewed vulnerabilities of climate change for vulnerable populations. 
However, the data presented also deepens Preston’s analysis of how climate engineering might 
do so by revealing an underlying concern about the further erosion of self-determination. As 
such, the findings presented in both the Ethics and Governance Manuscripts supplement and 
extend previous assessments of ethical and governance considerations.  
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Finally, the connections between the three manuscripts explored above indicate that 
social, political, and ethical aspects of climate engineering are all inherently linked. As Low et 
al. (2013) point out, climate engineering is not a topic that can be considered in isolation; it is 
inexorably tied to many other issues. Similarly, it is not an issue that can be adequately explored 
by any on discipline in isolation. Future research designed and carried out by interdisciplinary 
teams could continue to build on some of the disciplinary and conceptual connections put 
forward in this dissertation. For example, social scientists and international relations scholars 
could work together to assess different regional organizations based both on their mandate and 
capacity, as well as their perceived legitimacy and relevance among key stakeholders and 
members of the public.  
 
Methodological Considerations: Strengths of Qualitative Approaches 
The findings presented in the three manuscripts also have implications for the 
methodological approach of future studies examining social, ethical, and political aspects of 
climate engineering. All three manuscripts suggest that perspectives on climate engineering are 
still forming. As such it is important to provide people with space to develop and potentially 
even change their opinions over the course of a conversation. Furthermore, even though nascent, 
people’s perspectives are likely to be nuanced and involve tensions if not flat out contradictions. 
As explored in detail in the Perspectives Manuscript, and well captured by the term reluctant 
acceptance, vulnerable populations are likely to wrestle with hopes and fears about the impacts 
of climate engineering technologies. They are also likely to discuss social, political, and ethical 
issues, and ultimately the type of world that climate engineering might bring about. Furthermore, 
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as explored in detail in the Ethics Manuscript, their perspectives are likely to be deeply 
enmeshed in broader social and political contexts and histories.  
As such, any method for exploring people’s perspectives on climate engineering should 
make room to accommodate the discussion and exploration of these types of contexts, concerns, 
and tensions. One Alaska Native interviewee spoke extensively about this, as explored in the 
Perspectives Manuscript, indicating that vulnerable populations in particular are likely to need 
space to express how they view climate engineering within a much broader history. Her 
suggestions align well with the recommendations of science and technology studies scholars. For 
instance, Jasanoff (2003) commends individual centered, qualitative assessments of the potential 
risks and benefits of new technologies. She suggests these approaches are better suited to factors 
like history, place, and social connectedness that often play crucial roles in determining how 
people view the potential risks and benefits of a new technology. Similarly, Corner et al. (2012) 
indicate that interviews in particular can allow a much deeper understanding of attitudes and 
opinions about topics like climate engineering when prior awareness is low. Interviews also 
allow study participants to express more nuanced perspectives than other methods might enable. 
As a result, future social science research should continue to embrace interview methodologies 
that allow people to express nuanced, and potentially even contradictory ideas. Furthermore, the 
exploration of these tensions revealed the most interesting insights across all three manuscripts. 
Along these same lines, the findings and resulting insights presented in the three 
manuscripts indicate the importance of not only documenting diverse perspectives on climate 
engineering, but also bringing them into discussion with theory. As noted in the Perspectives and 
Governance Manuscripts, there have only been three studies to date documenting what 
vulnerable populations think about climate engineering. Only one is a peer reviewed journal 
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article (Winickoff et al., 2015). The other two are non-peer reviewed meeting summaries from 
workshops in Africa (AAS & SRMGI, 2013) and the South Pacific (Beyerl & Maas, 2014). 
While these reports provide much needed insights into perspectives on climate engineering from 
regions vulnerable to climate change, it is also important to recognize that they do not provide 
the same depth of analysis expected of peer reviewed social science. This added depth is critical 
to ensuring that diverse perspectives function to help ‘open-up’ discussions around climate 
engineering to the, “widest possible range of perspectives, and illustrate the ways in which 
particular societal courses of action depend on the particular values, perspectives, or framings 
that are privileged” (Cairns, forthcoming, p. 2). In other words, diverse perspectives can help 
expose and unpack the assumptions shaping emerging science and technology. However, 
enabling them to do so often requires an additional level of analysis not often present in meeting 
reports. 
To utilize a helpful distinction provided by O’Doherty and Burgess (2009), the reports 
based off the meetings in Africa and the South Pacific can be thought of as ‘deliberative 
outputs,’ which rely on explicit collective statements by participants to compile an overview of 
deliberations on a given topic. In other words, deliberative outputs are distillations of data, either 
qualitative or quantitative, into a form that can be easily digested and utilized by decision makers 
or the public. Deliberative outputs are intended to be accessible by non-specialists and should be 
recognizable to participants. Simply stated, deliberative outputs report what was said at face 
value.  
Social science research, on the other hand, has the opportunity to produce ‘analytical 
outputs,’ which yield additional insights not evident in a mere reproduction of collective 
statements (O’Doherty & Burgess, 2009). By subjecting participant statements to deeper analysis 
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in line with particular social science theories and methods, analytical outputs yield additional 
insights in the form of findings emergent from the data, but not explicitly referred to by 
participants. In other words, rather than simply distilling participant perspectives into a 
manageable form, social science critically interprets those perspectives to uncover meanings that 
may not be obvious on the surface or even to the participants themselves. 
One example of an analytical output from this study is connecting interviewee 
perspectives on specific regional organizations to the scholarly literature on regionalism. 
Examining quotes in light of theoretical justifications for interest in regional scale governance 
revealed interviewee interest was often an intuitive, but unstated recognition of the growing 
tension global environmental problems pose for national governments and international 
organizations. Tying interviewee perspectives to literature on regionalism also helped to 
contextualize their concerns within the broader history of global environmental politics as well 
as ongoing processes of globalization. 
The findings presented in previous peer reviewed studies of public and stakeholder 
perspectives, which have predominately taken place in the United States and United Kingdom 
(see Corner et al., 2012 or Bellamy & Lezaun, 2015 for summaries), indicate the richness and 
depth of insight available through critical examination of perspectives from wealthy developed 
countries. The findings presented and discussed in the three manuscripts contained in this 
dissertation indicate how drawing upon even more diverse perspectives from around the world 
has the potential to open up taken for granted assumptions and worldviews to an even greater 
extent. Social science research has the theoretical and methodological capacity to help utilize 
diverse perspectives to ensure future climate engineering research and governance is ethically, 
politically, socially, and technologically robust. 
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Methodological Considerations: Framing Issues 
Finally, there are several important conclusions and research recommendations to be 
drawn from the overall study based on insights examined in the methods chapter that did not 
feature in any of the manuscripts. In discussing the strengths and weaknesses of this study in the 
methods chapter, one of the issues raised was information framing. More specifically, there was 
an extended discussion about how the information in the film shown to interviewees contained 
some images and commentary that other studies have suggested could bias people’s perspectives 
on climate engineering (Corner et al., 2011; Corner & Pidgeon, 2015). Rather than reviewing the 
specific framing issues or how they did or did not appear to manifest in the interviews, the point 
of returning to this issue here is to indicate how framing considerations explored in this study 
could inform future research efforts.  
First and foremost, information provision will likely be a critical piece of future research 
efforts on climate engineering. As the results reported in the Perspectives Manuscript indicate, 
prior awareness of climate engineering among interviewees was quite low. Therefore attempts to 
elicit perspectives from diverse populations around the world will likely require providing 
information about climate engineering. As such, one key consideration in future studies should 
be the framing of information provided, with special attention to how different framings of 
information could influence perceptions.  
According to Friedman (2007, p. 1), “framing refers to how information and messages—
such as media stories, political arguments, and policy positions—are defined, constructed and 
presented in order to have certain impacts rather than others.” Researchers from both the fields of 
science and technology studies and international relations, among others, have argued that 
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framing is inherent in discussions about science and policy (Stirling, 2005; Kadlec & Friedman, 
2007). However, many of these same scholars also suggest that framing can be a good thing, if 
recognized and carefully considered. In fact, according to Kadlec and Friedman (2007, p. 11), 
framing can be an effective tool for, “clarifying the range of positions surrounding an issue so 
that citizens can better decide what they want to do.” Framing is typically thought of as partisan, 
or intended to persuade by, “defining an issue to one’s advantage in the hopes of getting an 
audience to do what you want it to do” (Friedman, 2007, p. 1).  
Researchers, however, have the opportunity to develop frames that help open up the 
range of possible responses to an issue, and help people effectively navigate new ideas and 
concepts to arrive at their own conclusions. In other words, recognizing the inevitability of 
framing actually opens up the possibility of framing information in a way that encourages people 
to develop their own perspectives rather than share predetermined ones. Walmsley (2009) 
suggests that used in this fashion, frames can actually make discussions more democratic by 
encouraging, “pluralism of perspectives, narrative styles and forms of argument [which] can also 
encourage challenges to hegemonic cultural discourses” (p. 4). If done with awareness and 
intentionality then, the framing of information can create legitimate space for the articulation of 
diverse concerns, values, moral positions, and knowledges in technical and political decision 
making.  
This study attempted to frame both the information presented to interviewees, as well as 
the questions they were asked about climate engineering in such a way as to create space for 
them to express diverse opinions and draw on different forms of knowledge to do so. As 
discussed in detail in the Methods Chapter, the combined interview and film format enabled 
sophisticated and insightful discussions with 100 individuals from geographically and culturally 
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diverse regions of the world. As the results and discussion sections of all three manuscripts 
indicate, interviewees discussed a wide range of issues related to climate engineering, actively 
questioned the assumptions and worldviews embedded in the film, the concept of climate 
engineering more broadly, and made novel suggestions for future research and governance. 
Future studies therefore should not only carefully consider different potential framings of 
information provided, but also the methodology for eliciting responses to that information. The 
semi-structured interview approach in this case appeared to be particularly effective at creating 
space for interviewees to explore and challenge provided information, while also expressing 
tensions in their views on climate engineering as discussed above. Along these same lines, future 
research could and should experiment with different information formats and framings, and 
examine how specific combinations of the two are received by different populations. These types 
of experiments would be particularly useful in helping to find the most effective means of 
building awareness about climate engineering in different contexts. Connecting these suggestions 
with those in the Governance Manuscript, regional organizations could play a role in helping to 
develop informational materials to be used in different parts of the world. As discussed in the 
Governance Manuscript, regional organizations may be particularly helpful in this regard 
because of their connection to local and national cultures and politics.  
 
Broader Recommendations for Science and Policy  
The findings reported and discussed in this dissertation also inform how we generate 
knowledge about and govern issues beyond climate engineering. For instance, the results of this 
study contribute to our understanding of how vulnerable populations are experiencing and 
responding to climate change. Furthermore, this study indicates how vulnerable populations are 
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thinking about different solutions. More specifically, this study highlights the fact that vulnerable 
populations view climate change as embedded in a long history of environmental and social 
inequality. They also view climate change as exacerbating current forms of social, political, 
economic, and cultural marginalization and exploitation. Furthermore, interviewees indicated 
they were concerned that climate change was becoming shorthand or a catch-all for myriad other 
social, political, and economic problems. These findings have clear implications for the ethics 
and governance of climate engineering as discussed in Chapters Four and Five. However, they 
also have implications for how we think about the ethics and governance of climate change more 
generally. 
This study indicates that climate change solutions of any kind must be attentive to 
broader social, political, economic, and historical contexts. Solutions must account for the fact 
that climate change intensifies inequalities resulting from colonialism, military and economic 
imperialism, and globalization. Therefore, interviewees were adamant that we must look for 
solutions that truly build the resilience of vulnerable populations and enable greater self-
sufficiency and self-determination in the long-run. Quick fixes that treat the symptoms but not 
the causes of the problem will ultimately render the most vulnerable populations of the world 
even more dependent upon outside aid—an unsustainable solution for all parties involved. At an 
even broader level then, one of the questions this study raises is: how do we research and govern 
environmental issues in a way that helps correct for past inequalities and injustices? 
The findings from this study suggest that the development and/or strengthening of 
regional governance frameworks could help answer this question. As examined in detail in 
Chapter Five, this study, in agreement with recent developments in the International Relations 
literature, argues that we need to begin ‘rescaling’ the governance of environmental issues 
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(Balsiger & VanDeveer, 2012; Maslow, 2009). Contemporary environmental problems challenge 
the capacity of both nation-states and international organizations like the UN to put forward and 
implement effective solutions. As a result we must recognize, as Slaughter (2004) has argued, 
that we live in a world where environmental issues, as well as other social and economic issues, 
require disaggregated governance that involves multiple entities (including international 
corporations and NGOs) working together at multiple scales. We therefore have to develop 
governance and research frameworks that are able to generate information and policies that are 
relevant and implementable across multiple scales. As Slaughter (2004) and Balsiger and 
VanDeveer (2012) point out, the fact of the matter is that disaggregated, multi-scalar governance 
arrangements are rapidly proliferating to address environmental problems. The task for 
researchers and decision-makers is to recognize that these alternatives to the traditional 
Westphalian mode of national and international governance exist, and then to begin working 
with these new modes of governance to come up with solutions that are attentive to the inherent 
connections between social, environmental, and economic problems. 
This study also indicates that one reason regional governance structures may be 
particularly helpful in addressing contemporary environmental problems (and potentially related 
social and economic problems as well) is because they enable greater participation by vulnerable 
populations. International relations scholars suggest that regional organizations can provide a 
mechanism for amplifying the voices of those vulnerable populations who often go unheard. 
Regional organizations can do so by connecting vulnerable populations to one another and 
providing collective and more powerful representation at the international level.  
Returning to some of the justifications for public engagement with emergent technologies 
discussed in Chapter One, this amplification of the voices of vulnerable populations is critical for 
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both normative and substantive reasons. Science and technology studies scholars and ethicists 
have argued that involving vulnerable populations in decisions about environmental matters and 
emergent technologies that could affect their lives is simply the right thing to do (Stirling, 2005; 
Preston, 2012). This study indicates that members of vulnerable populations themselves strongly 
agree, and are likely to demand inclusion as a requisite of international decision making on 
issues like climate change. This is in large part because these populations view contemporary 
problems and proposed solutions as embedded in histories of exploitation and marginalization. 
As interviewees in this study pointed out, they know all too well the cost of not having a seat at 
the table. 
In addition to simply being the right thing to do, this study also validates substantive 
justifications for involving vulnerable populations in decisions about environmental problems 
and emergent technologies. This study documents a number of ideas, concerns, and 
considerations raised by interviewees that had been previously overlooked by experts in North 
America and Europe, where the bulk of research on this topic is being conducted. This study 
therefore provides proof that vulnerable populations can make substantive contributions to 
science and policy discussions around complex issues like climate change and climate 
engineering. While the contributions members of the public can make to such discussions has 
been well documented in wealthy, developed countries (Wilsdon & Willis, 2004), there have 
been much fewer examples from developing countries or indigenous populations within 
developed countries (Leach et al., 2005). This study affirms that even when being introduced to a 
complex novel technology for the first time, members of vulnerable populations are able to 
critically engage with the social, political, and ethical aspects of that technology and provide 
critical and novel insights. These findings suggest that inclusion of diverse perspectives in future 
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research and decision-making on environmental issues and emergent technologies can help to 
expose gaps in previous thinking. Ultimately, broad based, meaningful inclusion could promote 
more equitable and desirable technological, political, and environmental outcomes. One of the 
goals of multi-scalar governance, particularly governance at the regional level, therefore should 
be the inclusion of more diverse perspectives in science and policy-making.  
Taken altogether, the findings reported in the three manuscripts also indicate the utility of 
integrated examinations of the social, ethical, and political aspects of complex scientific, 
technological, and environmental issues like climate change and climate engineering. The 
overlaps between the three manuscripts suggest that not only do social science, ethics, and 
governance studies inform academic inquiries across the disciplines, but also point to broader 
social, ethical, and political considerations for decision-making. More specifically, social science 
research has the potential to highlight public concerns about emergent technologies and 
environmental issues. These types of concerns can then inform the design of governance 
processes and also the content of policies developed therein.  
As discussed above, public engagement processes could be extremely helpful in 
uncovering these types of concerns and feeding them into decision-making processes. However, 
public engagement processes on emergent technologies are not particularly common in the 
United States. There are examples though of scientific and regulatory bodies establishing Ethical, 
Legal, and Social Implications (ELSI) programs on issues like research on the human genome 
(Thomson et al, 1997). In fact Tuana et al. (2012) suggest that an ELSI program be established 
for SRM to ensure that future research and decision making are attentive not only to scientific 
issues, but also the social and ethical issues inherent in climate engineering technologies. If 
established, an ELSI advisory committee could require public engagement processes to be part of 
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federally funded research on climate engineering. In turn, the advisory committee could include 
the findings from such engagements in any official recommendations to federal agencies and/or 
politicians. Furthermore, effective public engagement processes actively engage experts and 
decision-makers in dialogue with members of the public in a two-way exchange of information 
and ideas. A well-designed engagement process in the United States could enable scientists, 
ethicists, lawyers, and politicians to hear and discuss public concerns in ways that facilitate 
mutual learning. 
 
Closing Remarks 
The world stands at a critical juncture in relation to climate change. This research project 
was originally conceived of in 2009, in the wake of the failure of the UNFCCC climate talks in 
Copenhagen to produce a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. At the time, climate 
engineering was just starting to find its way into mainstream science and policy discussions. 
Now, as this dissertation is being written in late 2015, the world has finally come to an accord on 
emissions reductions in the form of the Paris Agreement. However, there are already indications 
that the commitments made in Paris will not keep the world below 2°C of warming (Boyd et al., 
2015). As such, climate engineering is likely to continue to feature in climate change science and 
policy discussions for the foreseeable future.  
We now know more about the policy and emissions context for climate engineering 
interventions than ever before. And yet, the technologies themselves are still largely unformed. 
They are still amenable to change, but already starting to take on particular social constitutions, 
or being discussed in certain ways by scientists and decision-makers in the United States and 
Europe with implications for how the technologies would be designed and used. Furthermore, 
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small to medium-scale field experiments are currently being proposed that could further lock-in 
the development pathway for different options. As such, now is an absolutely crucial time to 
ensure that perspectives from around the world are being considered in relation to proposed 
climate engineering technologies.  
In the words of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (2002), we live in a world 
where problems travel without passports. Unfortunately research and decision-making processes 
struggle to do the same. If we are to address issues like climate change that are simultaneously of 
both local and global concern, the time has come to stop calling for broad based global inclusion. 
We must actively pursue new and creative forms of environmental research and governance that 
provide a meaningful voice to populations from around the globe—particularly those vulnerable 
populations with so much to gain or lose by our collective decision-making. This study was a 
step in that direction. However, there is much additional work to be done. The information and 
analyses presented in this dissertation point to some concrete steps forward for taking the 
perspectives of vulnerable populations into account. Hopefully this study also indicates the depth 
of insight and wealth of knowledge that will be missed if research and governance efforts do not 
intentionally, and urgently, seek out collaboration with vulnerable populations around the world. 
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Appendix A: Interview Guide 
 
Introduction and explanation of study:  
Thank you for your willingness to talk with me today. I am interviewing people for my graduate 
research on possible solutions to climate change including climate engineering. The goal of this 
research is to better understand what people think about climate engineering and to suggest ways 
that different perspectives can be included in future discussions about research and policy. I am 
not an advocate for or against climate engineering; I am simply interested in learning more about 
what other people think about it. You don’t need to be familiar with climate engineering to 
answer my questions. I’m interested in your opinion because of your experience working on 
climate change. If it is okay with you, I would like to record our conversation so that I can be 
sure to have an accurate record of your views.  
 
Preliminary Questions: I would like to begin with some background questions about your work 
and your views on climate change. 
1. Can you tell me about your work with ____? 
2. How has climate change affected your work? 
3. What are your primary concerns about climate change? 
 What are your organization’s primary concerns about climate change? 
 How would you like to see those concerns addressed? (Or in an ideal world how 
would climate change be solved?) 
4. Is the topic of climate engineering or geoengineering something that you’ve come across 
before? 
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-Ask if YES to 3: 
 If so, where/how? 
 What type of information, who presented it? 
 What are your impressions of climate engineering based on what you already 
know?  
 
Information Presentation  
If YES to 3: I realize that you already know about climate engineering, but some of the people I 
will be interviewing do not. Therefore, I am showing everyone I speak with a brief video about 
climate engineering. 
If NO to 3: It’s okay that you have not heard about climate engineering before. At this time, I 
would like to show you a brief video about climate engineering. 
To all: The video is 7 minutes long and was produced by a group of researchers to provide the 
public with information about climate engineering. I did not have any input into the content of 
this video and the views being expressed are not my own. I say that because you should feel 
comfortable agreeing or disagreeing with anything in the video – again I am not for or against 
climate engineering, I am simply trying to better understanding other peoples’ views on it. We 
can pause or rewind the video at any time if you would like to.  
 
5. Do you have any questions about the video or the information in the video? 
6. If YES to 4: Did the video provide any information about climate engineering that you 
had not heard before? 
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 Did it raise any additional thoughts, questions, or concerns about climate 
engineering that we have not discussed yet? 
 Did it change any of your impressions about climate engineering? 
7. If NO to 4: Based on the video, what are your initial thoughts about climate engineering?  
 Does climate engineering evoke any emotions for you? 
 Does the idea of climate engineering raise any hopes or concerns for you? 
8. To all: What do you think about climate engineering as a possible response to climate 
change? 
 Does anything seem positive or potentially beneficial? 
 Does anything seem negative or potentially harmful? 
9. As the video mentions, if anyone were to do climate engineering, it would affect the 
whole planet. But the harms and benefits of climate engineering would not be even. For 
instance, if we mimicked a volcanic eruption, it would probably slow melting ice and sea 
level rise, but would also change the rainy seasons in Asia and Africa causing severe 
droughts. How should uneven impacts be handled? 
 If not everyone can benefit from climate engineering, who should benefit and 
why? 
 How should we decide who benefits? 
10. The video also suggests that climate engineering could have negative side effects and 
side effects we couldn’t predict in advance. How should negative side effects be handled? 
 How should unpredicted side effects be handled? 
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 Are there particular impacts you would be concerned about: impacts on the 
environment or on people? 
11. How should decisions about climate engineering be made and who should have a say? 
 What if climate engineering can only be done at a global scale, then who should 
have a say? 
12. Do you think you or members of your community (government/organization/etc.) should 
be involved in decisions about climate engineering?  
 Why or why not?  
 How could you or members of your community (government/organization/etc.) be 
more effectively involved in decisions about climate engineering? 
13. Do you have any comments or questions about either of the specific climate engineering 
technologies in the video? 
 
As the video mentioned, climate engineering technologies are not ready to be used right now. 
One reason is that the technology has not yet been fully developed. Another reason is that there 
are still a lot of questions about things like whether or not these technologies would work, what 
the side effects would be, who would be in charge of them, and so on.  
 
14. Do you think that more research should be done on climate engineering? 
 Why or why not? 
15. What would you like to see future research focus on? 
16. If you could talk with climate engineering researchers, are there any questions you would 
like to ask them? 
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17. Is there anything you would like to tell a climate engineering researcher if you had the 
chance? 
18. Do you think you or other members of your community (government/organization/etc.) 
should have input into climate engineering research? 
 How could you or other members of your community be more effectively 
involved in research on climate engineering? 
19. If climate engineering technologies are developed, who should be in control of them? 
 
I’d like to wrap up with a few big picture questions to pull everything we’ve talked about back 
together. 
 
20. Thinking back to your concerns about climate change that we discussed earlier, could 
climate engineering play a role in addressing them?  
 How so? Or why not? 
21. Given some of the risks and dangers of climate change that you’ve discussed, does 
climate change or climate engineering seem more risky or dangerous to you right now? 
 How would you decide between the risks/dangers of climate change and the 
risks/dangers of climate engineering? 
 Is there a point at which you would change your mind and want climate 
engineering to be used?  
22. Would climate engineering be a part of your ideal solution to climate change? 
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 Why or why not? 
23. Are there any other issues or aspects of climate engineering you would like to discuss 
more or that we have not discussed yet? 
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Appendix B: Chapter 3 Supplemental Data 
 
Table 1: Climate change 
B-1.01: 
Q: What are your concerns about climate change? Do you have any worries? 
 
A: Yeah, I have a lot of worries. We live near coastlines, and my main worry is that maybe 
some year this tide or the sea with come and wash our homes away, because we are so close 
to the shoreline. One thing, too, regarding our source of food, we used to make gardens, but 
if the weather is not steady and if it’s still too much raining, then there will be no yield, no 
more food from the crops. And even disease, too. 
 
Q: What about disease? 
 
A: Like, in some places, malaria is becoming a big problem. Even dengue fever. I don’t 
know if it is caused by climate change or what, but I think that climate change can bring in 
new diseases. 
 
B-1.02: 
In Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia, we are experiencing significant shifts in climatic patterns. 
We have been having more frequent droughts, like in northern Kenya, where we have the 
Northern Rangeland Trust. Drought cycles used to be 10 years about thirty years ago. It’s 
been reduced to five years. Actually, it’s come down to every two years now we have a cycle 
of drought, and it can be very, very severe. People lose livelihoods, their household assets get 
degraded, it’s inflating conflicts and things like that. It’s a big problem we have. The reverse 
is that when we get rains, it floods, much more than we’ve been experiencing over the years. 
It’s quite a shift, and it’s impacting the political integrity of some of the systems we’re 
working with, it’s impacting communities, it’s impacting biodiversity. So climate change has 
become an integral part of what we do in Kenya. 
 
B-1.03: 
But let me go back, many years back. About a thousand years ago, people from my village, 
they came and settled. They wanted to: number one be free from mosquitoes on the 
mainland—it’s too much diseases, malaria; and then you have fear of raids, enemy raids, 
they normally come and raid; and number three, these people owned part of the reef, so our 
people came down and built artificial islands. They built it way high above any high water 
mark. When high water comes, it’s just below. So they built those artificial islands, putting 
coral stones over the reefs in the lagoon. 
 But the high priest or the people at the time did not know about climate change. They 
have no idea. You can imagine that 800 years later, those islands—I can show you from my 
laptop, I didn’t bring it, but I can show you that my elder brother was sitting in our village 
and the high tide, the king tide, came to this height, just below his knees. That’s the first time 
we experience the high tide. So climatic change has impacted so much of the villages in the 
northern part of Malaita. So we are at risk at this point in time because we have come a long 
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way a long time ago from the mainland, so other people occupied that strip of land that is on 
the coast. So we cannot go back again to that land. And secondly, probably some of us have 
forgotten our genealogy, so we cannot trace our roots. Because genealogy and myths are 
transferred verbally, from father to son. So we have lost quite a lot of heritage that we had, 
but also we are lost the land, the coral stone villages, the artificial islands that we possess. So 
we are people in the throes of climate change. 
 
B-1.04: 
Women have also been impacted in terms of, how do they earn an income? Some of the 
foods which used to be there, some of the insects which used to be there are no longer there. 
Like the termites are a key indicator of climate change. Areas which used to have termites, 
now they don’t have them. That’s another thing that has affected people, because those who 
depend on natural foods, like in the western part, they depend on termites. I don’t know if 
you’ve heard of it, but the numbers have reduced, and that’s where there’s an institution 
coming in to increase their production so that they will still produce and increase. It has also 
affected some of the communities in that way. 
Another thing is the issue of water. We notice now erratic weather patterns where in 
many areas they used to have two seasons. Now they find one season is good, the other 
season the harvest goes down. So climate change has also affected the rainfall pattern. 
There’s a lot of sunshine when it used to rain. That’s also in place and the food security is 
also suffering. Another thing is with the pastoralists. Now there’s a lot of increased conflicts 
because of lack of pasturing areas. This is attributed to erratic weather patterns where we 
have a long dry spell, so it affects pasture and water, and it forces them to move high up the 
mountains. When they move, they have to destroy some crops. They have to go through 
farmlands of others and destroy. In the process, there is a lot of conflict as a result of climate 
change. 
 
B-1.05: 
Out here on the islands you hardly see any industries. We’ve got very minimal emissions of 
greenhouse gases, yet we experience these changes. I guess the frustration comes in not 
taking responsibility. But I understand it ties up heavily with the economy of the countries as 
well. So how do we balance that, so that we are able to survive here out in these small 
islands? It makes me feel frustrated that maybe my children will grow up and experience a 
hard life because of the changes that are starting to happen now. 
 
B-1.06: 
I think that people in the villages, even if we know what’s happening, even if we give out 
awareness—that’s not a problem, we can go out and teach our people. I’m somebody who 
goes out to do awareness—but when they know, what will they do? I think what they can do 
is, when there are projects to protect the trees and the forest, maybe that is where they can 
take part, understand and try to protect what is to be protected. 
 
Q: But otherwise, it’s other people from other parts of the world who are causing the 
problem? 
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A: Yes. We are not causing the problem. They are causing the problem. Everybody is reaping 
the consequences. 
 
Q: That’s a really good point. What can people in the villages do? They’re not causing the 
problem, but they’re being affected by it. 
 
A: We are trying to protect our environment by practicing conservation, yet the climate 
change is bigger than what we can protect. When we talk about conservation, we talk to the 
people, protect some areas, harvest some areas, but climate change destroys even the 
protected areas, so what will conservation do?  
 
B-1.07: 
In our case, it’s quite hard to stop climate change. Although most of the international 
negotiations are going on, there’s no clear results from such big meetings. We cannot solve 
it, it’s still quite hard, but I think what we can do is adapt to these changes until such time 
comes when you realize it’s bad, we should do something. I can only think about how we in 
the islands can adapt to these changes.  
 
Table 2: Prior Awareness 
B-2.01: 
Actually, this is very new to me. I didn’t think about it in that way. When you said 
engineering, at first I thought about data systems, collection of data, but I see this is a totally 
different thing. 
 
B-2.02: 
Oh, it’s just mind-boggling! Climate engineering, gee, I really never, with all the TV and 
news that goes on, I haven’t see this. 
 
B-2.03: 
Q: What are your impressions of this idea of climate engineering as a potential response to 
climate change? 
 
M: My first impression, [colleague] and I talked about it, is that it’s farfetched. I met this guy 
in Doha the first time at one of the Conferences of the Parties under the UNFCCC. He gave 
me his card and I had seen some of the posters and some of his invitations to people to attend 
his presentations. I didn’t bother to read it much. I met him waiting for public transport and 
he gave me his card and then we talked. He noticed I am black, he was not black, because he 
was from those North African countries, so you cannot tell whether he’s an African or from 
the Middle East. He introduced himself and we talked and he gave me this. The idea was not 
even to use the clouds as reflectors, but more electronic kind of satellite-based reflectors. 
That’s what he’s actually selling unless he has changed his thinking. And I thought that was a 
bit far-fetched, because one, you have mentioned this in your quick introduction, there is no 
agreement as to who is responsible for the coordination of such a new and perhaps 
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threatening—to a layman it looks threatening, because it’s thinking too far into the future—
there is no institutional framework to address that. 
 
B-2.04: 
Q: You mentioned you had heard about climate engineering or geoengineering where? 
 
A: At the Indigenous People’s Global Summit on Climate Change. I printed out a copy. I 
don’t know if you saw this. 
 
Q: I haven’t seen that. 
 
A: Not us here, but the [organization name] and I volunteered at this conference. We brought 
indigenous people from all over the world, folks from the UN. To me it was interesting 
because we just consider the indigenous people of Alaska, the Canary in the mine, we’re on 
the front edge of the climate change. But it’s not just the Eskimos or the Inuit or Inupiat. 
People from Africa and Russia, all over, the indigenous people came and shared their stories. 
A lot of that is in here. I found that really eye-opening, that we’re not the only ones. We look 
at it as just affected the cryosphere: snow, ice, and those issues, but then the hydrology and 
natural resources of other areas are equally affected, not just the Arctic. 
 
Q: Did someone come and speak specifically about climate engineering? 
 
A: Yeah, different people. Somewhere in there I remember one of the things that they said as 
a group was that we’re against geoengineering. But I think at that time there wasn’t a lot of 
explanation as to what that would be, it was just a theory, like, “Here’s what we could do or 
might do.” I think a lot of people were worried that it would adversely affect their areas, their 
land, their resources. What are you going to do, grow trees on the tundra? That’s a bad idea. 
 
B-2.05: 
What was clear [from the workshop] was, many Africans were really not aware of this, 
especially the absence of governments to set the rules and the boundaries for this kind of 
work. Suppose someone says, “I would like to do such experimentation.” I’m sure there 
would be issues that would arise. Should we agree to it or not? Would something done by 
one country affect different countries? And the realization that interference of this kind, 
although there is modeling work to see what kind of effects they have, they are far from 
being very certain how they will be affected, and the effects could be more of one kind in one 
region and opposite in another region. If your target is to have more here than maybe even 
less than what there is now, and therefore really I think the trend is that one should proceed 
very, very cautiously, but the research should continue. But I can’t say we really have full 
consensus on all issues, only divergent views. The whole idea of the workshops was not to 
reach consensus, but to allow people to express and see divergent views, to what extent these 
views exist. I think basically this is what we arrived at.  
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Table 3: Reluctant Acceptance 
B-3.01: 
My initial impression, I’m not sure it’s still the same, was that it was really idiotic. [laughter] 
It was really arrogant and that it was putting more focus on mitigation as opposed to 
adaptation, just keep the world stagnant in whatever condition that people are most 
comfortable living in in the last 10 years, not even the last 100 years. That just seemed really 
stupid to me. 
I didn’t keep that idea. I do think that we are going to have to come up with 
something, because we’re at 400 parts per million of CO2. We’re going to have to do 
something. And whereas I’m extremely concerned that that makes people think they can go 
on doing whatever they want, I think the reality is that no matter what we come up with, 
people are going to be faced with the dilemma that they really do have to change. And either 
it happens because they choose to or because they’re forced to. Either blackouts keep 
happening, so they come up with better ways of transferring electricity, or they just don’t 
have it any more. 
 
Q: So maybe we’re headed towards a point where we’re going to have to talk about climate 
engineering seriously? 
 
A1: I think so. When we look at the changes in the water cycle, in the hydro cycle, that are 
taking place, when we look at the changes we’re creating even within the rock cycle itself, 
we’re going to have to do something to address the changes that we’ve already caused. So 
it’s almost—it’s not—I guess the more I think about it, it’s not anything different than what 
we’re already doing. We’re already making large-scale changes, which I’m not saying is a 
bad thing. Actually, the large-scale changes we are doing is bad. But what I’m trying to say 
is, I don’t believe that humans shouldn’t have any type of impact on the earth. I believe that 
we’re part of this ecosystem. But the extent of the alterations we’re making within the 
systems, we’re going to have to try to change that. 
The concern is that we decide how those systems should interact with each other. And 
that’s what we see a lot happening within management. That’s just trying to create another 
false sense of security, that we’re able to control these systems and the way that they interact 
with each other.  
 
B-3.02: 
On a very personal note, I see climate engineering as just one of many options. It may be a 
very far-fetched option, but it’s worth looking at, because adaptation is not easy and not 
cheap. Adaptation is very expensive, and mitigation is equally very expensive, and even 
more difficult to get consensus as to how to get it done, how much should be cut, who should 
be cutting. So we think that makes a need to get an alternative. Whether it is a realistic 
alternative, and it is a achievable with less risks, that’s a totally different to look at. But 
surely it is worth looking at, because the two options that have always been looking at, to 
adapt or to mitigate, they are both not really succeeding at the moment, and the earlier we do 
something about mitigating the effects of climate change the better, we cannot stop 
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adaptation because already we are already committed to some change, whether now or in the 
near future we’re already committed. 
 
B-3.03: 
Time and again human history has shown that we haven’t really understood some of the 
changes that we’ve made, often, well, always on a far smaller scale on what we’re doing to 
climate, I guess. It’s very apparent in conservation terms in things like introduction of species 
where you think you’re dealing with some other exotic and you end up making the situation 
worse.  
 
B-3.04: 
My gut reaction is, I’m thinking of cane toads in Australia, of Coqui frogs in Hawaii. Every 
time humans start messing with systems, they mess it up. This is a huge one. I don’t know. Is 
the idea of trying to cool the climate well thought-out?  
 
Table 4: Negative and Unanticipated Impacts 
B-4.01: 
The higher yield agricultural areas, especially the highlands both east and west of the Rift 
Valley, they have got a local system, and especially to the west of the Rift valley, they have 
one long growing season. So the variety of maize they grow, the variety of other crops they 
grow, is long-maturing, because they have got enough rainfall and the rainfall system is long. 
It means sometimes when I want the rains in the short rainfall season areas, it’s actually 
when they don’t want the rains in the long rainfall area because they want a dry season so 
that the crops can dry up for harvesting. And that’s a problem, because how do you manage 
such risks?  
In terms of climate engineering, there is no assurance of when we reach the optimum. So 
that now we have cooled the globe enough. At what point do we stop it? Because that 
cooling, of course, will have a longer-lasting effect than when it stops. Just like global 
warming; if we stopped polluting now, the greenhouse gases already in the atmosphere will 
continue acting until they finish their lifetime, unless there is another way of removing them 
through environment or climate engineering. So that’s what I’m talking about. You can cool 
the atmosphere to such a level that you think you have reached the best level, but the effect 
then continues. Where is the surety that this is the very critical value that we should reach 
and stop so that we don’t continue, now we don’t move the atmosphere to the opposite side. 
 
Table 5: Conditional Acceptance 
B-5.02: 
Overall, my main reaction or opinion to this is—right now the communities are working with 
the government, grappling with issues around REDD, our REDD policy and our REDD law. 
All we have are policies that are giving sort of a bearing, piecemeal sort of readiness towards 
issues of climate change. We don’t have a clear direction. All we have are policy papers and 
action plans. That is at the national level. At the community level, communities are still 
trying to grapple with issues with REDD as a mechanism to mitigate climate change, because 
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they also have their own interests as I mentioned earlier. They need to adapt first to the issues 
of climate change, which they are not able to do right now because they’re poor. The 
government is not subsidizing or having any sort of programs at the local level aimed 
towards addressing the livelihoods of most of these communities. So it’s a very tricky 
situation if we were to adopt this new technology. 
 
 
B-5.02: 
I’m hoping that apart from what the goals are, maybe you want to look at other areas, like 
coming up with creating clouds so that it can fall on the atoll and we can collect that for 
drinking, and for washing and all that. So I’m hoping that someone out there will do that. 
Because in the Solomons, we don’t want to move. These islands have always been our 
islands. Even if someone says to me, “You go to Australia.” Australia’s a nice place, but I 
don’t want to go there. And that is the kind of mentality that a lot of people here will have. 
People from Lord Howe, they’ve always lived on the atolls. For us to move them to another 
place, some people will definitely refuse. We’ve heard stories that people from Carteret 
Islands outside of Bougainville, there was a program for them to relocate to Bougainville. A 
lot of families went and the PNG government settled them on church land, Catholic owned 
land. They give them one hectare each for each family to do farming and plant cocoa for their 
livelihood, so that they can sell and earn money. People from the main lands would think that 
is ideal. But after six months or so, some families returned back to the atolls. They couldn’t 
cope with farming and working in the garden and all that for their livelihood. They’d rather 
fish, and that’s the reality. So for me, even if someone says, “Go to Australia,” I wouldn’t 
want to. But if someone says, “Okay, hang-on, we can do something. We can use our skills 
and technology to bring clouds there and then you can have water,” that would be for 
Solomon Islands. That would be what we want. I know that sounds optimistic. Still you 
showed us that video clip of creating clouds, creating white clouds to bounce off light to the 
atmosphere. If you can easily do that for us here, create clouds so that you can have water out 
in the atolls, then we wouldn’t have to move as long as there is a little bit of space on the 
island where we can build a house. 
 
Q: So you’re optimistic about climate engineering? 
 
A: Yes, I’m optimistic that you can easily use those skills and technology and address the 
issues that are being experienced here, and one of them is water out in the atolls. Or like I 
said you could easily just put some machines somewhere in the sea, and it can collect back 
sand that has been washed off, and then we can have more land, more sand around our 
islands. The thing is we’ve got issues here that are happening, and I think our immediate 
needs are trying to address those issues. I can see where climate engineering ideas are 
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coming from, and that is fine. But like I said, for us out here on the islands our needs are 
much different. 
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Appendix C: Chapter 4 Supplemental Data 
 
Table 1: Skewed Vulnerabilities 
C-1.01: 
When I was a kid my parents would take me to our village on [redacted island name]. My 
mother comes from [island name], which is an Island in the North Solomon Arc. It’s sort of 
one of the big islands in the Solomons. We live on the southeast coast in a small village … I 
remember we would climb the coconuts and jump into the rivers and the sea. Now the 
coconuts—there are only stumps that are left because the sea eroded the land back a little bit. 
And because we’re on a black sand beach beside a river, it’s very swampy, so at high tide we 
get extreme high tides that come into the grass areas—seeps that come through the holes. 
When I think of climate change I think of those conditions that have changed from when I 
was small. 
 
C-1.02: 
A: [This island] will last for maybe 5 or 6 years but then we’ll lose everything at the rate of 
these higher sea levels. What I notice is really far beyond my imagination of what would be 
the mark of this year’s high tide. I measure already from the previous years. Maybe within 5 
or 6 years, my suspicion is the water will be level with the higher ground which we are 
talking about at this point. 
 
Q: So eventually will people from [island name] have to move onto [nearby island name]? 
 
A: Yep. That’s the recommendation. We have a portion of land here we just have to prepare 
and decide which would be the best place. 
 
C-1.03: 
I know that just in my lifetime I’ve seen changes. My dad had no sons, so he kind of had to 
make do with me, I’m his oldest. So he would take me out whaling on the ice, and man, it’s 
just one of the most beautiful places on earth, I tell you, so serene. You’re out there with your 
family. All you can hear, really, is the wind blowing on the ice. … All you see is just beauty, 
and in the distance you can see whales jumping around, playing. Once you get your little 
wind block set up, you’re close to maybe 18 hours of daylight in the spring, and it’s just 
warm. You can take your parka off, sit there, relax. And all you’re doing really is just sitting 
there and waiting for that whale to come close by so you can get in the boat and chase it. It’s 
just one of the best places I’ve ever been in my life. … 
I’ve noticed just throughout my lifetime that the ice has been less stable. There had 
been a time where we were out on the ice getting ready to help pull in another crew’s whale 
when we got a phone call saying, “The currents shifted, the winds changed, you need to 
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come back. That ice is going to drift away. It’s going to break off. You need to get back.” 
That was a really hard time for us, but more so for that crew, because number one, we didn’t 
want to tell them we had to leave, because there were very few people out there to help pull 
in the whale. We had to tell them we were going to leave. As soon as we told them, we heard 
the whaling captain’s wife start crying, a loud, depressing cry. We took off, and sure enough, 
shortly after we left, the ice did crack and it shifted and all these people began to float out off 
into the ocean. 
They were able to be saved by chopper, but they lost their whale. All their gear had to 
be left out there, and their only hope was that maybe the ice would come drift back and they 
would be able to get everything back that way. That was devastating to witness. It’s just been 
kind of like that more so every year. The ice conditions were crazy this year. For instance, 
the ice just maybe 20 to 50 feet off of the coast broke off in March and just left, so there was 
all of this open water so close to shore, and it was weird. That’s not normal. That’s what 
everybody was saying, “This is so weird.”  
 
C-1.04: 
A: When you talk about climate change, it’s real in Kenya. It’s a day-to-day thing that we go 
through. 
 
Q: What are some of the primary concerns in Kenya? 
 
A: In most cases, we’ve had droughts. Then after droughts immediately we have floods. It’s 
fluctuation. You wonder. We’ve had the droughts where people have lost livelihoods, 
especially in the drier parts of Kenya. Livestock is lost. And you know, Kenya’s economy is 
on agriculture, and some of these crops are very sensitive to climate parameters. Whenever 
we have a drought, it’s a major negative impact. But also, the infrastructure that we have, 
some of it was not built with climate change in consideration. So sometimes we lose roads. 
Whenever we have a lot of rain, we have to do the roads afresh, and it costs the government a 
lot of money. The bridges sometimes are washed away, stripped away. The soil is lost 
because of floods. And the impact is big. 
 
C-1.05: 
95% of the food I put on my table is what I kill myself. … Now we have seals and walruses 
that get infected with different parasites and it makes the food inedible. And there’s caribou, 
too, that we’ve noticed that have infections that we’ve never seen. There’s some caribou that 
won’t even run away because they’re so infested. You cut them open and it looks like a bomb 
went off inside. It’s really, really gross, really disgusting. It’s a crying shame.  
I know a lot of it has to do with climate change and the survivability of the insects or 
the parasites. Back 20 years ago it was so cold they couldn’t live up here. Nowadays, it’s so 
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warm that these parasites, the infections, they’re able to live. So climate change is having a 
real big impact on the way we live, and on the food we eat.  
 
C-1.06: 
We in Africa in particular, are somewhat victims of this accumulated carbon stock in the air, 
as it were, occupying the equatorial belts of the globe. We face the most impact when it 
comes to climate change, basically because of the geography.  
 
C-1.07: 
The whole climate change and development policy is well-schemed to benefit some people 
and others remain disenfranchised. Development policy, and climate change is becoming a 
development policy, you cannot delink it from development policy. Why? Because it’s a 
question of groupings of nations who are within a certain GDP level and the groupings of 
others who are in the middle and others who are down there, who are very vulnerable. You 
see now we want to almost attribute the poverty experienced by countries to climate change. 
I think that is a gross exaggeration. So when you look at it, it’s of course an economic 
strategy. At the end of it, there will be those who will gain and those who will lose, leave 
alone the climate change itself. You know of course those who have more will continue 
getting more, and those who have little, will continue getting less. 
 
C-1.08: 
I’m an inhabitant of the tropical areas, I’ve been to the middle latitudes, I’ve been all over the 
tropics. That is my experience. From my technical background, I know when you are talking 
about climate, you are talking about the weather. The only difference is the temporal scale, in 
terms of time. You are saying what you see instantly, that’s the weather, but what is 
cumulative over several years is climate. But what you accumulate to get climate is weather. 
The weather-generating systems in the middle latitudes are totally different from the weather-
generating systems in the tropics. In the middle latitudes, you can almost put one index—
almost. Because the weather is mainly generated by large-scale frontal systems. Frontal 
systems can sometimes span several thousands of kilometers. I used to be a forecaster, and 
now, being a climate scientist, I know it even more. …  
In the tropics, the weather-generating systems are actually very small scale in terms of 
time and space. It can be raining here. Sometimes we hear thunderstorms and less than two 
kilometers from the center of town it’s raining and thundering. You look through the 
window, it’s raining terribly in town. People are calling and telling you it’s raining dogs and 
cats. And here is dry and shiny! It cannot happen like that in the middle latitudes.  
So the proponents of climate engineering initiative, if they think having a uniform index 
for the topics, it is not enough. Even on a seasonal scale, you can actually have a small hill 
here and here, you always get good harvest, and it’s less than two kilometers apart. That’s a 
problem. In the tropics, the systems are small-scale in terms of temporal and spatial scale, 
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and very sporadic. It’s not like a frontal system, where you can see it coming from the Pacific 
and calculate and see, based on its speed, when it will be hitting Spain after four days. 
Because that’s a large-scale system, it dies slowly. Even the degeneration is a function of the 
scale. The small-scale will die very fast, and then you forget about it. If it was a hot season, 
you don’t feel the heat because it was a very small-scale heat system or storm system. But 
not so with the middle latitude systems. So again, there is the aspect of their nature in terms 
of the tropical system being very sporadic.  
 
C-1.09: 
Most of the native people in the north, our biggest concern is not whether it’s going to rain, 
or snow, or the sun’s going to shine. That’s not a concern. It’s the direction of the wind, 
which way the wind’s blowing. That’s a major concern ever since I was a little kid. “Which 
way is the wind going to blow today?” It may be 40 or 50 below outside, but if the wind is 
blowing from the wrong direction, you don’t go out and hunt. If the wind is blowing the right 
direction then it’s time to go hunting, whether the sun is shining, rain, cold, freezing, 50, 60 
below, or even warm, like summer. It depends on how many days you’ve been here, the 
boats that go out hunting, that go out right now, that’s all they look at, whether it’s raining, 
sunny, or not, it’s what direction the wind’s blowing so they can go out hunting. That wind is 
something that controls every animal in the North Slope. That’s the way I look at it. The 
weather people that make these weather predictions now, “We’re going to have a sunny day 
today.” I don’t care a dang about a sunny day. What way’s the damn wind blowing? And 
how fast? 
 
C-1.10: 
I have one question … if we agree that it is most suitable to carry out climate engineering—I 
will ask as an island state talking to you, because it needs more economical contribution to 
do more research—so if we consider one of the methods, does our island state need to 
contribute something financially? And if we don’t, what will they say about it? 
 
C-1.11: 
Q: What has been the relationship between the formal U.S. climate negotiating teams and 
indigenous peoples in the U.S.? 
 
A: Non-existent. I’ve been trying to be part of the delegation for the last seven or eight years. 
I’ve done everything I can think of to do … it would be nice to have an indigenous person. 
They say, “You’re not a State Department employee.” Well maybe you can find an 
indigenous State Department employee, then. I don’t care, it just would be really nice to have 
somebody there who can fulfill that role. Hasn’t happened. Yet.  
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C-1.12: 
There is a history of using diseases, smallpox and stuff like that, to control certain 
populations and eradicate them. I’m just afraid that something this powerful could be used as 
the way to affect different parts of the world without their approval. 
 
C-1.13: 
I have some questions to ask scientists about climate engineering. With the ideas that you 
have with climate engineering, it’s something to do with the climate, with the environment. 
… How are you going to try it on the environment? … Who are you going to test this thing 
on when it’s ready? Where? Where on earth? In Moruroa? In French Polynesia? It’s already 
been done. The French have tested nuclear things there.  
 
C-1.14: 
I also look at it in terms of these arid areas, and everybody’s sending money there. But you 
also kill innovations in terms of fighting the challenges that are there. And what you get is 
patronage. They are rendered into beggars. So if the challenges that are there for climate 
change would actually be addressed within the framework of natural realities, so that then the 
communities adopt in a natural way, which is more sustainable than artificial interventions, 
then I think we would be moving to the right direction. Otherwise, some of the interventions 
cause people to become dependent on the artificial interventions, which are sometimes more 
cosmetic than the actual reality. 
 
Table 2: Willingness to Consider and Moral Failure 
C-2.01: 
I think coming from the Pacific view, we are the ones feeling [climate change] the most now. 
If we do one thing and it helps to … reduce the impact, I think they will appreciate it. … 
Some of the low lying islands are desperate now, in reality, with issues like food security. I 
think when one thing helps them they will appreciate that. 
 
C-2.02: 
I want something that I can actually take home and actually get engaged in it and practice it. 
The only thing I can ask a climate engineer is, what are some of the tools, technologies, and 
ideas that you can give me that I can actually go and implement at very minimal costs, so the 
communities, the people I interact with on a daily basis can easily adopt it, and get the 
process going? When you’re talking about massive capital investment, that sort of erodes the 
whole process again, because that is capital that they do not have. But I’m sure there are 
other simplified technologies that you can give me that I can share with the people I work 
with … So why don’t you give me something I can work with right now, and we’ll get 
moving? We’re all about action. 
  
235 
 
C-2.03: 
Normally people don’t consult indigenous communities to begin with, but I do think it’s an 
important element, especially since we’ll be the ones who will be primarily impacted. 
Regardless of what happens with climate engineering, we’ll be taking the brunt of the 
problem again. 
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Appendix D: Chapter 5 Supplemental Data 
 
Table 1: Pros and Cons of Global Governance Frameworks 
D-1.01: 
I have some questions to ask scientists about climate engineering. With the ideas that you 
have with climate engineering, it’s something to do with the climate, with the environment. 
… How are you going to try it on the environment? … Who are you going to test this thing 
on when it’s ready? Where? Where on earth? In Moruroa? In French Polynesia? It’s already 
been done. The French have tested nuclear things there.  
 
D-1.02: 
Yeah, I think it should be the UN. The same way it does for the REDD and all this. Because 
the UN is worldwide. It looks at actions of people worldwide. I think that should be the right 
body to deal with policies so that we have a coordinating body that includes most countries in 
the world. In that way it gives space for collaborative decisions that’s coming from all 
people, all countries that are represented within UN. 
 
D-1.03: 
The UN, I guess, or some body within the UN. You ideally want as many nations as possible 
to be engaged. In terms of civil society or society being represented, I guess the nation is 
possibly the only realistic building block that we’ve got to represent the peoples of the world 
at the moment. The UN is possibly the most inclusive of all of those organizations. I would 
have thought that’s the only way forward. … I think it’s got to be as inclusive as possible. 
 
D-1.04: 
A: Would there be a possibility of having every nation with an equal voting right. Something 
like that. So that one nation, just because of the size or how developed or rich they are they 
get a persuasive vote and a smaller country does not. So do you all come to the table on an 
equal footing? I don’t know. I think one of the first things would be to figure out what the 
consequences would be before you decide whether or not this is something that we should be 
doing.  
 
Q: That makes sense to me. 
 
A: It makes sense, but it’s a little wishful thinking I think. 
 
Q: So saying that it’s a little wishful thinking, what do you think is more likely? 
 
A: I think the bigger richer nations or more developed countries, they’re going to have a say 
and basically it’s going to be, ‘This is the way forward, and this is what we’re going to do, 
and that’s that. Take it or leave it.’ 
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Q: And it probably seems obvious, but how would you feel about that if that were to happen? 
 
A: I would hate it. 
 
Q: Why? Can you elaborate on that? 
 
A: I still that that regardless of what happens anywhere else, especially the pacific island 
countries, other countries as well, probably Africa, they would be affected. The effect will 
always reach us and we don’t have a say in anything that happens. I think that’s the main 
reason why. 
 
Q: And you feel like that’s a recurring thing? 
 
A: Yeah. With all the climate change discussions, we’re seeing a lot of the effects, but the 
other countries, because it doesn’t suit them, nobody really wants to set down regulations on 
how you can regulate the emissions, because it doesn’t suit what they’re doing. So I think 
we’re always keen on any discussion that involves that, but it’s not benefitting us. 
 
D-1.05: 
I would hope it would come from the UN. But then again, do you want them imposing on 
countries that can’t afford to participate? It’d be tough to say that there would be a fair and 
equitable decision-making matrix coming from the UN in terms of how it would affect or 
impact smaller countries that might not have a strong voice. Or on the other hand, will that 
mean that the bigger countries, the G8, who have more of the resources, will be paying 
more? Maybe they should be, because they’re probably creating more of the pollution. In 
which case it should go through the UN in order to hold them accountable. 
 
D-1.06: 
It’s pretty easy to say that within the UN that indigenous peoples are not a large part of the 
decision-making there. 
 
D-1.07: 
A1: There is a big problem, especially after this previous meeting, was it in Oslo? People 
who went there came back, and they looked so frustrated. 
 
A2: They never agreed on anything. 
 
A1: They think the developed world is taking the developing world for granted 
 
D-1.08: 
If you just look at the negotiations, Africa will send one or two people to the COP. They 
can’t cover, and that’s why they formed the G-77 and China, to be able to lobby issues. But 
it’s not only on matters of climate change. It’s the same thing when you look at the trade 
negotiations. Africa sends one or two people, whereas the U.S., the European Union, they 
have their negotiators, they have a battery of scientists and research assistants. 
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D-1.09: 
Q: Any thoughts on what a good decision-making structure might look like? 
 
A: I don’t know. The way the current climate change system works, that’s too bloated a 
system: too many people, too many stakeholders, too much discussion, you never make a 
decision. … If it relied on every single country giving their consent every time there was a 
question asked, it would just end up in the same system we’ve got with the climate change 
program, in which nothing ever gets decided. Every time there’s a meeting, another country 
has changed political parties or the government, and then they bring in new questions and 
disrupt what’s been agreed before it was changed. It just hasn’t gotten enacted. Too bloated a 
system. 
 
D-1.10: 
I’m thinking naturally the UN might be one place to go, and maybe that’s perhaps the best 
option we have. It might also be that an agency of the UN might have to be created to just 
focus on these issues. But of course, because it’s a global thing it has to be at a global level. 
But I think also within countries in areas where climate change is impacting a lot, there might 
also be some agency at that level that could actually be the voice of the people within that 
particular region, be it the whole of Africa, East Africa, or a country. Whatever mechanism is 
established, it has to have the voice of the majority of the people who are actually going to be 
impacted or who are now being impacted by climate change.  
In terms of how it can be implemented, it has to be done at a global level, but what I’m 
saying is that people who are suffering because of climate change, and people who might 
suffer because of whatever technology will be implemented have to have a voice, and a big 
voice, for that matter. 
 
Table 2: Pros and Cons of Global Governance Frameworks 
D-2.01: 
To present our case. For the Pacific Island communities, one particular country, has less 
weight, to have more weight, they have to come together in their forums, like the Melanesian 
groups, to have their own power. 
 
D-2.02: 
The effects would be felt differently, this is what I’m looking at. Climate engineering will not 
affect every place in the same way, because we have other geographical situations and the 
placement of countries is also different in terms of latitude, in terms of altitude. There is no 
way we will get a uniform result for every place. Actually, I think with the engineering, it 
will call for different applications in different places. It means maybe that those regions with 
expanses like highlands will get affected differently than land masses like coastal Africa. Or 
let’s take something like South America or North America, or Asia. Asia and islands in the 
Indian Ocean, they are not experiencing the same problems. Even when you’re talking about 
disease, there are tropical, subtropical diseases … The disease control methods about malaria 
in the U.S. is different from Africa and other places. … What kind of engineering would we 
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apply here in Africa? What would be the appropriate one for the other continents? We cannot 
all be uniform because the effects of global warming are also different. 
 
D-2.03: 
I’ll talk about what ICC is. It’s the Inuit Circumpolar Council that’s part of a network of 
Inuits. There’s an office in Greenland, Chukotka, Canada, and then the Alaska office. It came 
together because there was an idea that there would be a stronger voice for the Inuit to come 
together on common concerns. At this point most of the work is done at the Arctic Council, 
because ICC is one of the six permanent participants. They work on various different 
directives. Their mandate is given to them or is informed by a general assembly that takes 
place every four years in which priorities are set, but then each respective country has its own 
regional boards or its own board that also set mandates. … 
As far as climate change goes, there are things you can say that ICC works on directly 
with climate change. For example, the Greenland office has been heavily involved in 
mercury negotiations and things like that. … They’re involved at the national level by 
working with the state and federal government in trying to bring to the surface the Inuit 
concerns and being involved in what their concerns might be. For example, right now the 
U.S. Arctic strategy just came out, so they give feedback on that strategy. They try to interact 
with the authors of it to try to direct things in a way that might incorporate some Inuit values 
and address some concerns within the Inuit communities. There’s numerous examples of that 
at the state and federal level. 
 
D-2.04: 
I think to avoid a lot of fragmentation, you could also go by regions. Africa region, America 
region. For instance with the Africa region we have now the African Union. It has specialists 
and agencies, for instance, for livestock we have the International Genetics whatever. It’s 
dealing with animal breeding and all that. Because this is a continental board, you can also 
have sometimes issues like climate change that are not easy for Kenya and so many countries 
to do on their own. When you deal with that regional body, they have a secretariat or a 
commission which coordinates with the continent. It becomes easier. So for Africa I’m 
thinking about an A.U. Commission as a regional body with specialists and agencies for 
various things like climate change. 
 
D-2.05: 
I was thinking one way we could look at it is organize at the regional level, like what AOSIS 
is doing now. That’s one good way to group everybody together, people with the same 
interests, as a big group, as a community or a society. I was thinking for countries who are 
low in terms of human resources or understanding of the issues, maybe their other neighbors 
will help them who are in front in terms of the knowledge and technology. 
 
D-2.06: 
The South Pacific Forum or the South Pacific Commission, or SPREP, South Pacific 
Regional Environmental Program, which is based in Samoa. They’re sort of overarching 
regional bodies that deal with regional issues in terms of climate. They help to coordinate 
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governments in the Pacific. So when there was a climate meeting in Copenhagen they were 
the voice of the Pacific. 
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Appendix E: List of Interviewees Quoted by Site 
 
This table is intended to give readers a sense of the number of individuals quoted from each 
research site in Chapters 2-6 including quotes found in the supplemental data in Appendices B, 
C, & D. The list has been anonymized, with individual interviewees identified by a letter 
corresponding to the research site: A for Alaska, S for the Solomon Islands, and K for Kenya, 
and a randomly assigned number.  
 
Chapter 3 
Solomon Islands 
S-10 
S-12 
S-13 
S-17 
S-24 (twice) 
S-25 
S-26 
S-27 
S-29 
S-30 (twice) 
 
 
 
 
 
Alaska 
A-13 
A-14 
A-16 
A-19 (twice) 
A-22 
A-23 (twice) 
A-27 
A-28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kenya 
K-04 
K-06 (twice) 
K-08 
K-11 
K-20 
K-21 
K-24 
K-25 
K-28 
K-30 
K-34 
K-38 (twice) 
 
Chapter 4 
Solomon Islands 
S-03 
S-15 
S-16 
S-21 (twice) 
S-24 
S-28 
S-20 
 
 
 
 
 
Alaska 
A-06 
A-09 (twice) 
A-16 (twice) 
A-20 (twice) 
A-23 
A-24 
A-28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kenya 
K-04 
K-06 
K-16 (twice) 
K-21 
K-22 
K-25 (twice) 
K-27 
K-28 
K-36 
K-38 
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Chapter 5 
Solomon Islands 
S-03 
S-04 
S-07 
S-09 
S-11 
S-14 
S-16 (twice) 
S-20 
S-23 
S-24 
S-25 
S-32 
 
 
 
Alaska 
A-09 (twice) 
A-17 
A-19 
A-20 (twice) 
A-23 (twice) 
A-27 
A-10 (twice) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kenya 
K-02 
K-04 
K-06 
K-14 
K-19 
K-27 
K-24 
K-25 (twice) 
K-32 
K-34 
K-36 
K-37 
 
 
Chapters 2 & 6 
Solomon Islands 
S-07 
S-16 
S-18 
 
 
 
 
 
Alaska 
A-02 (twice) 
A-08 
A-16 (twice) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kenya 
K-16 (twice) 
K-18 
K-22 
 
 
 
 
243 
 
Appendix F  
 
Carr, W., A. Mercer, & C. Palmer. (2012). Public Concerns about the Ethics of Solar 
Radiation Management. In C. Preston (Ed.), Engineering the Climate: The Ethics of Solar 
Radiation Management. Plymouth: Lexington Books. 
 
·.:.::e that is focused on the wrong 
: .:nethical and unfruitful framing 
<So .'0umalists. and citizens to be-
of science in a democratic 
:lterest and reflection on these 
Chapter Ten 
Public Concerns about the Ethics of 

Solar Radiation Management 

Wylie Carr, Ashley Mercer, and Clare Palmer 
"Talk straight. make sure. don't screw up. and don't forget anything." 
--Respondent 747 
[n the past five years. a shower of reports published by think tanks and 
scientific bodies have discussed future prospects for the geoengineering tech­
nologies currently being proposed in light of rising greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. These reports have characteristically emphasized that social and 
ethical considerations should playa key role in geoengineering research and 
have insisted that public engagement is critical to the process of developing 
and debating geoengineering technologies. For example, the influential 2009 
Royal Society report "Geoengineering the Climate" stated, "The greatest 
challenges to the successful deployment ofgeoengineering may be the social, 
ethical, legal and political issues associated with governance, rather than the 
scientific and technical issues" (2009, p. xi). One of the key recommenda­
tions of this report was to "initiate a process of dialogue and engagement to 
explore public and civil society attitudes, concerns and uncertainties about 
climate change" (2009, p. xii). Likewise, a recent report on geoengineering 
produced by the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) emphasized that geoengi­
neering raises "new ethical. legal, and social issues of broad public concern" 
(2011, p. 19) and that "public engagement must inform the program agenda" 
(BPC,2011,p.17), 
These types of explicit calls for public engagements and ethical inquiries 
on emerging technologies have grown in recent decades (Rogers-Hayden & 
Pidgeon, 2007). While both ethics and public engagement are increasingly 
considered critical and urgent aspects of the development of emerging tech­
169 
170 Chapter f() 
nologies, they are rarely brought together in a meaningful fashion. Ethicists 
construct logical arguments, debate these arguments, and come to (often 
conflicting) ethical conclusions. Social scientists utilize engagement methods 
such as. surveys, interviews, citizen juries, and focus groups to elicit public 
perceptIons that mayor may not be incorporated into decision-making pro­
cesses. But rarely are the arguments of philosophers and the concerns of the 
publ!c brought into direct contact with one another. So far. work on geoengi­
neertng has followed a similar pattern. Despite being pursued concurrently. 
the small but growing body of academic ethics research on geoengineering 
(e.g., Gardiner, 2010; Hamilton, 201 la, 2011c; Jamieson. 1996,2010; Pres­
ton, 2011) has remained largely separate from public engagements that probe 
k~owledge about, and opinions of. various forms ofgeoengineering (Leisero­
WltZ, 20 I 0; Mercer eta!., 20 II; Godfray, 20 I 0; Spence et aI., 20 I 0). 
This disciplinary separation represents an opportunity lost. The potential 
synergies of philosophy and social science are notable-particularly in the 
context of emerging technologies. Social science research has indicated that 
public concerns about emerging technologies naturally gravitate toward so­
cial and ethical issues (Wilsdon & Willis, 2004; Wynne. 2007). Previous 
public engagements have revealed areas where average citizens questioned 
foundational assumptions being made by scientists and/or policymakers and 
asserted different visions of technologies and their future roles in society 
(Reynolds & Szerszynski. 2007; Walmsley, 2009). In other words, the basic 
concerns that individuals have about emerging technologies are inherently. if 
not always explicitly, linked to ethics. As such, social scientists are increas­
ingly attempting to create space in public engagement processes for the dis­
cussion of normative issues (Reardon, 2007). 
If these types of processes were brought into contact with philosophical 
refl~ction, it ~eems plausible to expect mutual enrichment. It might be that 
particular ethIcal concerns that philosophers have not considered, or have not 
yet clearly articulated, arise in public consultation. Conversely. philosophers 
may have persuasive arguments that could reinforce or calm certain public 
concerns or potentially raise problematic issues in public awareness. Philo­
sophical work can help in interpreting and providing explanations of funda­
mental ethical concerns-such as concerns about justice or relations between 
human beings and nature-that may underpin ~hat emerges from public 
responses. Collaborations of this nature could result in enriched understand­
ings of social and ethical issues related to emerging technologies. In fact 
Borgmann (2006, p. 15) has described such connections as inherent and 
unavoidable: 
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Public Concerns about the Ethics ofSolar Radiation Management 
Social science without ethics is aimless: ethics without social science is hol­
low. In fact, the two fields inevitably overlap. There is no social science 
research that is not tethered. however indirectly, to concerns of social justice 
and human nourishing, and there are not ethical reflections that fail to appeal 
somehow to the actual human condition. 
PURPOSE AND METHODS OF THIS PAPER 
This chapter aims to initiate an interdisciplinary and mutually beneficial 
conversation between ethics and social science on geoengineering. Co-writ­
ten by two social scientists and an ethicist, this paper brings together data 
from an international survey of public perceptions of geoengineering with 
current research on the ethical questions about geoengineering, either raised 
by ethicists directly, or found in the ethics sections of major geoengineering 
reports. We look for areas where philosophical concerns dovetail with, devel­
op, or reinforce public concerns; where they tend to diverge from such con­
cerns; and where there are worries that seem important either to the public or 
to philosophers that do not arise in the other group. We suggest that di­
alogues of this kind could improve both public and philosophical engage­
ment with geoengineering and improve the research and development of 
solar radiation management technologies. 
Some stylistic challenges arose in merging our disciplinary backgrounds. 
Social scientists typically inhabit a world of quantitative and qualitative so­
cial data and tend to prefer empirical statements to normative ones when 
describing study findings. But we found in constructing this paper that hold­
ing fast to disciplinary conventions can inhibit meaningful cross-disciplinary 
exchange. Presenting survey methods and results as is commonly done in 
social science may render findings of consequence to an ethics audience 
uninteresting or inaccessible. As such, our presentation of the data breaks 
with some social science conventions. We do not attempt to quantify statisti­
cally various positions but focus instead on the significance of particular 
quotations for exposing shared and divergent concerns between the public 
and philosophers about the ethics ofgeoengineering . 
The Survey 
The data presented below come from an international survey of public per­
ceptions of one branch of geoengineering proposals referred to as solar radia­
tion management (SRM). This survey focused on a particular SRM approach 
that would enhance atmospheric albedo by increasing the concentration of 
sulfuric acid droplets in the stratosphere (Royal Society, 2009). Scientists 
hypothesize that this technique could lower global average temperatures rela­
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tively quickly and cheaply by reflecting a small percentage of incoming 
sunlight back into space. This type of intervention presents some significant 
ecological. social. political, and economic risks and uncertainties at varying 
scales from the local to the global. Both because of its potential benefits and 
risks, stratospheric aerosol injection has received significant political and 
scientific attention in recent years and was the focus of this social science 
investigation. 
The survey was conducted in Canada, the United States, and the United 
Kingdom in November and December of 20 I O. The survey questionnaire 
was designed to assess respondent familiarity with geoengineering more 
broadly, with SRM in particular, and respondent opinions about these topics. 
The large majority of survey questions were close-ended, meaning they pre­
sented respondents \'lith limited answer choices that were statistically ana­
lyzed to make generalized statements about the broader population (see Mer­
cer et aI., 2011 for a quantitative analysis of this data). Three survey ques­
tions, however, were open-ended, allowing respondents the opportunity to 
describe their views in their own words. One such question asked respon­
dents, "If you had the chance to talk to Solar Radiation Management re­
searchers and decision makers, what would you say or ask?" Preceded by a 
short. unbiased description ofSRM, to help provide standardized information 
to all participants, this open-ended question provided a place for respondents 
to discuss anything they felt relevant to SRM research or policy. The re­
sponses to this question highlight the significance of ethical concerns that 
members of the public have about SRM and provide insights into the nature 
of those concerns. Based on our analysis. just over 69% of the 2,809 survey 
respondents who chose to answer this question discussed issues that we 
identified as pertaining to ethical aspects of SRM. This indicates that the 
ethics of SRM are extremely salient to members of the public. even when 
encountering this topic for the first time. 
Below we present the ethical concerns of the public Llsing their own 
words. I We have included a large number of quotations to provide readers 
with an indication of how similar ethical concerns were expressed in differ­
ent ways. We bring these public concerns together with those expressed in 
the professional ethics I iterature. drawing on publ ished material from a num­
ber of academic sources. We have classified the quotations related to ethical 
aspects of SRM into seven broad themes: (I) negative side effects; (2) play­
ing God and messing with nature; (3) the wrong solution; (4) distribution of 
harms and benefits; (5) the role of science, trust, and public participation; (6) 
governance of SRM technology; and (7) climate denial. These themes often 
overlap. and respondents frequently refer to more than one theme in a single 
quotation. However, there is sufficient distinctiveness between each concern 
for it to be useful to separate them out. 
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Public Concerns about the Ethics ofSolar Radiation .\lanagement 
We hope this approach of coupling social science data with professional 
ethics literature will allow an ethics audience to see the salience of ethical 
concerns to the public, to compare the ways in which average citizens de­
scribe those concerns to the ways professional ethicists treat similar issues, to 
see where there are different or competing concerns, and to begin envision­
ing how future interdisciplinary research, particularly on geoengineering, 
could benefit from further integration of public engagements and profession­
al ethical inquiry. 
ETHICAL CONCERNS ABOUT SRM 
1. Negative Side Effects 
Many survey respondents raised major concerns about the potential for unin­
tended, negative side effects of SRM. Some respondents raised fairly sophis­
ticated technical questions: 
While I understand that volcanoes release sulfur particulates ... is the particu­
late release intended to be on a similar magnitude. or much larger? Will these 
particulates be prone to causing an increase in lung cancer/respiratory disor­
ders? Is it possible to increase the earth's albedo to a point where we could 
cool the earth from the surface. rather than atmospherically? 
However, technical questions were rare in comparison to general concerns 
about the potential impacts of SRM on humans. plants, animals, and ecosys­
tems: 
Would these solar emissions that you shoot into the sky have any impact on 
the health of humans. animals or plant life and will it affect the air we breathe'.> 
We were told that smoking \Vas not harmful to our health.- We were told that 
asbestos vIas not harmful to our health .... What kind of health problems 
might be expected or are \ve just changing one problem for another perhaps 
more costly') 
These types of comments were more focused on the effects than the effec­
tiveness of SRM proposals. Respondents expressing interest in potential side 
effects were less interested in the technical feasibility of SRM and much 
more concerned with the possible negative impacts. Many respondents were 
particularly concerned about side effects that experts might fail to predict: 
. 
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The thing that really worries me is the unforeseen effects. HO\\ever much 
research you do, you cannot allow for all possible outcomes and once it's done 
it can't be undone. You cannot know for certain what the effect will be, 
however much rcsearch is done. 
You will never be able to fully determine the effects of Solar Radiation Man­
agement on nature. Even if there are no short term effects. there will be long 
term effects that may cause more damage than initial estimates. 
Manipulations of nature by humans have a history of turning out vel)' badl~. 
with unexpected side effects~such as introducing alien species of plants or 
animals into other areas--and even the effects that we have already had on the 
climate. Did anyone expect what has happened to happen? And we don't know 
for certain what changes to climate have been effected by humans and what 
changes are naturaL'Doing something on a global scale eould be extremely 
risky, ... There could be wild extremes ofchanges that were not predicted. 
These responses embody a widespread sentiment among survey respondents 
that SRM has the potential to bring about unforeseen, negative consequences. 
These concerns are about more than risks or the quantification of the chances 
of foreseen consequences coming to fruition: these concerns are about uncer­
tainty and ignorance or about not knowing the relevant parameters of natural 
systems or how they interact (Shackley et aI., 1998; Wynne, 2006). This 
sentiment was nicely captured in the following response: 
Testing Solar Radiation Management on a small scale over several years or 
seventy years for that matter would never allow you to predict what the effects 
would be on a global scale. our planet is unpredictable. we should never 
assume we know exaetly how it works ... taking risks on our planet based on 
small scale research is frightening to me and I am sure many others also. 
In worrying about unforeseen negative impacts of SRM on humans, the 
public shares the concerns of ethicists and indeed geoengineering researchers 
as well. Admittedly, some of the specific risks raised by the public do not 
appear in the ethics literature. For instance, the literature does not discuss 
direct human health impacts from the use of sulfate aerosols (presumably 
because ethicists writing on this subject are familiar with scientific literature 
on the amounts and atmospheric location of the sulfates that would be in­
volved, which makes such problems unlikely). But interestingly, several of 
the public responses explicitly refer to the possible impact of SRM on nonhu­
man nature--on the interests of individual living beings and on the health of 
ecosystems. Such harmful human impacts on organisms and ecosystems 
have been featured in environmental ethics (for instance, Rolston, 1989; 
Singer, 2009; Taylor, 1986) and have to some extent played a role in broader 
worries about climate change (Nolt, 2011 b; Palmer. 20 II), But there is very 
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Public Concerns aboulthe Ethics a/Solar Radiation A4anagement 
little about these kinds of impacts in the geoengineering literature, though 
environmental ethicists would be expected to have concerns about this issue. 
More work to explore the ethical questions raised by SRM in terms of its 
direct impacts on nonhuman organisms and systems seems called for. 2 
Respondents were not only concerned about the risks of particular side 
effects but also about associated uncertainty (where the probability of partic­
ular outcomes is not known) and ignorance (where some of the possible 
outcomes remain unknown). Moreover, the comments above suggest that 
some respondents do not believe that further research will result in all pos­
sible effects becoming known. Such sentiments mesh interestingly with Sare­
witz's (2004) claim that additional research can actually open up new areas 
of uncertainty rather than reducing it. This worry about uncertainty and "un­
known unknowns" has been a major concern in all the relevant literature. The 
IPCC (2007d, p. 15) notes "Geo-engineering options ... remain largely 
speculative and unproven, and with the risk of unknown side effects." Unsur­
prisingly, this concern has also featured in the ethical literature. As long ago 
as 1996. Jamieson argued that "The problem with our technological interven­
tions is that we often don't know the price of the meal in advance or even the 
currency in which it will be extracted" (p. 327). In the ethics literature more 
broadly, some form of precautionary approach is often defended in cases 
where outcomes are uncertain (e.g., Gardiner, 2006a). Precaution is not ex­
plicitly mentioned in these public responses but may be a way to conceptual­
ize how such concerns could gain traction in a policy context. It is worth 
noting, though, that not acting for precautionary reasons can itself generate 
alternative risks (Sunstein, 2005), as there are uncertain, potentially negative 
outcomes from not using SRM in the absence of GHG mitigation. 
In the case of ethical concerns about side effects, philosophers and the 
public have relatively similar responses to SRM. The communication of 
better information about the known risks of SRM to the public (for instance, 
that threats to stratospheric ozone are much more likely than threats to hu­
man respiratory health) would bring these concerns closer. But worries about 
uncertainty and "unknown unknowns" are common to both groups. This 
overlap suggests one key area where social scientists and ethicists could 
work together to encourage more transparency about risk, uncertainty, and 
ignorance associated with SRM technologies, encouraging more open and 
democratic discussions about both science and policy. 
2. Playing God and Messing with Nature 
A second ethical concern raised by respondents related to "messing with 
Nature" or "playing God." This overlaps with concerns about side effects, as 
some respondents feared that "messing with Nature" could negatively re­
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bound on human beings. But there was also a distinct concern about the ways 
in which human beings understand themselves and about appropriate human 
relations with the rest of nature: 
What gives you the right to mess about with nature and cause a potentially 
worse disaster than you're trying to prevent? 
I would say. Stop playing God. there is no easy way ouL We must be logical 
and not go on making more problems for ourselves-You are making us all 
feel like goldfish in a blender, Thanks for nothing l 
The central concerns here seem to be whether humans have a "righe' to 
"mess about" with the natural world and whether it is appropriate for us to 
shape the earth's climatic systems in accord with human interests. Here 
again, public concerns resembled those of ethicists. though ethicists have 
raised several different issues in this context. One kind of worry is about "the 
end of nature," as articulated by McKibben (1989) in the context of anthro­
pogenic climate change. It is possible to argue that intentional geoengineer­
takes further steps toward "ending nature" because nature would no 
longer be "independently-directed." Keith (in Goodell. 20 I0, p. 45) relatedly 
describes geoengineering as potentially bringing about "the end of wildness," 
whereas Hamilton (20 II c, p. 21) sees SRM as "a conscious attempt to over­
come resistance of the natural world to human domination, the last great 
stride toward total ascendancy." Something like these arguments appears to 
be lurking in the public responses outlined above. 
A second, related issue that also appears in these responses concerns 
human self-regard and the idea that intentionally controlling the earth's cli­
mate is an example of human hubris, arrogance, or self-aggrandizement. Hill 
(2007, p. 684) calls attitudes like this a "failure to appreciate one's place in 
nature" and a lack of "proper humility." As Hamilton (201 la, p. 14, quoting 
Coady) puts it, one could see SRM as "an unjustified confidence in knowl­
edge. power, and virtue beyond what can reasonably be allowed to human 
beings." Although the respondents above might maintain that the problem 
with such overconfident attitudes is that they are mistaken--we do not in fact 
have the control over the climate we imagine-the attitudinal worry could 
remain even if humans were in (effective) control of the climate. That we can 
do something does not mean that a good or virtuous society should do it; as 
the second respondent above suggests, this might be taking "an easy way 
out" rather than addressing a more fundamental problem. Indeed, this may 
reflect another attitudinal issue--of human laziness and, perhaps, of superfi­
ciality. Some environmental ethicists (e.g., Sandler, 2007) have developed 
accounts of environmental virtues, and Gardiner has specifically, though 
briefly, discussed these in the context of SRM (Gardiner, 20 I0, p. 303). The 
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idea that geoengineering is a kind of human over-reaching that reflects nega­
tively on us (or, rather, on some of us) arises so widely in public responses 
that further philosophical work on "playing God" and human virtue (includ­
ing the idea ofcollective virtues) seems called for. 
Preston (20 II) has recently raised the question whether, in certain 
circumstances. deployment of SRM could be morally permissible despite 
these concerns, suggesting that such worries should not necessarily be taken 
as decisive. After all, the attitudes displayed by allowing increasing GHG 
emissions are also morally troubling. With continued emissions, there could 
at some time in the future be a threat of runaway climate change, such that 
the risks of SRM appear to be much the lesser evil (Preston 20 11, p. 471) . 
Such arguments-though not made by any respondents here-are important 
and indicate a potential need for further public discussion to explore ethical 
arguments about how, when, and whether justifications for the use of SRM 
may ever override deep ethical misgivings about intentionally manipulating 
the global climate. This may be a case where an important philosophical 
argument such as Preston's could form the foundation of future public en­
gagement processes. 
3. The Wrong Solution, Better Alternatives, and Technological Fixes 
A third concern was that SRM is the wrong solution to the problem of 
climate change-a "technological fix" rather than something that gets to the 
heart of the problem. As such. a number of respondents asked whether alter­
natives to SRM might exist: 
Would there be any other alternative to Solar Radiation Management or other 
technologies similar that would solve global warming? 
What are the other options') Do we have better solutions') 
Are there any other alternatives currently being studied') 
Some participants even suggested alternatives that they felt might be worth 
pursuing in place ofSRM: 
Your time would be better spent trying to develop technologies that can re­
move substantial amounts of the emissions humans have emitted, 
While this individual refers to technologies that are currently being re­
searched and developed, namely, carbon dioxide removal technologies, the 
overall message is that some members of the public were skeptical that all 
options for addressing climate change were being explored. In fact, the most 
frequent alternative raised by respondents was reducing carbon emissions: 
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Why put large amounts of effort into reducing the amount of sunlight (which I 
think is a bad idea)? Put efforts into developing non-carbon based (this in­
cludes not using plant/food for fuels) sources of energy such as nuclear. solar 
(which would seem to be hurt by reducing sunlight). wind and hydro. Also 
why not put efforts into making our usc of energy more efficient to reduce the 
amount used') 
Understanding we are in serious trouble with global ",'arming. I support efforts 
to stall or retard advancement. However. rather than a band-aid we need to 
STOP at all costs the emissions. 
I think it's better to tackle a problem at the source (I.e. cutting down on 
emissions) instead of combating/counteracting the effects with more man­
made interference. 
These comments indicate that rather than proposing alternative technological 
solutions to SRM (such as other forms of geoengineering), many respondents 
insisted that the problem should be tackled by cutting emissions. Some re­
spondents specifically regarded SRM as a "quick fix" or "technological fix": 
Whilst using this technology will we carryon researching in other ways on 
how to stop climate change for good? Or will we just look to solar radiation 
management as a quick fix solution,) 
This seems like another quick fix to an environmental issue we have. We need 
to stop trying to solve problems with ways that could cause more problems, 
Remember DDT? 
Several interesting ethical ideas arise here. One is the thought that SRM is an 
"easy option" allowing us to carryon living in the same ways while doing 
nothing about "fixing climate change for good." These comments call to 
mind Gardiner's (2006b. 2010; see also Hamilton, 2011a) discussions about 
the way climate change opens up possibilities for extensive moral corruption. 
A second idea is whether, as one respondent suggested, SRM is one of a 
series of cases where new technologies have been invented to "fix" a prob­
lem but have ended up "causing more problems" themselves. 
This may point the way to further useful philosophical work. Although a 
broader philosophical literature already exists on the idea of technological 
fixes, this has not been applied in any detail to geoengineering. Scott (2011), 
in the context of agricultural technology, notes that despite the term "techno­
logical fix" being widely used as a derisive label, people "typically demon­
strate an overriding preference for technological fixes" (p. 208). Indeed, a 
small number of survey responses displayed this exact preference: 
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Please. please. please do geoengineering ... we must have the technology to 
adjust our atmosphere to protect ourselves from any eventuality. 
These types of responses raise questions about whether something being a 
technological fix matters ethically, particularly if the outcomes of using it are 
better than the alternatives. This, in turn, generates further questions about 
the ways geoengineering might be regarded from the perspective of different 
ethical theories-those where outcomes are what matter rather than those that 
focus on principles or character. More broadly. the idea of SRM as a techno­
logical fix provides an opportunity to explore contrasting attitudes toward 
technological innovation, both within and between different societies (Borg­
mann, 2006; Scott, 2011; see also Corner & Pidgeon, 20 I O). ."l 
Whereas most respondents prioritized cutting GHG emissions, they dis­
agreed about whether SRM should be pursued while working on emissions 
reductions or whether research on SRM should be abandoned altogether. 
Most geoengineering studies agree that SRM is no "solution," but here we 
see the same divide. Scientists such as Crutzen (2006) propose research on 
geoengineering while adamantly advocating for carbon mitigation; others, 
sLlch as Kiehl (2006), reject the pursuit of geoengineering technology alto­
gether, arguing that such high-risk alternatives should not be on the table at 
this point. Similar division also exists in the ethical literature. Gardiner 
(20 I 0) comes close to rejecting SRM research, arguing that our attention 
should instead be focused on GHG mitigation. However, Preston (20 II), as 
we have seen, argues that we might be best to regard SRM as a last resort in 
the case of runaway climate change. Given that this distinction seems to be 
found in public responses, the scientific literature, and the ethical literature, 
there may be opportunities here for climate experts and ethicists to engage 
the public in discussions about the basic permissibility of SRM and other 
forms of geoengineering and about risk-risk trade-offs between climate 
change and SRM, involving how such risks can be we.ighed and compared. 
and whether such trade-offs and comparisons are ethically permissible. 
4. Distribution of Harms and Benefits 
A number of respondents raised questions about the impacts of SRM on 
particular regions of the earth. Some were concerned about the impacts on 
themselves and on regions in which they have interests: 
What would be the expected changes in the weather-changes in the air. lamL 
and water temperature-changes in the amount of sunlight. rain. snow. fog. 
occurring in the direct arca of Canada in which I own a home'.' 
' 
. 
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But others raised questions about impacts on vulnerable or poorer regions of 
the world: 
What area of the world are you concerned with? Asia in particular has been hit 
with severe flooding but there seems to be more concern with coastal cities 
such as NYC so I question what part of the world will benefit. 
How severely will this technology change weather patterns in the poorer parts 
of the world? 
These questions about regional impacts suggest that the public is concerned 
about possible distributive justice issues related to SRM. Modeling studies 
do indicate that sulfate particle injection could alter regional precipitation 
patterns, particularly 'in Africa and Asia (Ricke et aI., 2010; Robock et al.. 
2008). This raises important regional justice issues, not least because those 
areas that have contributed least to creating the problem of climate change 
might be impacted most by this way of "fixing" it. These kinds of distributive 
justice concerns have been highly significant in the current ethical debate 
about climate change more generally but have not been much developed in 
work on geoengineering ethics (Jamieson, 1996; Gardiner, 2010; Royal Soci­
ety, 2009). Yet this is clearly salient for members of the public. And the 
issues here are particularly important, as the distributions of harms resulting 
from SRM would be much more clearly intentional than harms resulting 
from climate change, raising different questions about moral responsibility 
and legal liability (Hamilton, 2011 a). 
Respondents were not only concerned about the distributive effects of 
SRM on present generations but on future generations as well: 
Will this kill my grand and great-grandchildren? 
My children and grandchildren are the future of this planet. We owe it to future 
generations to further explore ALL avenues of sciencc AND restraint. We 
need to be much more aware and prudent. in our consumption and use of our 
natural resources. 
These comments, anchored in the personal concerns people have for their 
children and grandchildren, indicates that respondents were also worried 
about the effects of SRM on the future. Whereas ethicists have focused on 
the long-range effects of climate change itself, not much yet exists concern­
ing the potential impacts of SRM on future people. Although Gardiner 
(2010) discusses SRM and the future in some detai I, his concern is primarily 
with the moral corruption current generations display by putting future gen­
erations in the position where they may have to act "evilly" by using SRM to 
protect themselves from dangerous climate change. 
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Public Concerns about the Ethics Q(Solar Radiation lHanagement 
In expressing concerns about distributive and intergenerational justice as 
well as about the constraints on moral choices we might be leaving future 
people, the public has picked up on important justice considerations related 
to SRM. These concerns point to a pressing need for further studies of wide­
rangingjustice issues in the SRM context. 4 
5. The Role of Science, Trust, and Public Participation 
Respondents were also concerned about how scientific research into SRM 
would be carried out and who would be in control of it. A number of ques­
tions were raised about the funding and conduct of research into SRM (in­
cluding about the survey itself): 
What will be the benchmarks for suecess/failure. who will identify these erite­
ria and how will these trials be funded? 
Who is paying for this research and who will benefit financially from the 
technology that emerges from ie 
Who pays you? How free are you to have an honest opinion? What environ­
mental groups do you support? Are you asking because you value my opinion 
or because you need to spin the information to persuade me? What is a small 
scale researeh project and what effects will it have? Where will you do the 
research? Who is most at risk from this proposal? , .. how open are you to 
dialogue with independent media and environmental groups and the unin­
formed. non-academics like me? Will you call for round table diseussions and 
offer all your data for perusal and invite all stakeholders to partake. including 
random people from every socio-economic sphere? 
This last quotation also indicates a concern expressed by a number of respon­
dents about the willingness of scientists to open their research up to public 
scrutiny and broader public dialog: 
Would the tindings ofthc scientists be published in full for the public to study? 
Not to hide any information to the public like many wealthy corporations do in 
this country. 
I would like to know how long this research has been ongoing to reach this 
stage. Are we being told of all potential damage and dangers involved, , , 
Something should be done and I am in agreement with research but we should 
all be informed honestly throughout each stage, Who would benetit financially 
from this? Would companies vie for business? How would it be funded? 
Along with calls for openness, honesty, and transparency, some respondents 
openly questioned why they should trust scientists on this issue at all: 
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Why should the public trust you? 
Why do you think the public should trust your judgment? 
How could you trust even yourselves to not use the science for personal gain 
and which government in the entire world would not use it for political gain? 
These comments reveal widespread suspicion about scientific research into 
SRM operating at various levels: suspicion about motivation. sllspicion about 
benefits, and suspicion about secrecy. Some of the comments suggest that 
these suspicions would be at least partially allayed if open and transparent 
scientific processes made research available to the public. 
These types of concerns have certainly been anticipated in the major 
reports on geoengineering. The Royal Society (2009), Asilomar Scientific 
Organizing Committee (20 I0), British House of Commons (20 10), Biparti­
san Policy Center (20 II), and Solar Radiation Management Governance I n­
itiative (SRMGI) (201 1) have all suggested principles that should govern 
research into SRM and ways in which public participation should be incorpo­
rated into the research process. The recent SRMGI report. published after this 
survey was carried out, explicitly raised issues about the funding of research 
and public perceptions of trust and liability. However, this is certainly a case 
where talk may be cheap. The announcement in the UK of a field trial of 
technology that could be used to deliver sulfate aerosols to the stratosphere in 
the future generated an international outcry in late 20 II. Much of the outcry 
concerned the lack of public consultation about the research that led to the 
announcement (Macnaghten & Owen, 20 J I). This incident, which resulted in 
deferral of the field trial while further public consultation was carried out. 
indicates the importance both of keeping the public informed about scientific 
developments and perhaps even providing the public with the opportunity to 
help frame research questions, and goals (Stirling, 2005; Wilsdon & Willis. 
2004). 
6. Governance of SRM Technology 
Alongside concerns about researching SRM. respondents expressed concerns 
about governance. Questions were raised about who would be in control of 
SRM technologies and who would be responsible if or when unexpected or 
negative outcomes occurred: 
What industries would develop the technologies and who would be responsible 
for implementing them? What kind of national and international oversight 
would there be and with what authority,) 
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Who would decide whieh part of the world would have their rain volume 
changed because of Solar Radiation Management and would that mean that 
some countries would need to become uninhabitable" 
HOI\ will you predict where effects such as extra rainfall will occur? And if the 
extra rain exacerbates flooding somewhere. how will it be dealt with? Who 
will take responsibility? 
These types of publ ic concerns were widespread and raised questions about 
international relations and international responsibility. What governance re­
gimes would deal with problems? And what would be an ethical way of 
doing so? Implicit here, as with the pursuit of scientific research. are ques­
tions about democratic participation in creating governance structures, in 
particular, how can those in hard-to-reach, but likely to be affected, locations 
be consulted? "With what authority" would there be national and internation­
al oversight? 
Multiple parties, including the United Nations Convention on Biological 
Diversity (2010) and SRMG I (20 II) and multiple pUblications, have dis­
cussed potential governance structures for SRM. However, these attempts to 
construct mechanisms for governing SRM do not carefully deal with all of 
the ethical issues that lie behind the worries expressed above. [n particular, 
because of its intentional nature, SRM generates different questions of moral 
responsibility than climate change. If the implementation of SRM harms 
some nations while benefiting others, new international justice questions are 
raised. SRM will be carried out from a point source or sources; it will be a 
decision deliberately made by some group or groups; it cannot be attributed 
to people now dead, and so on. Ethicists should explore very closely the 
implications of these international justice questions raised by the governance 
ofSRM. 
The importance of public engagement is at least as pressing in developing 
the governance of SRM technology as research into the technology itself. 
There has already been some discussion of the ethical requirements here: 
Jamieson (1996) considers the need for democratic processes in the context 
of intentional climate change; Comer and Pidgeon (20 I0) describe upstream 
engagement as a potential mechanism for soliciting meaningful public partic­
ipation in decision-making processes about SRM research and governance: 
and SRMGI (20 II) discusses in some detail different forms of public partici­
pation in creating governance structures. But there is still work to do, and 
scrutiny is needed to ensure that espoused ethical principles of participation 
in decision making are actually implemented in practice . 
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7. Climate Denial 
Finally, and in line with research on public perceptions of climate change, a 
handful of respondents questioned the underlying assumption behind SRM 
research. namely, that anthropogenic climate change exists at all: 
You are from a premise that is unproven. many would even say un­
founded, That is. that human activity results in global warming (climate 
change), This idea is nothing more than a political maneuver to gain votes, 
Hard, peer-reviewed science indicates that the earth goes through cycles of 
warming and cooling, Nothing to be alarmed at. 
Why do you continue to waste money on charlatan theories and political 
grandstanding when overwhelming evidence suggests that the current climate 
changes are cyclical'in nature and that carbon emissions have not been shown 
to impact climate nearly as much as the public has been led to believe? 
It is important to acknowledge climate change deniers in this context for two 
reasons. First, as Jamieson (1996) notes, the prospect ofgeoengineering may 
create strange bedfellows, Those who oppose SRM (and perhaps other forms 
of geoengineering) as unethical may find themselves in an alliance with 
those who oppose SRM because they do not accept climate change at all. 
Alliances over particular moral questions for widely divergent underpinning 
reasons are not uncommon, with alliances between feminists and conserva­
tives against pornography being an obvious example (West, 1987). But in 
this case, an alliance between climate change deniers and those opposed to 
SRM for other reasons may well be a fragile one, If SRM could be imple­
mented without requiring any significant change to "business-as-usual," in 
contrast to what is demanded by significant GHG mitigation, politically and 
economically conservative climate deniers might easily shift to being SRM 
supporters. It is also clear that, right now, those who sincerely reject the 
science of climate change present another fonn of ethical opposition to SRM 
that has not been considered. This is an area where ethicists could inform 
future public engagement efforts aimed at exploring the relationship between 
climate denial and perceptions ofgeoengineering. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter. we have reproduced and discussed some of the key ethical 
concerns raised by the public about SRM and brought these concerns into 
dialog with ethical debates found in formal reports and academic papers. 
This dialog has led us to draw a number of conclusions. 
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Public Concerns about the Ethics ofSolar Radiation Management 
First, and most generally, we have shown that ethical considerations are 
central to public concerns about SRM. This has emerged in other public 
engagements (Godfray, 20\0: Parkhill & Pidgeon, 2011) but it is a point 
worth emphasizing. The core questions raised by geoengineering technolo­
gies in the public arena are, as the Royal Society (2009) anticipated, social, 
ethical, and political, rather than primarily scientific and technological. Over 
two-thirds of the responses to a very broad, open-ended question on an 
international survey focused on what we have classified as ethics issues. This 
indicates that ethical questions are at the forefront of people's minds when 
they think about geoengineering. and it is these questions that the public will 
want to see addressed by scientists and decision makers (Wynne, 2006). If 
SRM is to gain public acceptance, it will need to gain ethical acceptance . 
And at the moment, there are many public ethical concerns that would need 
to be allayed-if. indeed, they can be. This, of course, assumes that for SRM 
to be deployed it should be widely ethically acceptable. Some might contest 
this, but all the major reports produced so far (for instance BPC, 20 II; Royal 
Society, 2009: SRMGI, 2011) emphasize that geoengineering technologies 
should be developed ethically. 
Second, we have shown that, in many cases, the concerns raised by the 
public are closely related to those articulated in ethics literature. Unsurpris­
ingly, public concerns about the ethics of SRM are often expressed more 
informally than scholarly ones, and though they emerge from personal life 
experiences and contexts, they are recognizably the same concerns. Because 
the academic ethics literature on geoengineering is relatively small, public 
concerns flag important areas for future work. For instance, a number of 
public comments raised questions about the distribution of the effects of 
SRM-who would benefit and who would be worse off-and what questions 
about distributive justice this raises. There has, so far, been little ethical work 
on these questions. Even if it is unclear at present what the effects of SRM 
might be, further research on the ethical significance of the intentional nature 
of SRM in contrast with anthropogenic climate change seems particularly 
important. 
However, the traffic here is not all one way. While raising issues that 
ethicists should explore, public concerns should also be subjected to critical 
scrutiny. In cases where popular claims or worries harbor factual inaccura­
cies, reflect inconsistencies, or are otherwise problematic, ethicists should try 
to make alternative arguments available in the public sphere, perhaps by 
contributing to popular publications, public discussions. or participation in 
public engagements. Indeed, even where the majority of ethicists and the 
public appear to agree, there is still space for debate and objection. For 
instance, some members of the public viewed SRM as problematic because it 
intentionally interferes with natural processes. While this view is also held by 
the majority of environmental ethicists, it is, nonetheless, an argument that 
186 Chapter l() 
can be challenged on a number of grounds: for instance that "nature" has 
already been intentionally "interfered" with or that the whole human/nature 
distinction should be abandoned (Jamieson, 1996; Preston, 2011). Such argu­
ments are not decisive, but bringing them into the public sphere could stimu­
late debate. Indeed, the salience of ethical concerns may indicate that the 
public would be interested in engaging in thoughtful and reflective treatment 
of these issues. Professional ethicists, then, should think about how to utilize The CuI' 
intuitive ethical concerns raised by the public to facilitate and inform more 
complex and pertinent discussions about ethics and geoengineering in ways 
that are accessible and digestible. 
There are, in addition, some arguments prevalent in the ethical literature 
about SRM that did not directly arise in comments from the public-for 
instance, the debate about whether geoengineering research itself creates a 
"moral hazard," causing people to be more reckless in terms of carbon emis­
sions (Hale, 2010). Such arguments, in more popular form, deserve wider 
public debate and discussion. 5 
Our third and final conclusion concerns the considerable space the re­
sponses discussed above reveal for mutual learning at the intersection of 
social science and ethical reflection on geoengineering. Social scientists can 
help ethicists to continue assessing the concerns of publics, including public 
conceptions of ethical issues, and how such issues can be effectively dis­
cussed. Social scientists can also help to incorporate public engagements into 
ethical assessments of SRM technologies. Just as the public may raise new 
research questions via social science for ethicists, ethicists can inform future 
social science research in several ways, including considering what ethical 
questions particular geoengineering proposals raise (for instance. about dis­
tributive and intergenerational justice and about human relations to nature) 
and in assisting social scientists in facilitating public engagements that spe­
cifically target these questions. We conclude, then, that ethicists and social 
scientists can and should seek out ways to work together more closely on the 
social and ethical challenges posed by geoengineering for the benefit of 
public debate, scientific research, and policymaking. 
NOTES 
1. We have corrected minor spelling and grammatical errors and shortened some quota­
tions. 
2. See the chapter by Sandler in this volume [editor]. 
3. See the chapter by Scott in this volume [editor]. 
4. See the chapters by Hourdequin. Smith. Ott. Whyte. and Preston in this volume [editor]. 
5. See the chapter by Hale in this volume [editor]. 
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1 The context for public engagement in solar radiation management
Solar radiation management (SRM) has recently received increasing scientific, political, and
public attention. SRM is a form of geoengineering that seeks to lessen the harmful impacts
of climate change by altering the earth’s albedo. Possible techniques include increasing the
concentration of sulfuric acid droplets in the stratosphere or increasing marine cloud lifespan
and albedo using salt water droplets (Royal Society 2009). While not a new idea (Keith
2000), attention to SRM increased dramatically with the publication of atmospheric chemist
and Nobel Laureate Paul Crutzen’s (2006) article “Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric
Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?”We focus here on SRM, as
a subset of geoengineering technologies, because several SRM techniques currently are
regarded as potentially inexpensive and technologically feasible, and could rapidly alter the
entire climate system with global implications.
Since 2006, numerous scientific and policy reports have called for increasing research on
SRM at both national and international levels. These reports have advocated increased
funding for scientific and engineering research on SRM, recommended the coordination of
interdisciplinary research to address the multifaceted ethical, legal, and social issues that
SRM raises, and also advanced calls for public engagement. In fact, “public participation in
geoengineering decision-making” is one of the five recommendations that make up the
Oxford Principles, perhaps the most well-respected set of norms proposed to date for the
governance of geoengineering research (Rayner et al. 2009). As Steve Rayner et al. point out
in this volume, this principle encapsulates a “primary concern for legitimacy” of any future
geoengineering activity (2013). Similar calls for engagement have featured in reports such as
the Royal Society’s (2009) Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and
Uncertainty, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee’s (2010) The
Regulation of Geoengineering, the Bipartisan Policy Center’s (2011) Geoengineering: A
National Strategic Plan for Research on the Potential Effectiveness, Feasibility, and
Consequences of Climate Remediation Technologies, and the Wilson Center’s
Geoengineering for Decision Makers (Olson 2011).
While these reports correctly identify a need for public input into SRM research and
policy-making, they fail to adequately specify the purpose of public engagement and explain
why it is necessary. Social scientists, on the other hand, have explored the justifications for
the inclusion of the public in the early stages of technological research and development, and
have begun to carry out preliminary public engagement exercises on SRM in the United
Kingdom (UK) (e.g. Corner and Pidgeon 2010; Corner et al. 2012; Macnaghten and
Szerszynski 2013). We wish to build upon this work by further exploring why public
engagement must play a role in SRM, and how public engagement processes can contribute
to SRM research and governance. More specifically, we hope to provide an accessible
interdisciplinary argument, consisting of social, ethical, and technological justifications for
engaging the public, to the broader community of climate scientists, policy-makers, and non-
governmental organizations.
We define “public engagement” as participatory processes through which members of the
public convey their views, concerns, and recommendations about emergent technologies and
related decision-making, with the idea that the outcomes will inform both research and
policy-making. Both advocates and critics of public engagement have sometimes seen it
merely as a public relations strategy to convince the public to support a proposal that an
organization wishes to press forward. Here we argue for public engagement as a legitimate,
democratic dialogue about whether and how to advance a particular technology. Public
engagement of this sort moves beyond viewing citizens as passive recipients of expert
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opinions and recognizes the importance of actively involving citizens in technological
design and policy making, and in shaping the goals and animating questions of public
engagement exercises themselves (Wynne 2006). Such engagement informs and lends
legitimacy to research, the governance of research, and policy decisions regarding a
technology’s regulation and/or possible deployment. The importance of public participation
in the research, development, and regulation of emergent technologies is now widely
recognized by both governments and scientific bodies (European Commission 2002;
House of Lords 2000; Leshner 2003), and has been widely discussed and implemented in
the case of nanotechnology in recent years (Delgado et al. 2011; Kearnes et al. 2006;
Macnaghten et al. 2005; Royal Society 2004).
The latest report by the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI
2013) briefly mentions three rationales or motivations for engaging the public on emerging
technological and scientific issues.1 We utilize these three justifications as a starting point for
examining the purpose and utility of public engagement processes in relation to SRM. The
first is a normative or ethical rationale which views participation as necessary based on
principles of equity and justice—people simply deserve to be informed about and have a say
in a technology that has the potential to affect their lives. The second is an instrumental
motivation frequently associated with bringing about particular outcomes, for instance
minimizing adverse public responses to an emergent technology, promoting public aware-
ness, or fostering trust in the scientists who design particular technologies and the institu-
tions that regulate them (Royal Society 2004: 63). The third rationale for public participation
is substantive, motivated by the desire to actually improve the quality of decisions involving
SRM technologies via the incorporation of broader knowledge and active deliberation
between publics, experts, and policy makers. Substantive motivations encourage the incor-
poration of diverse perspectives into research and development processes in order to
improve both the relevance and effectiveness of resulting products, be they technologies
themselves or regulatory policies surrounding implementation. The remainder of this article
explains why all three rationales for public participation are relevant to SRM, provides
concrete reasons why public participation is necessary from ethical, political, and techno-
logical perspectives, and explains why now is an appropriate time to begin engaging diverse
publics in meaningful dialogue about SRM research and policy.
1.1 Normative justifications
Scientists involved in SRM research have been quick to acknowledge that the ethics of SRM
are challenging. Many forms of SRM are designed specifically to impact the global climate.
Modeling studies suggest that SRM techniques will likely have uneven impacts on regional
and local climates (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012; Ricke et al. 2010; Robock et al. 2008). As with
unintended anthropogenic climate change (IPCC 2007), there will be winners and losers
with SRM. Because the world’s poor are most vulnerable to climate change they might be
expected to benefit most from SRM, particularly if the technology mitigates expected losses
in crop productivity (Pongratz et al. 2012). However the uneven effects of SRM mean that
some people living at the subsistence level may be worse off if such technologies are
implemented (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012; Robock et al. 2008).
The possibility of uneven benefits and burdens raises difficult ethical issues involving
consent and participation (Preston 2012). The deployment of SRM could be intrinsically
1 Although attributed to Stirling (2005) in the SRMGI (2013) report, these rationales for public engagement
date back to Fiorino (1990).
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unpredictable in its effects, both on climatic processes and political systems (Hulme 2010;
Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013). Further, the very promise of SRM technologies could
further weaken progress toward the reduction of carbon emissions. These issues by their
very nature demand public engagement. To avoid compounding the existing injustices of
climate change (Shue 1992), diverse populations whose lives, livelihoods, and societies
could be significantly impacted by SRM should have the opportunity to be informed about
the various technologies being proposed and how they might be affected. The requirement to
be informed is essentially “an acknowledgement of one’s moral status” (Rayner et al. 2013)
(i.e. of that fact that one counts morally). Additionally, these same populations should be
afforded the opportunity to deliberate about, consent to, and agree to bear any possible
harms of both field testing and possible deployment.
How the public conceives of notions such as ‘participation’ and ‘consent’ will influence
how engagement processes are viewed and the ways in which they are implemented in
practice (Rayner et al. 2013). In the case of SRM, the task of enabling meaningful public
engagement that contributes to legitimate governance processes is complicated by the fact
that it must be international in scope. Additionally, it must consider highly technical
questions about a nascent technology that could be designed or used with a variety of
intentions that will be difficult to pin down or regulate (Corner et al. 2012; Stilgoe 2011).
While cognizant of these challenges, we suggest there is a moral imperative that diverse
publics begin to contribute in meaningful ways—and soon—to discussions about whether
and how any SRM testing and deployment should take place.
Public engagement is arguably even more necessary since the traditional institutions and
practices of representative democracy may be inadequate to address the global implications
of SRM technologies. The scale and scope of SRM proposals necessitates public engage-
ment processes that seek out diverse views and encourage dialogue about public concerns
and the assumptions that shape research priorities (SRMGI 2013; Wilsdon and Willis
2004). This needs to take place not only in the United Kingdom, where, as Corner et
al. (2012) highlight, engagement processes on SRM are already taking place, but also
in regions of the world where SRM is just beginning to enter the scientific and
political lexicon. Engagement methods such as stakeholder groups, citizens’ juries,
consensus conferences, and scenario workshops, among others, can be designed in
culturally sensitive ways to ensure meaningful public participation at local, national,
and even global levels (Rusike 2005).
1.2 Instrumental justifications
As the term itself indicates, instrumental rationales have tended to view public engagement
as a tool for advancing particular goals. Instrumental public engagements have often taken
the form of assessing public understanding and opinions about a given technology in order
to shape strategic communications designed to generate public support or to prevent adverse
responses (Stirling 2005). More manipulative forms of ‘engagement’ are already, and will
continue to be, utilized by groups attempting to sway the debate on SRM in particular
directions, by presenting information that is selective and framed in ways that are likely to
lead to predetermined conclusions rather than genuinely open dialog and debate. However,
instrumental engagements need not follow this trajectory. In fact, more recently, instrumental
arguments for public engagement have tended to focus more on the positive indirect effects
of greater openness and transparency about science and technology, including increased trust
in public institutions, to the extent that those institutions are genuinely willing to open up
their assumptions and self-conceptions to challenge and reformulation (Wynne 2006).
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In the case of SRM, research into public perceptions can play a different but no less
important instrumental role. While public perception methodologies such as survey research
can reproduce the assumptions of researchers, and do not foster the back and forth dialogue
between experts and publics characterized by effective public engagement methodologies,
carefully crafted surveys and thoughtful assessment of public perceptions can play a critical
role in promoting public awareness and debate about SRM. While often not explicitly aimed
at integrating public concerns into policy-making or technological design, public perceptions
work can make attentive scientists, engineers, and policy-makers aware of the social di-
mensions involved in the introduction of new technologies. The nascent nature of SRM
research means that, while public awareness may be on the rise (Mercer et al. 2011) and
media and political frames are beginning to take shape (Scott 2012), the majority of the
global population is not familiar with the topic. As such, research aimed at understanding
public perceptions of SRM and tracking changes in those perceptions over time can enhance
our understanding of how to best facilitate dialogue between experts, policy makers, and the
public about SRM and its attendant issues. For these reasons, research methods aimed at
gauging public perceptions of SRM, such as mail and online surveys, telephone polls, and
focus groups, while not constituting engagement in and of themselves, can provide valuable
information that can inform more participatory processes in the future.
It is important to note that SRM is a contentious issue and it would be a mistake to try to
reduce the discourse around it to a bland consensus that conceals genuine differences in
interests, values, and framings. It would be even more problematic for public engagements
to be utilized to maximize the power of a public relations campaign or to manipulate public
opinion. As the Royal Society (2009: 42) has stated, “the full potential of any public
engagement will not be realized if it is motivated primarily by a desire by advocates to
secure public consent to geoengineering”. Rather, we need to know how different publics
approach SRM, what they are concerned about, and how the stakes involved in SRM
research and deployment decisions can be better articulated and debated. Crucially, this
might involve changing the framings and assumptions of scientists, engineers, and policy
makers, as much as those of the public.
1.3 Substantive justifications
Common misperceptions of the role of public engagement build on assumptions that
technologies spring forth fully formed from the sciences, and that the role of the public is
simply to shape decisions about their use, including the possibility of their prohibition. This
framing deeply misconceives the task at hand in researching and developing SRM technol-
ogies and the appropriate role of public involvement. Rather than science, the development
of SRM tools may be more usefully seen as engineering—the practical application of
science to satisfy human needs or solve human problems. Science does not discover tools
to manage climate risks by manipulating solar radiation any more than science discovers the
iPod. The development of both is an engineering process that starts with a particular
problem-definition, and—ideally—proceeds on the basis that the resulting technology will
have to function under real-world conditions, and must thus take account of the likely
interaction of users with the technology and the possibility for its misuse.
However, scientific and engineering communities involved in the development of SRM
technologies will inevitably make assumptions—implicitly or explicitly—about the follow-
ing: the objectives of the technologies; the criteria that should be used to assess them and
how they should be weighed; the kinds of knowledge appropriate to draw upon for research;
and the meaning and significance of public concerns (Galarraga and Szerszynski,
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forthcoming). Thus, one substantive justification for public engagement is to open up these
assumptions (Stirling 2005), and to try to ensure that research considers the broadest
possible set of framings of SRM and related issues. This approach is more likely to produce
socially robust research outcomes.
To do so, public engagement processes could directly deliberate plausible objectives for
SRM technologies, for example, (1) keeping the climate as near as possible to pre-industrial
conditions, (2) maximizing agricultural productivity, or (3) managing the consequences of
low-probability high-impact ‘climate catastrophes’. They could also interrogate how tech-
nical choices during the development of SRM would shape costs, the extent to which
technological control would be dispersed or centralized, and how vulnerable SRM might
be to disruption by societal changes like economic recessions or wars. Public engagement
could also be used to challenge embedded problem-definitions to which the proposed
technologies are presented as a solution (Stirling 2005), to question the plausibility of using
‘technical fixes’ for complex problems (Sarewitz and Nelson 2008), and to examine how
well the assumptions made by technical and governance communities about SRM are likely
to stand up under real-world conditions (Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013). Without such
public input the technical community developing SRM will tend to fall back on the implicit
assumptions of a relatively homogeneous community (Kitcher 2001; Longino 1990;
Wilsdon and Willis 2004) .
Public engagement can help to democratically weigh and refine the objectives that drive
SRM research, and help prevent a scenario in which the unstated assumptions of a commu-
nity of developers ultimately impact the global population. Such engagement processes can
also create the space for ideological discussions about the place and role of emergent
technologies in our lives, and about the nature of the world that SRM deployment might
bring about. Opposition to new technologies is often based on reasoned distrust of those who
will be in control of new technologies and how they will use them, and on an assessment of
the kind of social relations that the technologies seem to imply (Grove-White et al. 2000). If
engagement processes facilitate recognition and genuine understanding of divergent views
on SRM by scientists and engineers, such processes have the potential to incorporate a broad
diversity of concerns into technological and policy decisions from the outset. SRM would
give certain groups an unprecedented amount of leverage over our planet. Public engage-
ment can help society to decide whether SRM should go ahead, but also help define the
proper goals and boundaries of that leverage if it does. Such engagement needs to be
characterized by an iterative dialogue that includes mutual learning and ultimately mutual
design of SRM research and technology.
2 The time is now
Are everyday citizens around the world ready and able to discuss SRM in a meaningful way?
We think the answer is yes. The potential for diverse publics to meaningfully engage in early
dialogue about emergent technologies has been amply demonstrated over the past decade. In
cases ranging from genetically modified foods to nanotechnology, researchers have found
that citizens are able to engage in thoughtful discussion about nascent and complex
technologies even when public awareness is low (Kearnes et al. 2006; Stilgoe and
Wilsdon 2007). In fact, public engagement can be more effective when initiated while
technologies and the public discourses surrounding them are still taking shape.
Participants in public engagement exercises do not need to have substantial knowledge of
the technology of interest beforehand. They can come to well-reasoned judgments about a
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technology through a combination of basic information conveyed during the engagement
process, their own ‘lay’ knowledge about nature and technology, and their commonsense
knowledge of the social world (Marris et al. 2001). In fact, several recent public engagement
efforts in the UK have demonstrated that citizens are able to critically assess social, ethical,
and technical aspects of SRM research when provided with relatively minimal information
(Corner et al. 2012; Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013). These engagement efforts and a
survey in North America and the UK (Mercer et al. 2011) establish that the public is able to
understand the basic mechanics of SRM and readily identify concerns and issues that they
believe need to be addressed.
Public engagement need not entail members of the public entering the lab and standing
over the shoulders of scientists and engineers, but rather can simply involve facilitating
processes whereby legitimate public concerns can be incorporated into decisions about the
practice and governance of SRM research. Just as experts often feel that science is misun-
derstood by the public, so publics often feel ignored or misunderstood by experts (Wynne
2006). Rather than questioning scientific or technical expertise per se, the public typically
wants to know that unrealistic assumptions about levels of predictability and control are not
being made, that alternative framings and problem-definitions have been considered, and
that decisions that will be highly consequential for society are not proceeding on the basis of
a narrow set of framings or economic interests. For instance, previous engagement exercises
in the UK and public perceptions research have revealed concerns about the relative
“naturalness” of different SRM technologies, unease about the scale of interventions,
concerns about the distribution of harms and benefits, a desire for governance mechanisms
and transparency about research, and skepticism about the ultimate compatibility of SRM
with democratic processes (Carr et al. 2012; Corner et al. 2012; Macnaghten and
Szerszynski 2013). In order for the public to view engagement processes as legitimate, they
need to know that scientists, engineers, and policymakers are ready to take such concerns
seriously.
As Corner and Pidgeon (2010) and Corner et al. (2012) point out, public engagement on
geoengineering faces the difficulties encountered by all attempts to include publics in
decision-making processes. Such challenges include decisions about how engagement
processes are structured, who participates, and how the results feed into policy-making
processes by government officials, scientists, or the private sector. Additionally, attempts at
public engagement must wrestle with the diversity of views on the role of the citizen relative
to formal political decision-making in different countries around the world. In countries that
embrace less democratic forms of governance, the public may not be conceptualized as
having a legitimate say in policy-making and political culture might not enable meaningful
dialogue. In the developing world, participatory practices can have the effect of strengthen-
ing the powerful and weakening other, complementary modes of democratic politics (Cooke
and Kothari 2001). Even in long-running democracies, citizen participation and input into
decision-making are variously envisioned, and practiced in ways that often only appear to treat
the public as equal participants (Wynne 2006). Because of the global implications of SRM,
public engagement would need to confront competing ideas about the role of the public relative
to experts and decision-makers. And while it is tempting to simply call for additional engage-
ments in well-established democracies in Europe or North America, public dialogue and
participation needs to include more diverse and marginalized populations as soon as possible,
to counter the dominance of Western perspectives in what should be a global discussion.
Conducting broad national and international engagements, particularly in developing
nations where the greatest impacts (positive or negative) of SRM could be felt, certainly
raises significant challenges. The enormous scale, the diversity of cultures and languages,
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and the differences in political cultures, access to communication technology, and awareness
and understanding of climate change and Western technology all present real barriers to
public engagement. As public engagement efforts expand to a broader range of countries, we
should not expect consistent methods and goals. Rather, the dynamic and emergent nature of
politics, along with the diversity of political cultures, will likely result in a range of
processes, that are haphazardly, opportunistically, and strategically stitched together to form
an evolving global discourse. Some initiatives will emerge spontaneously in civil society,
and perhaps take more unruly forms than those discussed here. Furthermore, if numerous
engagements were carried out across the globe, public input would need to be synthesized
and made usable for scientists, engineers, and policy makers. At the same time, some
governments and interests will resist engagement efforts and seek to undermine them.
While a disparate and non-uniform set of engagements may seem less than ideal, innovation
and creativity has the potential to result in processes that are culturally relevant and
politically feasible in different countries around the world.
A range of institutions could spearhead efforts, as the question of who should facilitate
engagement and at what scale will be answered differently in different political and cultural
contexts. Furthermore, we should expect considerable diversity in and across regions and
countries, depending on who has the interest and capacity to implement engagement
processes. For instance, in the UK, public engagement processes on geoengineering have
thus far been largely funded by the national government through two research councils and
carried out by academics, market research companies, and NGOs (Corner et al. 2012).
Following this model, funding agencies in various countries, such as the National Science
Foundation in the United States, could encourage or require future geoengineering research
proposals to include public engagement exercises. Alternatively, professional societies or
NGOs interested in promoting awareness and dialog around environmental and technolog-
ical issues could initiate engagement efforts. The Royal Society, for instance, organized a
small engagement process in conjunction with their 2009 geoengineering report. They have
also coordinated with TWAS [the academy of sciences for the developing world], and the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), to facilitate the ongoing Solar Radiation Management
Governance Initiative (SRMGI), which has now conducted meetings in Africa and Asia
aimed at expanding the discussion of SRM to include perspectives from the developing
world (SRMGI 2013). While these meetings were not public engagement exercises as
described above, SRMGI does indicate the possibility for innovative partnerships across
government agencies, NGOs, and research societies to fund and initiate such processes in the
future.
We suggest that engagement processes could, and will need to, scale up over time as
scientific understanding and research and governance capacity builds (SRMGI 2013). Initial,
small scale public engagement efforts such as focus groups in different parts of the world
could begin to spotlight the different perspectives of diverse populations. Over time,
engagement processes should expand, include more diverse groups and better reflect and
represent both the global population and a broader range of views therein. Throughout this
process, interdisciplinary research teams will need to work with governments, civil society
groups (such as environmental NGOs), and citizens to develop effective engagement
methods sensitive to different political and cultural systems, while also working to better
integrate the information generated in public engagement exercises into the development of
SRM technologies and policies.
A range of engagement methods have been developed in the past decade and could be
employed across a variety of political and cultural systems around the world (Rowe and
Frewer 2005). For instance, in several European parliamentary systems, upstream public
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engagement has proven a particularly useful tool, eliciting public views in advance of and in
coordination with decision-making by elected representatives. In the United States, where
citizens have multiple avenues through which to influence decision-making beyond electoral
processes, such as litigation, ballot initiatives, lobbying, and comments during administra-
tive rule-making, innovative stakeholder processes have emerged, including citizen-initiated
collaborative groups that could be utilized to link stakeholder processes directly to decision-
makers and/or legislation and regulatory rule-making (Dryzek and Tucker 2008). These
engagement methods will undoubtedly need to be adapted or new and innovative forms of
engagement developed to be effective in non-Western contexts. Examples of this type of
adaptation exist, such as the use of citizen’s juries in India and Zimbabwe to include
subsistence farmers in discussions about genetically modified crops (Rusike 2005).
Despite potential difficulties, the scale and scope of current SRM proposals make the
alternatives to open and inclusive international deliberation, such as decisions made solely
by scientists and policy makers in a small group of countries, unacceptable. Even existing
national and supranational institutions of representative democracy may struggle to com-
mand sufficient legitimacy to make decisions about willfully manipulating the global climate
through either large-scale testing or deployment of SRM. Such decisions have the potential
to shape our collective future and therefore must incorporate the views and concerns of the
diverse publics that inhabit this planet to be ethically, politically, socially, and technologi-
cally legitimate and robust. From a normative perspective, public engagement exercises help
satisfy moral requirements for participation by affected parties. From an instrumental
perspective, early awareness of public concerns can produce a better understanding of
how to ensure that public engagement exercises connect with the sort of issues and concerns
that people have about SRM. From a substantive perspective, engagement with diverse
publics will ensure that decisions about SRM research and its possible deployment are
informed by a broader set of perspectives and priorities, and are thus more likely to serve the
needs of the world’s various populations. Because diverse publics currently appear ready,
willing, and able to engage with the topic of SRM, and because public engagement
processes hold the potential to improve SRM technologies and policies, we suggest that
public engagement should be a mandatory component of any nationally or internationally
funded research program on SRM.
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Abstract
Calls for public participation in climate engineering research and governance have appeared in numerous
scientific and policy reports on the topic, indicating a desire for transparency and public oversight. But mean-
ingful public engagement can require more of scientists and regulatory agencies than many realize. Over the
past several decades, researchers and practitioners have developed many different methodologies to enable
citizens to productively engage with experts and policy makers about emerging scientific and technological
issues such as climate engineering. In fact, the United Kingdom has already convened several public partici-
pation exercises on climate engineering. Now is the time for federal agencies in the United States to start similar
processes. The public is ready to discuss climate engineering. Are American scientists and decision makers
ready to reciprocate?
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O
n March 18, 1971, columnist Jack
Anderson exposed the ÒWater-
gate of Weather WarfareÓ in the
Washington Post. Under the headline ÒAir
Force Turns Rainmaker in Laos,Ó Ander-
son (1971) described how covert US mili-
tary operations in Southeast Asia aimed
to seed clouds and increase rainfall to
reduce traffic along the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, the major supply route of the
United StatesÕ adversary in the Vietnam
War. The revelation of this top secret
program eventually led to the creation
of the United Nations Convention on
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other
Hostile Use of Environmental Modifica-
tion Techniques, otherwise known as the
ENMOD Convention, which went into
effect in 1978 (Fleming, 2006, 2010).
This little-known convention recently
came back into the spotlight with the
advent of the idea of climate engineer-
ingÑthe deliberate, large-scale interven-
tion by humanity into the EarthÕs climate
system in order to moderate global
warming. Proposals include mimicking
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volcanic eruptions by increasing the con-
centration of sulfate particles in the upper
atmosphere to reflect incoming sunlight,
and fertilizing the oceans with nutrients
to create algae blooms to consume large
amounts of carbon. Also known as
Ògeoengineering,Ó this approach has gar-
nered burgeoning attention from scien-
tists and policy makers in recent years
as a possible response to climate change.1
Scientists researching climate engin-
eering do not wish to reproduce the
secrecy that surrounded past attempts
at weather and climate modification,
like those of the Vietnam War. ÒPublic
participation and consultation in
research planning and oversightÓ is one
of five key recommendations for respon-
sible research that was agreed upon by a
group of climate engineering experts at
an international conference in 2010 (Asi-
lomar Scientific Organizing Committee,
2010).2 Similar calls for public participa-
tion in climate engineering research and
governance have appeared in numerous
science and policy reports on the topic,
indicating a desire for transparency
and public oversight (Bipartisan Policy
Center, 2011; House of Commons, 2010;
Olson, 2011; Royal Society, 2009).
However, such ideas are easier in
theory than in practice. Meaningful
public engagement can require more of
scientists and regulatory agencies than
many realize. Reports advocating public
participation rarely describe how it
should be conducted, who should con-
duct it, when, and for what purpose.3
These questions are not easy to
answer. But over the past several dec-
ades, researchers and practitioners have
developed many different methodologies
to enable citizens to productively engage
with experts and policy makers about
emerging scientific and technological
issues such as climate engineering. In
fact, the United Kingdom has already
convened several public participation
exercises on climate engineering. Now
is the time for federal agencies in the
United States to start similar processes.
Public participation and climate
engineering
There are two types of climate engineer-
ing proposals: those that aim to reduce
the amount of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere and those that aim to reflect
more incoming solar radiation back into
space. The former are classified as carbon
dioxide removal (CDR) techniques; in
addition to fertilizing oceans, they
include methods such as the large-scale
planting of genetically modified, fast-
growing trees, and the use of artificial
trees to capture and store carbon dioxide.
While such techniques actually address
the cause of climate change by reducing
greenhouse gas concentrations, current
removal proposals appear expensive and
will likely take a long time to have a
noticeable effect on the global climate.
The other broad category of climate
engineering proposals falls under the
heading of solar radiation management
(SRM). In addition to mimicking vol-
canic eruptions, it includes methods to
brighten the clouds over the ocean by
injecting small saltwater droplets, or
putting mirrors into space between the
Earth and the sun. There are also some
surface-based SRM techniques, such as
painting roofs white on a large scale or
putting large mirrors in deserts.
In contrast to CDR techniques, certain
SRM approaches could be technologic-
ally feasible in the near term and cool
the planet quickly. Solar radiation man-
agement could also be relatively
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inexpensive compared with efforts to
lessen the amount of carbon regularly
pumped into the atmosphere by human-
kindÑsuch as changing from the burning
of coal for the production of electricity to
generating energy from photovoltaics,
and using hybrid or electric vehicles in
place of gasoline-powered automobiles
(Keith, 2013). Solar radiation manage-
ment also has the potential to be cheaper
than efforts to adapt to a permanently
changed environmentÑsuch as the build-
ing of seawalls to counter the rising
waters of a warmer planet. For these
reasons, certain of these proposalsÑ
specifically those that mimic volcanic
eruptions and brighten marine cloudsÑ
have seen an upsurge of attention from
scientists and policy makers, with rising
calls for increased research (Bipartisan
Policy Center, 2011; Keith et al., 2010).
Agencies such as the US National
Science Foundation, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Energy
Department have already funded research
into various aspects of climate engineer-
ing. So far, however, research funding has
been limited, and oversight of climate
engineering has been addressed in what
the Congressional Research Service
describes as Òa largely piecemeal fashionÓ
(Bracmort and Lattanzio, 2013: 38).
In other words, important decisions
about research funding and regulation
have yet to be made. The nascent
nature of climate engineering research
means that now is the time to think crit-
ically about whether and how to proceed
with public participation.
But are Americans ready to
discuss climate engineering?
While media coverage and public aware-
ness of climate engineering are on the
rise, surveys show that the large majority
of Americans have not heard of climate
engineering; even fewer are familiar
enough with the term to correctly define
it (Corner et al., 2012; Mercer et al., 2011).
In the past, low levels of public aware-
ness were cause for educational cam-
paigns, which were seen as a necessary
step before meaningful public participa-
tion. The public certainly does need
accurate,digestible scientific information
about climate engineering; however, cer-
tain types of public participation can
contribute effectively to climate engin-
eering science and policy before every-
one is fully educated and up-to-date on
the topic. There are a number of public
participation processes, broadly referred
to as Òupstream public engagement,Ó in
which participants learn about the topic
of interest as part of the process itself.
Social science research has demonstrated
that these types of processes can be most
effective when they are started in the very
early stages of research and development,
before the technologies and the dis-
courses surrounding them are set in
stone (Rogers-Hayden and Pidgeon,
2007; Wilsdon and Willis, 2004).
The goal of such processes is to en-
courage the public to play an active role
in deliberations throughout the entire res-
earch and development phase of a new
technology; therefore, it is important to
include the people who may be most
affected by that technology in the discus-
sion (Corner and Pidgeon, 2010). If deci-
sion making is to be more inclusive and
transparent, then this means creating
meaningful forums for members of the
public to ask questions, such as:
Why this technology? Why not another? Who
needs it? Who is controlling it? Who benefits
from it? Can they be trusted? What will it mean
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for me and my family? Will it improve the
environment? What will it mean for people in
the developing world? (Wilsdon and Willis,
2004: 28)
Early deliberations on these sorts of
questions can help ensure that experts
and decision makers consider the broad-
est ways of thinking about a given prob-
lem, and that regulatory policies include
ample reflection on risks and public
needs. For instance, in 2008 a nationwide
upstream engagement process revealed
significant public concerns about access
to, and control of, nanotechnology.
These concerns were then made avail-
able to members of Congress working
on legislation related to funding future
nanotechnology research (Guston, 2014;
Philbrick and Barandiaran, 2009).4
Researchers and practitioners have
developed a variety of methodologies in
recent years to enable members of the
public to productively discuss complex
scientific issues like climate engineer-
ing with experts and decision makers.
Examples include citizensÕ juries,
consensus conferences, and citizensÕ
technology forumsÑsuch as those
involving nanotechnology. While the
specifics of each method vary, they do
share some common characteristics,
the most important being discussion
and the exchange of information bet-
ween all concerned parties. Rather
than information being conveyed in
a one-way fashion from the experts to
the public as in the typical public aware-
ness campaign, or from the public to regu-
lators as in public comment processes,
upstream engagement processes allow
for a true dialogue, with mutual learning
that can transform the ideas and opin-
ions of everyone involved (Rowe and
Frewer, 2005).
Different methods for conducting
public engagement exercises share
important procedural elements. Typi-
cally, participants are recruited from
the broader public in order to achieve a
generally representative sample of some
type, whether in terms of demographics
or viewpoints on relevant topic areas.5
Experts then introduce participants to
the specific issue of interest, followed
by discussion and deliberation (typically
guided by a moderator), which ideally
includes the experts and relevant deci-
sion makers. Engagement processes
over the past decade have indicated
that members of the public are able to
not only grasp complex scientific and
technological issues quickly, but also
effectively engage experts and decision
makers in discussions about those issues
(Corner et al., 2012; Philbrick and Baran-
diaran, 2009; Walmsley, 2009).
In other words, even though public
awareness is currently low, members of
the public can begin contributing to
research and policy making on climate
engineering sooner rather than later via
upstream engagement processes.
Why upstream public
engagement in the United States?
Upstream public engagement makes
sense as a starting place for discussing
the idea of climate engineering in the
United States for several reasons. First
and foremost, climate engineering is
very much a technology in the early,
upstream phases of research, develop-
ment, and regulation. Big questionsÑ
about the trajectory of scientific res-
earch, the technologies that may be
developed and the risks they may entail,
and government regulationÑare still full
of uncertainty and therefore up for
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discussion. Public participation at this
early stage could be particularly fruitful
because it could inform research and
policy regarding concerns about risks
and uncertainties that may not be visible
from the purely scientific perspective.
Second, from a research standpoint,
emerging high-risk technologies such as
climate engineering often struggle to
obtain private-sector financing and sup-
port during the initial phases of investi-
gation. As the Congressional Research
Service (Bracmort and Lattanzio, 2013:
24) states: ÒEmerging technologies
(such as climate engineering) may
require some measure of initial public
subsidy to help spur developmentÓÑ
meaning that US research into climate
engineering will likely be dependent
upon funding from federal agencies.
Many Americans are unaware that their
tax dollars are funding such work. This is
not unusual with emerging science and
technology, but unlike other federally
funded research, even field tests of cer-
tain solar radiation management technol-
ogies could have an impact upon the
entire American population, although
theyÕd have to be large-scale field tests.
Any one individual or segment of the
population will be limited in their ability
to either consent to or opt out of such field
tests. Climate engineering technologies
are not like a product that one can
simply choose not to buy. While no
large-scale field tests have been proposed
to date, upstream engagement processes
would provide an opportunity for mem-
bers of the public to provide input into
decisions about the nature of field testing
before specific proposals are on the table.
Third, climate engineering cannot be
separated from other technological and
policy responses to climate change. For
example, the prospect of climate
engineering could create something
akin to a Òmoral hazardÓ that erodes com-
mitment to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. Individual nations could
adopt the attitude that they do not need
to take active, costly steps to reduce their
production of greenhouse gases because
a future technology will handle the prob-
lem. Thus, the public interest in climate
engineering is not just about how, and to
what extent, these technologies might
benefit or harm them. The public must
wrestle with the possibility that fewer
resources may be devoted to reducing
greenhouse gas emissions if climate
engineering looks promising. This is par-
ticularly important for solar radiation
management because, once deployed,
any abrupt cessation in such manage-
ment would leave many people and eco-
systems even more vulnerable to
elevated greenhouse gas concentrations
due to rapid temperature rise (McCusker
et al., 2014; Robock et al., 2008).
Climate engineering policy, in other
words, is tied into a wide range of other
social and environmental issues in which
the public has a serious stake. Upstream
engagement could provide members of
the public an opportunity to think
about the full complexity of responses
to climate change, and about the relative
benefits and risks of climate engineering
compared with climate mitigation or
adaption.
Fourth, the partisan divide on climate
change in the United States places cli-
mate engineering discussions in a
unique context. Numerous studies have
demonstrated that in contrast to, say,
Europe, views in the United States
about climate change are connected to
political ideology and political party
affiliation (McCright and Dunlap, 2011;
Pew Research Center, 2012), and that
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political differences are framed as dis-
agreements over the science of climate
change. There are some indications that
climate engineering could shift the par-
tisan discussion on climate change
(Kahan et al., forthcoming; Lane, 2013).
In that case, upstream public engage-
ment might provide useful and meaning-
ful forums for altering some of the
entrenched politics of the climate
change problem, and provide an oppor-
tunity to destabilize the dogmas of cur-
rent climate politics in helpful ways.
What upstream public
engagement might look like
At this time, there is no clear regulatory
body at the federal level to coordinate
upstream public engagement and
incorporate the results into formal deci-
sion processes. As researchers David
Winickoff at the University of California,
Berkeley, and Mark Brown at California
State University, Sacramento (2013: 81),
suggest, a logical first step could be the
establishment of a government advisory
committee to Òrecommend principles,
policies, and practices that help make
research more safe, ethical, and publicly
legitimate.Ó This advisory committee
could then promote public engagement
exercises as part of federally funded
research projects on climate engineer-
ing, and help ensure that the results are
relayed to the relevant government
agencies early enough to inform policy.
Unfortunately, this type of advisory
committee does not yet exist. But for
the time being, preliminary public
engagement exercises could be encour-
aged by federal research funding agen-
cies. For example, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Energy Depart-
ment, the Department of Agriculture,
and the National Science Foundation all
fund climate engineering research; these
agencies could require that future
research projects include public engage-
ment exercises, which could inform both
the specific research being funded and
broader discussions about research and
policy. Several such efforts have already
taken place in the United Kingdom; for
example, in 2010 the United KingdomÕs
Natural Environment Research Council
commissioned a series of public dia-
logues to inform future decision making
based on public views regarding the eth-
ical and social implications of climate
engineering (Ipsos MORI, 2010). Results
indicated that some approaches to cli-
mate engineering garnered more support
than others, while also revealing con-
cerns about the controllability, revers-
ibility, effectiveness, and oversight of
various technologies.
Perhaps even more pertinent, a subse-
quent project funded by the same organ-
ization, which did not include public
engagement, met with stiff opposition
from concerned citizens and environ-
mental groups. Public opposition to the
SPICE (Stratospheric Particle Injection
for Climate Engineering) project was
part of the reason why a small outdoor
experiment was canceled, even though it
was the centerpiece of the original
research proposal. In later public discus-
sions, scientists learned that the experi-
ment itself was of less concern than what
it representedÑa symbolic step toward
the development of technologies that
could someday control the climate
(Stilgoe et al., 2013). These and other
public engagement efforts in the United
Kingdom (Corner et al., 2012; Mac-
naghten and Szerszynski, 2013) provide
insights into how to carry out such pro-
cesses, as well as indicating what can
Carr et al. 43
happen when researchers fail to include
the public.
Similarly, the National CitizensÕ Tech-
nology Forum on nanotechnology and
human enhancement (defined as the
use of nanotechnologies to improve
human abilities, such as enhancing intel-
ligence or restoring damaged brain cells)
provides a well-documented example of
federally funded research that included
upstream public engagement on emer-
ging science and technology issues in
the United States (Guston, 2014; Phil-
brick and Barandiaran, 2009). The
researchers involved stated that their
exercise served as a proof-of-concept
for nationwide upstream public partici-
pation in the governance of emerging
technologiesÑeven if no specific legisla-
tion came about as a result (Philbrick and
Barandiaran, 2009: 335).
Professional societies or other nongo-
vernmental organizations could also ini-
tiate efforts in public engagement. For
example, the United KingdomÕs Royal
Society organized a small public engage-
ment process as part of their 2009 cli-
mate engineering report (Corner et al.,
2012). The society also coordinated
efforts with the Academy of Sciences
for the Developing World, and the Envir-
onmental Defense Fund, to start up the
Solar Radiation Management Govern-
ance Initiative. This collaboration
precipitated meetings with scientists,
journalists, decision makers, and mem-
bers of the public in the United Kingdom,
Africa, and Asia, focused on SRM
research and regulation (SRMGI, 2011).
This partnership and the resulting meet-
ings demonstrate the possibility for simi-
lar collaborations in the United States.
Despite numerous potential benefits,
however, upstream public engagement
is not a panacea. The conveners of
public engagement exercises must think
very carefully about who is being
included in the process, and perhaps
more important, who is not included
(Braun and Schultz, 2010). There is the
danger of defining Òthe publicÓ in such
a way that it excludes particular perspec-
tives or demographics, thus legitimizing
only one subset of public views on cli-
mate engineering. Similarly, engagement
processes should complement but not
replace other forms of public involvement
in federal decision making, such as the
public involvement process mandated
by the National Environmental Protection
Act. These typically ÒdownstreamÓ par-
ticipation processes allow far more
people to express their opinions on
actions that affect the environment than
upstream engagement processes, which
include only a small subset of the public.
Making it count
Upstream engagement does not neces-
sarily guarantee better climate engineer-
ing science, technology, or regulation.
The quality of the outcome depends on
the effectiveness of the process itself. For
instance, how the information about cli-
mate engineering is presented and who
presents it can strongly affect how par-
ticipants respond, which in turn deter-
mines what gets conveyed afterward to
scientists and decision makers about
public views on the issue (Corner et al.,
2012; Macnaghten and Szerszynski, 2013).
More important, there is no legal require-
ment for federal agencies to engage the
public prior to developing regulations
and specific project proposals.6
Even if upstream engagement pro-
cesses are carried out, public input may
not have an effect upon federal policy.
Even the best public engagement
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process cannot meaningfully contribute
to research and governance if the results
are ignored (Guston, 2014; Stilgoe et al.,
2014). This can lead to frustration on the
part of participants and the broader
public, who may feel that their contribu-
tion was not taken seriously, and that the
resulting policy is not fair or transparent.
This further erodes public trust in
researchers and government.
In a similar vein, upstream public
engagement processes should not be
expected to identify unified, consensus
views or come up with specific directives
for scientists and policy makers. The value
of upstream engagement does not hinge
on generating consensus, or quelling con-
troversy and debate. Rather, its strength
lies in highlighting public concernsÑeven
if they are highly contestedÑand explor-
ing how they can inform the scientific
and policy making process.
With these challenges in mind,
upstream public engagement should not
be entered into lightly; meaningful public
engagement is both costly and politically
risky (Stilgoe et al., 2014). To be effective,
such processes should be convened in
partnership with organizations that have
extensive experience in this area. Public
engagement exercises should not be
tacked on as afterthoughts to proposals
for federal funding, but thoughtfully inte-
grated as valued pieces of the interdiscip-
linary research that is critical to future
exploration of climate engineering.
The research community has exp-
ressed a desire for greater public partici-
pation in climate engineering research
and governance. However, publishing
these sentiments in policy reports and
academic journals is not enough to guar-
antee that future research and decision
making is actually more transparent
and responsive to public concerns. If
scientists truly want to avoid the secrecy
of past attempts at climate and weather
modification that led to the ENMOD
Convention, then now is the time to actu-
ally begin implementing participation
processes. The public is ready to discuss
climate engineering. Perhaps the ques-
tion then is, are scientists and decision
makers ready to reciprocate?
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Notes
1. It is unclear how the ENMOD Convention
might affect climate engineering proposals
because the treaty does not prohibit research
on or use of environmental modification for
peaceful purposes. In fact, it is currently far
from clear how climate engineering research
will be regulated, if at all, within the United
States or internationally (Bracmort and Lat-
tanzio, 2013; Hester, 2013).
2. The five principles for responsible research
advanced by the experts at the Asilomar con-
ference are based in large part on the Oxford
Principles of geoengineering research, per-
haps the most well-respected set of norms
proposed to date for the governance of cli-
mate engineering research (Rayner et al.,
2009, 2013).
3. With a few notable exceptions; see, for exam-
ple, Corner and Pidgeon (2010).
4. This engagement exercise was entitled the
National CitizensÕ Technology Forum on
Nanotechnology and Human Enhancement,
and consisted of a month-long deliberative
process involving over 70 citizens at six dif-
ferent sites across the country. These delib-
erations resulted in a report by participants
recommending that nanotechnologies for
human enhancement be developed for the
collective good, with strong public oversight
and equitable access to the benefits regard-
less of socioeconomic status (Bal, 2013).
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The results of this public engagement pro-
cess were provided to the Congressional
Nanotechnology Caucus in conjunction
with discussions about the reauthorization
of the National Nanotechnology Initiative.
5. Some public engagement methods strive for
statistically representative samples of the
larger population, while others are primarily
concerned with capturing the wide range of
viewpoints on an issue of interest. For exam-
ple, researchers in the United Kingdom con-
vened seven focus groups composed of
participants whose backgrounds made them
likely to think about climate engineering in
different ways. One group was composed of
outdoor enthusiasts, another of mothers of
young children, and a third of professionals
in the public sector (Macnaghten and Szers-
zynski, 2013). Accordingly, each individual
pool of recruits garnered from the general
public need not be what a statistician would
call a statistically representative sample of
the entire larger population.
6. The Administrative Procedure Act (1946)
requires that the agencies seek public
comment during the development of specific
federal regulations. The National Environ-
mental Policy Act (1969) requires public
involvement in any federal or federally
funded project that might impact the envir-
onment. However, in both cases, the public
involvement requirement is ÒtriggeredÓ by
the proposal of a specific regulation or pro-
ject. Thus, because they are not legally
required to do so, federal agencies do not
typically engage the public on more general-
ized key issues of public concern prior to
specific policy and project proposals.
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“It’s very dangerous to try and play God. 
This is God’s stuff we’re messing with. 
Historically speaking, any time we try to 
play God, we lose every time. That’s what 
I think about it.” This is how Peyton1—an 
Alaska Native, subsistence hunter, and 
wildlife specialist in Barrow, Alaska—
described his impressions of geoengineer-
ing after hearing about it for the first time. 
The ‘playing God’ metaphor Peyton uti-
lizes is not novel; it appears time and 
again in discussions about emergent scien-
tific and technological issues.2 In recent 
years, the phrase has been employed by 
journalists, philosophers, bloggers, and 
members of the public alike in reference to 
geoengineering.3 Ethicist Clive Hamilton 
suggests ‘playing God’ resonates with 
both theists and atheists because it cap-
tures a sense of, “humans crossing a 
boundary to a domain of control or causa-
tion that is beyond their rightful place.”4 
In other words, the metaphor indicates 
that the prospect of intentionally modify-
ing the global climate evokes deeply held 
beliefs about the proper place and role of 
humans in the order of the cosmos. For 
many people these deeply held beliefs are 
religious in nature. Consequently, reli-
gious beliefs could play a critical role in 
future discussions about geoengineering at 
local, national, and international levels. 
This article draws upon past social science 
research and recent interviews with reli-
gious individuals to argue that religion 
will play a role in public support for, or 
                                                          
1 Pseudonym 
2 Peters 2007; Silver 2007 
3 Carr et al. 2012; Farrell 2012; Wagner and Weitzman 
2012 
4 Hamilton 2013, 177-178  
opposition to, geoengineering research in 
many countries.  
 
In the United States, a large majority of 
the population claims a religious tradition, 
and religious groups exert significant so-
cial and political influence.5 Social science 
research indicates that religion also affects 
perceptions of emergent science and tech-
nology. Studies have found that religion 
negatively impacts belief in climate 
change and support for scientific research 
on issues like biotechnology and nano-
technology.6 Brossard et al. for example, 
found that in the US, religion played a 
more important role in shaping percep-
tions of nanotechnology than factual 
knowledge about the topic, with more re-
ligious individuals significantly less likely 
to support funding for research.7 In a simi-
lar study that compared the US with Eu-
rope, Scheufele et al. found that more reli-
gious countries like Italy and Ireland were 
similar to the US, exhibiting lower levels 
of public support for nanotechnology re-
search than less religious countries such as 
Denmark and Germany. 8  These studies 
indicate that religion provides a key per-
ceptual filter, or framework through 
which people interpret science communi-
cation, and form opinions about emergent 
scientific and technological issues.  
 
Religious beliefs will likely play a similar 
role with regards to geoengineering. As 
Kahan et al. (forthcoming) argue, “cultur-
                                                          
5 Pew Research Center 2012; Silk 2008 
6 Gaskell et al. 2005; Jelen and Lockett 2014; Maibach et 
al. 2009 
7 Brossard et al. 2009 
8 Scheufele et al. 2008 
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al values are cognitively prior to facts in 
public risk conflicts … groups of individu-
als will credit and dismiss evidence of risk 
in patterns that reflect and reinforce their 
distinctive understandings of how society 
should be organized.” In other words, 
people interpret information about science 
and technology within a particular cultur-
al context and in light of the values that 
they hold individually and share with oth-
ers. As a result, people accept or dismiss 
scientific evidence not on content, but 
whether or not it is framed in a way that 
aligns with or threatens their values and 
beliefs. Interestingly, Kahan et al. found 
that the prospect of geoengineering better 
aligned with the values of certain cultural 
groups who view “human technological 
ingenuity as the principle means by which 
our species has succeeded in overcoming 
environmental constraints on its flourish-
ing”. 9  Geoengineering could therefore 
make cultural groups who extol techno-
logical ingenuity more open to discussing 
climate change solutions. The exact oppo-
site may be the case for religious groups.  
  
Drawing on theological reflection as op-
posed to social science research, Forrest 
Clingerman suggests that religious re-
sponses to geoengineering are likely to 
emerge along a continuum that emphasiz-
es human fallibility at one end and human 
capability on the other. 10  The fallibility 
perspective or narrative stresses the 
finitude of human knowledge and past ex-
amples of human hubris in trying to inter-
fere with divinely ordered processes. As 
                                                          
9 Kahan et al. forthcoming, 19 
10 Clingerman 2012; 2014 
such, this perspective is likely to caution 
against geoengineering and suggest that 
attempts to modify the climate are likely 
to result in calamity. The capability per-
spective, on the other hand, views human 
nature and ability more optimistically. It 
suggests that despite past failures, humans 
should still employ their ingenuity and 
new technologies to address contemporary 
problems.  
 
This tension between human capability 
and fallibility arose time and again in in-
terviews I conducted with over 100 indi-
viduals (like Peyton quoted above) in the 
Solomon Islands, Kenya, and Alaska 
(United States) about their views on ge-
oengineering.11 The majority of interview-
ees openly wrestled with whether or not 
they thought humans should try to modify 
the global climate. Roughly a quarter of 
the individuals I spoke with invoked reli-
gious beliefs or spirituality explicitly (and 
unprompted) as they grappled with this 
                                                          
11 Unfortunately there is not room here for a thorough 
discussion of the methods or results of this research. 
However, in brief, these three study sites were chosen to 
explore whether or not individuals in regions experienc-
ing different impacts from climate change were currently 
aware of geoengineering and what they thought about it 
as a possible response to climate change. All interviews 
were conducted in-person between March, 2013 and 
January, 2014. All interviewees were actively working 
on climate change or related issues (such as wildlife con-
servation or ecotourism) at the time of the interview. 
Interviewees were shown a seven minute animated vid-
eo that introduced the topic of geoengineering, ex-
plained several proposals, indicated some potential 
harms and benefits, and touched on some of the social 
and political questions that geoengineering raises. The 
video was a modified, preliminary version of a film pro-
duced by the Climate Media Factory for the Institute for 
Advanced Sustainability Studies and used for research 
purposes with permission. The final version of the film 
entitled “Engineering the Climate” can be viewed here: 
http://www.iass-potsdam.de/research-
clusters/sustainable-interactions-atmosphere-
siwa/news/climate-engineering-trump-card. 
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question. For example, Rachael12, a Na-
tive Alaskan who directed an organization 
dedicated to including indigenous people 
and knowledge in science, described her 
initial response to geoengineering in the 
following way:  
 
The indigenous side of me has an automatic re-
action to messing with the creator’s plans. I 
would venture to say that that’s probably going 
to be the reaction from most indigenous com-
munities. … Our first concern is always the 
care of Mother Earth. That’s the way we’re 
taught from the day we can breathe, that we are 
the original stewards of the universe and our 
homelands. Our environment around us is 
meant for us to protect. … I’m pretty certain if I 
had my elders sitting here, that they’d probably 
feel pretty much the same way.  
 
Rachel’s wariness of geoengineering is not 
necessarily surprising, or unique to reli-
gious persons. As David Keith et al. have 
noted, “It is a healthy sign that a common 
first response to geoengineering is revul-
sion. It suggests that we have learned 
something from past instances of over-
eager technological optimism and subse-
quent failures”.13 A key difference for reli-
gious individuals is that this initial revul-
sion stems from deeply held beliefs about 
the proper order of the world, not just 
from anxieties based on past technological 
failures. In other words, in addition to 
concerns about human fallibility, religion 
may prompt a sense that humans simply 
should not intentionally interfere with the 
‘domain of the Gods’.14  
 
This concern was, in fact, a common 
theme across all interviews where individ-
                                                          
12 Pseudonym 
13 Keith et al. 2010, 427 
14 Donner 2007 
uals discussed religion, regardless of loca-
tion or religious tradition.15 More specifi-
cally, all of the individuals who referred to 
religious beliefs said their faith was a key 
reason they were dubious of geoengineer-
ing. This should not be taken as an indica-
tion that all religious traditions or reli-
gious individuals will react the same way. 
There will not be any single religious re-
sponse to geoengineering. As Clingerman 
points out, “Different religious traditions 
have different authorities, rituals, scrip-
tures, historical contexts, and theological 
commitments. These result in a dialog be-
tween different approaches to technology, 
politics, and environmental concerns …”16 
My point therefore is not to argue that re-
ligious individuals will interpret geoengi-
neering in any particular way. Rather, the 
interviews I conducted suggest that the 
prospect of geoengineering evokes reli-
gious beliefs for religious individuals. Ge-
oengineering confronts our perceptions of 
the proper place of humans in the world. 
For many, these perceptions are explicitly 
informed by religious beliefs about where 
humans stand in relation to nature, crea-
tion, and the divinities. While religion was 
not the focus of the interviews, and this 
sample is certainly not representative of 
the broader population in these three 
countries, these findings align with past 
research, and indicate that religion is a 
powerful frame that many people will 
draw upon to make sense of geoengineer-
ing. 
                                                          
15 All interviewees who brought up religion in the Solo-
mon Islands and Kenya discussed Christian beliefs. 
Some interviewees in Alaska discussed Native spirituali-
ty as Rachael did, while others discussed Christian be-
liefs like Peyton. 
16 Clingerman 2012, 208 
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So why has religion been largely absent 
from previous assessments of public per-
ceptions of geoengineering? The most like-
ly reason is that most studies to date have 
taken place in the United Kingdom17, a 
“less religious country”.18 While 83% of 
Americans claim that religion is either 
very important (60%) or fairly important 
(23%) in their lives, only 47% of Britons 
say the same thing (with only 17% indicat-
ing that religion is very important). 19 
However, there is ample evidence across 
existing research that geoengineering does 
raise questions about the concept of na-
ture and how humans relate to it.20 In one 
UK based public engagement exercise in 
particular, Corner et al. found ‘messing 
with nature’ to be a dominant narrative.21 
They concluded that, “The wide variety of 
ways in which people … conceptualised 
and debated the relationship between ge-
oengineering and the natural world sug-
gests that this will be a key factor deter-
mining public views on the topic as 
awareness of it grows”.22  They also noted 
that it would be interesting to see whether 
or not religious individuals employed sim-
ilar narratives.  
 
Considering that nearly 85% of the 
world’s population claims membership in 
                                                          
17 Corner et al. 2012 
18 Scheufele et al. 2008; Pew Research Center 2012 
19 See Ray 2003. Unfortunately similar data does not 
exist for Kenya or the Solomon Islands. However over 
97% of Solomon Islanders are Christian, while 85% of 
Kenyan’s identify as Christian, and another 10% as 
Muslim. It is reasonable to conclude that religion is im-
portant to the large majority of individuals in both coun-
tries. 
20 Carr et al. 2012; Corner et al. 2012; Corner et al. 2013  
21 Corner et al. 2013 
22 Corner et al. 2013, 946 
a religious group23, religion will undoubt-
edly have much to say about geoengineer-
ing.24 Future research needs to explore the 
connections between religious beliefs and 
geoengineering more explicitly. Religion 
will not only affect individuals’ percep-
tions, but also the tenor of public discus-
sion, media frames, and even policy pro-
posals in countries with large religious 
populations. As Corner et al. argue with 
regards to public perceptions of geoengi-
neering more broadly, researchers and 
policy-makers need to resist the tempta-
tion to dismiss religiously informed per-
spectives as irrational or anti-science. 25 
While certain religious traditions in coun-
tries like the US have a long history of 
clashes with science, concerns about ge-
oengineering based on religious beliefs are 
fundamentally concerns about how hu-
mans should understand and relate to the 
world around them. As a result, effective-
ly engaging religiously informed perspec-
tives means discussing deep-seated val-
ues—including the values that scientists 
and policy makers bring to the table. Ge-
oengineering research could face stiff op-
position if religious values are not taken 
into consideration. Furthermore, certain 
geoengineering approaches may be 
deemed wholly unacceptable from certain 
religious perspectives regardless. Advo-
cates for geoengineering research should 
therefore bear in mind that for many peo-
ple around the world, this is God’s stuff 
we’re messing with. 
                                                          
23 Pew Research Group 2012 
24 Clingerman 2012 
25 Corner et al. 2013 
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